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SAMENVATTING 
 
 
Deze doctoraatsthesis heeft tot doel meer inzicht te verwerven in de factoren die 
de performantie van corporate spin-offs (CSO) beïnvloeden. Een corporate spin-off of 
CSO is een nieuwe onderneming die gebaseerd is op activiteiten die oorspronkelijk 
ontwikkeld werden in een groter moederbedrijf. Een CSO is geconcentreerd rond een 
nieuwe bedrijfsactiviteit en heeft tot doel om nieuwe producten en services te 
ontwikkelen en te commercialiseren. In eerste instantie hebben we een literatuurstudie 
uitgevoerd, waaruit bleek dat de literatuur rond CSO niet consequent en coherent is. 
Verschillende onderzoekers hebben studies verricht rond corporate spin-offs, maar hierbij 
is zelden voortgebouwd op het werk van andere onderzoekers. In de literatuur konden we 
twee stromen identificeren, die we het ‘legal’ en het ‘entrant’ perspectief genoemd 
hebben. De studies in het ‘legal’ perspectief hebben zich gefocust op het linken van de 
antecedenten om een CSO op te richten met de performantie van CSO. De studies in het 
‘entrant’ perspectief hebben zich eerder gefocust op de overdracht van kennis vanuit het 
moederbedrijf naar de CSO en de impact die deze kennisoverdracht heeft op de 
performantie van CSO. Deze studies hebben duidelijk geschept in verschillende factoren 
die de performantie van CSO kunnen beïnvloeden. We hebben deze inzichten 
geïntegreerd en een model ontwikkeld die de verschillende factoren en antecedenten die 
de performantie van CSO beïnvloeden, samenvatten.  
We zijn vervolgens dieper ingegaan op de populatie van CSO. We hebben twee 
groepen CSO geïdentificeerd die we de ‘restructuring-driven’ en de ‘entrepreneurial’ 
spin-offs genoemd hebben. Restructuring-driven spin-offs worden geïnitieerd door het 
moederbedrijf, terwijl entrepreneurial spin-offs geïnitieerd worden door werknemers van 
een bedrijf die een opportuniteit willen exploiteren. In het geval we de performantie van 
beide groepen CSO vergelijken, valt op dat de entrepreneurial spin-offs een betere 
performantie vertonen dan restructuring-driven spin-offs. Verklaringen kunnen gevonden 
worden in de motivatie van oprichters van entrepreneurial spin-offs om hun eigen bedrijf 
op te starten en in het feit dat deze spin-offs zeer vaak vanuit een marktopportuniteit 
opgestart worden. Daarnaast hebben we ook gekeken naar de overdracht van kennis 
vanuit het moederbedrijf naar de twee groepen van spin-offs. Een overdracht van kennis 
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kan gebeuren op drie niveaus: op gebied van technologie, van productie of marketing. 
Zoals verwacht wordt vooral in het geval van restructuring-driven spin-offs veel kennis 
getransfereerd vanuit het moederbedrijf naar de spin-off. Hierbij wordt voornamelijk 
technologische en productie kennis getransfereerd dankzij de actieve steun van het 
moederbedrijf. Een belangrijke vraag die hieruit voorvloeit is of deze kennisoverdracht 
bijdraagt tot de performantie van CSO. We hebben dit onderzocht door de relatie tussen 
de technologische middelen, de technologische strategie en de performantie verder te 
bestuderen voor CSO. 
Een CSO is een bedrijf dat wordt opgezet om een nieuwe technologie verder te 
ontwikkelen en naar de markt te brengen. Technologie speelt dus een belangrijke rol in 
deze bedrijven en heeft bijgevolg ook een belangrijke impact op de performantie van 
CSO. Een CSO moet vervolgens een strategie uitwerken die hen toelaat deze technologie 
te commercialiseren. De ontwikkelde strategie hangt nauw samen met de middelen die de 
CSO ter beschikking heeft. Enkel in geval er een samenhang bestaat tussen de 
technologische strategie en de technologische middelen, zal er een competitief voordeel 
kunnen verwezenlijkt worden. Deze studie gebruikt de ‘resource-based view of the firm’ 
om inzicht te creëren in de relatie tussen de technologische middelen, de technologische 
strategie en de performantie van CSO. Deze theorie stelt dat het succes van een 
onderneming bepaald wordt door de middelen waarover de onderneming beschikt. De 
oorsprong van de spin-off zal de middelen en de heterogeniteit van deze middelen 
beïnvloeden. Zo kan een gevestigd bedrijf besluiten om veel of weinig middelen mee te 
geven aan de CSO. CSO zijn echter niet de enige bedrijven die afkomstig zijn uit een 
groter moederinstituut. Ook universitaire spin-offs (USO) hebben een moederinstituut, 
namelijk een universiteit of een onderzoeksinstelling. Daarom hebben we ervoor gekozen 
om in het empirisch deel van deze doctoraatsthesis ook de groep van USO te 
beschouwen. USO worden vaak opgezet om een nieuwe technologie te gaan 
commercialiseren. USO vertonen echter ook een aantal verschillen met CSO, aangezien 
zij afspinnen uit zeer verschillende moederinstituten. Door het bestuderen van de relatie 
tussen technologische middelen, technologische strategie en performantie voor beide 
groepen van spin-offs, krijgen we een beter inzicht in deze relatie.  
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Doordat CSO en USO afkomstig zijn uit moederinstituten die elk hun eigen 
doelstellingen hebben, verwachten we verschillen te zien in de relatie tussen 
technologische middelen, technologische strategie en performantie voor beide groepen 
van spin-offs. De empirische data verzameld in dit doctoraat, bevestigt dit vermoeden. In 
eerste instantie verschillen CSO en USO in hun technologische middelen. USO hebben 
meer interne R&D middelen, ze gaan meer samenwerkingsverbanden aan op 
technologisch gebied, en ze transferen meer technologische kennis vanuit hun 
moederinstituut dan CSO. Deze bevinding suggereert dat het mogelijks eenvoudiger is 
voor USO om technologische middelen te transferen vanuit hun moederinstituut temeer 
daar het moederinstituut de oprichting van de USO vaak steunt. CSO transferen meer 
productie kennis vanuit hun moederbedrijf dan USO, maar het verschil is niet significant. 
De CSO in onze databank verkiezen om geen grote hoeveelheden productiekennis mee te 
nemen opdat dit hen niet zou hinderen om nieuwe, innovatieve oplossingen te bedenken.  
Een fundamentele veronderstelling van de strategic management theory is dat een 
verschil in middelen leidt tot een verschillende strategie. Onze resultaten tonen aan dat 
het verband tussen de technologische middelen en de technologische strategie inderdaad 
verschilt voor CSO en USO. We vonden echter geen significant verschil in de 
technologische strategie van CSO en USO zelf. Onze hypothesen stelden dat USO een 
breder technologieplatform en een hogere graad van nieuwheid van technologie zou 
hebben in vergelijking met CSO, maar de resultaten van deze hypothesen waren niet 
significant. Meer duidelijkheid werd gecreëerd door het bestuderen van de relatie tussen 
de technologische strategie en performantie. In het geval van CSO vonden we dat de 
breedte van het technologieplatform negatief geassocieerd is met performantie terwijl de 
nieuwheid van de technologie positief geassocieerd is met performantie. Voor de groep 
van USO vonden we tegenovergestelde resultaten. In deze groep vonden we dat de 
breedte van het technologieplatform positief geassocieerd is met performantie, terwijl de 
nieuwheid van de technologie negatief geassocieerd is met performantie 
Deze resultaten bevestigen het belang van de oorsprong van spin-off bedrijven. 
De technologieën die aan de basis liggen van USO, zijn vaak zeer nieuw en vergen 
aanzienlijk wat tijd vooraleer ze op de markt kunnen gebracht worden. De 
onderzoeksactiviteiten van grote bedrijven daarentegen, zijn vaak gericht om op korte 
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termijn een aantal concrete markteisen in te vullen.  In het geval USO kiezen voor een 
hoog niveau van nieuwheid van technologie, betekent dit vaak dat het een tijd duurt 
vooraleer deze technologie op de markt kan verkocht worden. Aan de andere kant, een 
hoog niveau van nieuwheid van technologie kan de CSO toelaten om zich te 
differentiëren van het moederbedrijf, wat vaak een positieve invloed heeft op hun 
performantie. Een breed technologieplatform laat toe om verscheidene applicaties te 
ontwikkelen voor verschillende markten. Zeker in het geval van USO kan dit een goede 
strategie zijn doordat de oprichters van USO vaak geen business ervaring hebben en 
bijgevolg soms hun technologieën iets te weinig aanpassen aan de marktbehoeften. In dit 
geval kan het zeer nuttig zijn om een aantal alternatieven te hebben. CSO daarentegen 
worden vaak opgezet om antwoord te bieden aan een concrete marktopportuniteit. 
Bovendien hebben de oprichters van CSO vaak business ervaring doordat zij reeds in een 
bedrijfsomgeving gewerkt hebben. Voor hen kan het eerder vertragend werken om voor 
een breed technologieplatform te kiezen, aangezien zij de marktnoden goed kennen en 
begrijpen.  
In deze doctoraatsthesis vinden we steun voor het contingency perspectief dat 
stelt dat de technologische strategie moet bepaald worden in overeenstemming met de 
technologische middelen om een goede performantie te bekomen. Uit onze resultaten 
blijkt dat in geval CSO en USO een gelijkaardige strategie volgen, dit 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk leidt tot een verschillende performantie. Dit komt doordat CSO en 
USO starten met verschillende technologische middelen en een verschillende 
kennisoverdracht. De resultaten van deze studie dragen dan ook bij tot de resource-based 
view of the firm literatuur, de organizational sociology literatuur en de institutional 
theory literatuur.  
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SUMMARY 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on creating a deeper insight into the factors that account 
for the performance of corporate spin-offs (CSO). A CSO is a separate legal entity that is 
concentrated around activities that were originally developed in a larger parent firm. The 
entity is concentrated around a new business, with the purpose to develop and market 
new products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill. We have first 
reviewed the literature on corporate spin-offs. We found that after two decades of 
studying corporate spin-offs, the literature remains fragmented with little efforts at 
accumulation, the empirical work infrequently build upon one another. We have 
identified two streams of literature on corporate spin-offs (CSO), which we have labelled 
the legal and entrant perspective on CSO. Most studies using the ‘legal’ definition of 
CSO have linked the antecedents to create a CSO to the performance of CSO and their 
parents. Most studies using the ‘entrant’ definition have focused on the knowledge 
relatedness between the CSO and the parent and its impact on performance. This large 
body of empirical works has provided some clarity in different aspects of the CSO 
phenomenon. We have integrated the existing literature on CSO and have introduced 
elements of the contingency model into one model of antecedents and characteristics of 
CSO by identifying the key dimensions that contribute to the performance of a CSO.  
Next, we have examined the group of CSO more closely. We have identified two 
groups of corporate spin-offs namely restructuring-driven spin-offs and entrepreneurial 
spin-offs. Restructuring-driven spin-offs are initiated by the parent firm, while 
entrepreneurial spin-offs are initiated by one or more employees in order to exploit an 
opportunity. When we compare the two groups of CSO, we see that entrepreneurial spin-
offs have a higher performance than restructuring-driven spin-offs. Explanations can be 
found in the entrepreneurial motivation of the founders of entrepreneurial spin-offs, and 
in the market pull from which these companies tend to be created. We have also 
examined the transfer of knowledge from the parent firm to the two groups of corporate 
spin-offs. A transfer of knowledge can take place on a production, technology and 
marketing level. As expected; restructuring-driven spin-offs transfer considerably more 
technological and production knowledge due to the active support of their parent 
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companies. An important question that comes to rise is whether this knowledge transfer 
contributes to the performance of CSO. We have examined this by looking more closely 
at the relationship between the technological resources of which the transfer of 
knowledge is a part, the technology strategy and performance of CSO and USO.  
A corporate spin-off (CSO) is set up with the purpose to develop and market new 
technologies. As a consequence, technology may have a crucial role in explaining the 
performance of CSO. CSO need to develop a technology strategy in order to be able to 
commercialize their new technology. These technology strategies need to be set in 
conjunction with the technological resources of the spin-off to achieve a competitive 
advantage. This study uses the resource-based view of the firm to examine the 
relationship between the technological resources, the technology strategy and the 
performance of CSO. One of the fundamental tenets of the resource-based view is that 
competitive advantage stems from resource heterogeneity between firms (Barney, 1991). 
The origin of the spin-off might influence this resource heterogeneity since the effect of 
originating from a parent organization may influence the spin-off beyond formation. 
Therefore, we have chosen to also consider the group of university spin-offs (USO) in the 
empirical part of this study. Corporate and university spin-offs are similar in the sense 
that they both originate from a larger parent institute e.g. an established firm, a university 
or a research institute. They are both young companies, set up to commercialize a new 
technology. However, due to the nature of their parent, USO and CSO may also show 
significant difference. Considering both groups of spin-offs allows us to create a better 
understanding of the relationship between technological resources, technology strategy 
and performance.  
 We expected to see differences in the relationship between technological 
resources, technology strategy and performance for CSO and USO, due to the fact that 
they originate from different types of parent organizations. Indeed, empirical evidence 
shows that the relationship is indeed different for CSO and USO. First, CSO and USO 
differ in their technological resources. USO have more internal R&D sources, they 
collaborate more in R&D consortia, and they transfer more technological knowledge 
from their parent than CSO. This finding suggests that it might be easier for USO to 
transfer technological resources from their parent universities, which often support the 
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creation of a USO. CSO transfer more production knowledge from their parent company 
than USO, but the difference is not significant. The CSO in our sample tend to prefer not 
to transfer a large amount of production knowledge in order not to be hindered in coming 
up with new, innovative solutions.  
 A fundamental premise of strategic management theory is that differing resources 
may lead to different strategies. We found that the association between the technological 
resources and technology strategy is indeed different for CSO and USO. However, we 
did not find any significant differences in the technology strategy of CSO and USO itself.  
We hypothesized that USO would have a broader scope of technology and a higher level 
of newness of technology than CSO, but these hypotheses were not supported. More 
clarity was created by considering the relationship between the technology strategy and 
performance. In the case of CSO, we found that the scope of technology is negatively 
associated with performance while the newness of technology is positively associated 
with performance. For the sample of USO, we found contrasting results. For USO, the 
scope of technology is positively associated with performance, while the newness of 
technology is negatively associated with performance.  
These results reinforce the importance of the organizational origin of spin-off 
companies. University inventions are typically rather embryonic and high risk, while the 
research activities of established firms are rather short term focused and related to market 
needs. A high level of newness may indicate for USO that it might take a long time 
before the technology is transformed into products that can be sold on the market. 
However, in case CSO, a high level of newness may allow them to differentiate 
themselves from their parent firm, having a positive impact on performance. A broad 
scope of technology allows changing market application in case the first pursued 
application turns out to be a dead end. Especially in case of USO, this strategy might be 
extremely valuable. Founders of USO frequently possess little business experience, 
which often results into developing products that are not adapted to the market needs. 
Having some alternatives might prove to be important. CSO on the other hand are often 
created in anticipation to a market need. Moreover, the founders have more business 
experience due to their previous working environment. A broad scope of technology may 
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deviate them from developing a few specific products that are well adapted to the market 
needs.  
This study contributes to the literature by supporting the contingency perspective 
that posits that the technology strategy should be set in conjunction with the 
technological resources in order to achieve a competitive advantage. From our results we 
can conclude that CSO and USO may follow similar technology strategies while 
obtaining different performance. The same choice of technology strategy might have a 
different impact on performance due to the fact that CSO and USO start with different 
technological resources and a different knowledge inheritance. The findings of this study 
contribute to the resource-based view of the firm literature, the organizational sociology 
literature and the institutional theory literature.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Spin-offs play an increasingly important role in the development and growth of 
emerging, high-technology industries such as the artificial intelligence, biotechnology, 
multimedia, personal computer, software, and telecommunication industries (Bell & 
McNamara, 1991). Spin-offs are widespread in industries such as semiconductors (Braun 
& MacDonald, 1978), disk drives (Christensen, 1993), and lasers (Klepper & Sleeper, 
2000). In these high-technology industries, corporate spin-offs are not only legion, but 
also major innovators. In the semiconductor industry, many spin-offs can be traced back 
to one firm, namely Fairchild Semiconductor, that they have been dubbed Fairchildren 
(Klepper, 2001). Some researchers characterize corporate spin-offs as parasites running 
away with the knowledge created in the parent firm. They assume that the corporate spin-
off can cause a lot of damage to their parent firm. Other researchers see corporate spin-
offs as a way to innovate. To them, the Fairchildren have jumped from a sinking ship and 
breathe new life into the semiconductor industry. According to this vision, corporate 
spin-offs are companies that bring new innovations to the market and by doing this, 
rejuvenate an entire industry. A persistent question surrounding corporate spin-offs is: 
“What accounts for the performance of corporate spin-offs?” 
Oakey (1995) has argued that two major sources of new high-technology firms 
are higher-education institutions and well-established industrial firms. In his study, 
Goldman (1984) found that 72 percent of the high technology companies in the Boston 
area in the early 1980s were based on technologies originally developed at MIT 
laboratories. As a result, the Route 128 economic infrastructure might not have existed in 
the absence of MIT and its spin-offs, even though most of these spin-off companies were 
not based on technologies formally licensed from MIT. Goldman’s study points to the 
unique characteristics of corporate and university spin-offs in the sense that they originate 
from a larger parent institute e.g. an established firm, a university or a research institute. 
The effect of originating from a parent may influence the spin-off beyond formation, as 
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the transfer of rules, routines, and procedures from parent to progeny organizations can 
both constrain and empower the spin-off (Brittain & Freeman, 1986; Romanelli, 1991). 
Researchers have suggested that entrepreneurial origin is an important source of 
resource differences, strategies, and performance (Knight, 1989; McGrath &MacMillan, 
2000; Shrader & Simon, 1997). Routines and resources are transferred from old to new 
organizations through personnel migration (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Almeida & Kogut, 
1999; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973). Organizational blueprints can transfer across firm 
boundaries, in a manner analogous to the reproduction and transmission of biological 
genes (Winter, 1991). These transfers may include unique insights and decision rules 
used to transform resources into action (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), cognitive dimensions 
of competency (Fiol, 1991), and specific knowledge and information (Boeker, 1997). 
Since “what an organization knows at its birth will determine what it searches for, what it 
experiences, and how it interprets what it encounters” (Huber, 1991), one implication is 
that a spin-off’s capability accumulation may be linked to its inherited knowledge and 
that the agent of transfer may have an impact on the efficacy of transfer.  
 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
A fundamental question in the field of strategic management is how firms achieve 
and sustain a competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997). Our study will build on the 
resource-based view of the firm to study the dynamics that underlie the performance of 
corporate spin-offs. The resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1974; 
Wernefelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) is an appropriate framework for this study since a key 
tenet of the resource-based view is that competitive advantage stems from resource 
heterogeneity between firms and from the sustainability of this heterogeneity over time 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Peteraf, 1993). Following this view, the starting point in creating 
a competitive advantage is to identify and classify a firm’s resources, especially its 
technology (Grant, 1991). Indeed, Lee, Lee & Pennings (2001) found that technological 
resources are a very critical success factor for new ventures.  
The resource view holds that the type, magnitude, and nature of a firm’s resources 
are important determinants of its profitability (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Following 
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Amit and Schoemaker (1993) we define resources as stocks of available factors that are 
owned or controlled by the firm. Heterogeneity in a spin-off’s resources has been related 
to the prior affiliation of the spin-off with its parent firm (Carroll et al., 1996; Helfat & 
Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000). Therefore, entrepreneurial origin may have 
different survival implications for spin-offs (Agarwal et al., 2004). Stinchcombe (1965) 
argued that founding conditions have a disproportionate effect on young firms. Klepper 
& Sleeper (2005) found that in case of spin-offs, their differences can be traced directly 
to their parents, who provide them with distinctive knowledge and resources. Spin-offs 
inherit general technical and market-related knowledge from their parents that shapes 
their nature at birth. The overall research question of this study is: 
“What accounts for the performance of corporate spin-offs?” 
 
The main research question is approached by first reviewing the literature on 
corporate spin-offs. We have designed a model of antecedents and characteristics of 
corporate spin-offs by identifying the key dimensions that contribute to the performance 
of CSO. The model allowed us to formulate a number of more specific research 
questions. Technology proves to be a vital aspect in explaining the performance of 
corporate spin-offs. Technology's profound effect on the industrial landscape is pervasive 
and is felt in nearly every sector of the economy (Zahra, 1996a). By making technology a 
focal point in their strategies; large companies as Apple, Merck, Microsoft, and DEC 
have created an advantage by offering unique products, lowering costs, or both (Zahra, 
Nash & Bickford, 1995). These companies have understood the role of technology as the 
mainspring of differentiation in today’s marketplace. Also new ventures like CSO, are 
found to play an increasingly important role in commercializing new technologies and 
often consider technological innovation their lifeblood (Acs & Audretsch, 1990).  
It is often a basic requirement for strategy to capitalize on technology, because 
technology can act as a fundamental weapon for competition (Itami & Numagami, 1992). 
Technology strategy is one of the most important aspects of any firm’s strategic posture 
(Zahra & Bogner, 1999). This dissertation wants to shed light on the way new ventures 
like corporate spin-offs, have designed their technology strategies to articulate their plans 
to develop and deploy technological resources to achieve superior performance. The main 
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focus of this dissertation is on corporate spin-offs. Corporate spin-offs form a unique 
group of new companies, since they originate from a larger parent firm. However, 
corporate spin-offs are not the only type of company that originate from a larger parent 
institute, also university spin-offs have a parent organization namely universities or 
research organizations. CSO and USO are both created to develop and market new 
products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill. Therefore, the way they 
deploy their technological resources into a technology strategy is of vital importance to 
their success and survival.  
 
Research question 1: 
Which factors influence the performance of corporate spin-offs?  
 
Research Question 2:  
Do corporate and university spin-offs follow different technology strategies in 
order to achieve a competitive advantage? 
 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to create insight into the performance 
of corporate spin-offs. More specifically, this study aims at understanding the 
relationship between technological resources, technology strategies and performance of 
corporate and university spin-offs. The detailed objectives of the study are: 
1) to review and analyze the literature on corporate spin-offs 
2) to create insight into the population of corporate spin-offs 
3) to extend the literature by examining the relationship between technological 
resources, technology strategies and performance of corporate and university 
spin-offs. 
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Our study has build on the resource-based view of the firm to study the dynamics 
that underlie the performance of spin-offs. The resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 
1959) complements the traditional Industrial Organization approaches by recognizing the 
competitive value of resources and how they combine with and influence the strategies 
pursued by the firm (Brush and Chaganti, 1999; Chandler and Hanks, 1994; Mosakowski, 
1993). In other words, it is argued that firm strategies in conjunction with the firm’s 
resource base determine firm performance (Barney and Zajac, 1994). Moreover, CSO and 
USO are unique in the sense that they originate from a larger parent institute. This 
implies that they will inherit knowledge and routines present in the parent firm. This 
inheritance differentiates them from independent ventures and it is interesting to see how 
this inheritance influences their strategy making.  
 
 
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
This first chapter has set forth the broad research problem and the specific 
research questions that will be examined in this dissertation. In Chapter 2, a review of the 
literature on corporate spin-offs is performed. We have attempted to integrate the  
different streams of literature on corporate spin-offs into one model that recognizes the 
role and importance of different factors to the performance of CSO. Chapter 3 discusses 
the theoretical framework that will be used to examine the research questions and 
develops the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical part of the study. Chapter 4 presents 
the research methodology. Issues related to research design, sample selection, data 
gathering and data analysis are explored and justified. Chapter 5 provides the descriptive 
statistics of the data, and more insight into the population of corporate spin-offs. Chapter 
6 presents the research results. Chapter 7 discusses the theoretical and practical 
conclusions derived from the study, as well as the contributions and limitations of the 
study. Finally, Chapter 8 provides several areas for future research. 
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2 THE PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS: A 
MODEL OF ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Corporate spin-offs are widespread in technology-based industries such as 
semiconductors (Braun and MacDonald, 1978), disk drives (Christensen, 1993), and 
lasers (Klepper, 2002). In the semiconductor industry, many corporate spin-offs can be 
traced back to one firm alone, Fairchild Semiconductor (Klepper, 2001). The Thompson 
database reports 2106 announced CSO between 1980 and 2005, of which 1128 have been 
effectively completed. Despite these impressive figures, The Thompson database only 
lists those CSOS which are publicly announced, excluding employee-based spin-offs and 
spin-offs from private firms. We might thus expect far more CSO than those identified by 
the Thompson database. In fact, Cooper (1971) found that firms with less than 500 
employees and small subsidiaries have about ten times as high spin-off rates as large 
firms. In a study on European corporate spin-offs, Moncada et al. (1999) found that CSO 
represented around 12.9 % of new firm formation in Europe. These figures indicate that, 
while precise estimates of CSO do not currently exist, we should expect them to be more 
prevalent than commonly acknowledged.  
 Corporate spin-offs are often the result of restructuring or reorganizations of the 
parent company. Activities that are not within the company’s core-competencies and that 
do not meet minimum performance requirements are either closed down or spun-off. 
Moreover, sectors with high spin-off frequencies are often sectors that undergo a high 
level of cost-cutting activity. Deregulation seems to have been one of the driving factors 
in encouraging the emergence of CSO in the energy and telecommunications sector. 
Corporate spin-offs might also be formed when employees are not able to realize their 
ideas in the parent company. These employees want to exploit an unused potential based 
on their key-experience acquired within the parent company. Some of them are frustrated 
because the parent firm does not allow them to pursue an opportunity, so they decide to 
leave the parent firm. Others spot opportunities in the external environment and decide to 
pursue the opportunity themselves, rather then sharing it with the parent firm. 
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Several studies have looked at the phenomenon of corporate spin-offs and found 
that they create excess stock return for the parent firm and the corporate spin-off. For the 
parent firm, excess share price improvements of about 3% around the announcement date 
of the spin-off have been found (Daley et al., 1997; Schipper & Smith, 1983). But what 
accounts for the performance of CSO? Besides the motivation to create a CSO, also other 
factors come into play when considering the performance of CSO. Since CSO originate 
from a parent firm, one can expect a CSO to inherit certain resources and routines from 
its parent. Moreover, the strategy the CSO follows and its industry conditions will further 
influence its performance. In their attempt to better understand corporate spin-offs, 
scholars have singled out one motivation to create a CSO or limited characteristics of the 
CSO and investigated their impact on performance. In this chapter we propose a model 
that links the antecedents and characteristics of corporate spin-offs to their performance. 
The model recognizes the roles and importance of different factors to the performance of 
a CSO. This model allows us to understand under what conditions CSO add value to their 
shareholders and to their parent firms.  
There is no consensus in the literature on the definition of corporate spin-offs. 
Therefore, this chapter starts with clarifying the confusion around the definition, followed 
by the development of our own definition of corporate spin-offs. Next, we develop a 
model that outlines the key characteristics of corporate spin-offs and the link with its 
performance. The interplay of antecedents and characteristics of CSO creates an 
understanding of the real contribution and performance of CSO. This model adds to the 
general understanding of the importance of the phenomenon corporate spin-offs. Last, we 
formulate our conclusion.  
 
 
2.1 Definitions of Corporate Spin-Offs 
Past research on the topic of corporate spin-offs (CSO) has been scattered. 
Scholars have used different definitions to identify corporate spin-offs. Table 1 provides 
an overview of the different definitions used in studies on corporate spin-offs. Studies on 
CSO seem to follow two sets of definitions, which we label the “legal” and the “entrant” 
perspective on CSO respectively.  
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The legal perspective 
 
Authors Definition Data source 
Abarbanell J., 
Bushee B. & 
Raedy J., 2003 
Corporate spin-offs create new firms with 
characteristics markedly different from the 
original firm 
Securities Data Company (SDC) 
Platinum mergers and acquisitions 
database 
Allen J., 2001 In a spin-off, a unit of a corporation is 
established as an independent company, and 
shareholders receive shares in the new entity 
on a pro rata basis.  
The Standard and Poor’s Quarterly 
Dividend Record 
Allen J., 
Lummer S., 
McConnell J. & 
Reed D., 1995 
In the typical corporate spin-off, a corporation 
(customarily called the parent) forms a new, 
separate corporation and ownership to a 
subset of the assets of the parent is transferred 
to the newly created corporate entity. The 
shares in the new corporation are then 
distributed on a pro rata basis to the 
shareholders of the parent firm.  
The Standard and Poor’s Quarterly 
Dividend Record.  
 
Aron D.,1991 A spin-off is a form of corporate divestiture in 
which the original corporation is separated 
into two corporations, each with separately 
traded stock. The stock of the spun-off 
division is distributed on a pro rata basis to 
shareholders of the original corporation.  
No empirical data 
Daley L., 
Mehrotra V. & 
Sivakumar R., 
1997 
A spin-off occurs when a firm creates a 
subsidiary to hold a portion of its assets, and 
then distributes the shares of the subsidiary to 
its shareholders to create an independent 
company. Spin-offs differ from other modes 
of asset divestitures in that they do not 
involve any cash.  
*Spin-off firms examined by 
Schipper and Smith (1983)  
*additional spin-offs by searching 
the Wall Street Journal 
*Supplemented by spin-off cases 
discussed in Kudla and Mclnish 
(1988)  and Vijh (1994) 
Desai H. & Jain 
P., 1999 
A spin-off is a pro-rata distribution of the 
shares of the subsidiary to the parent’s 
shareholders. A spin-off creates a new entity 
that trades independently of its former parent.  
*Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) 
*The Dow Jones News Service 
(DJNS)  
*The Standard & Poor's Dividend 
Record  
Dittmar A., 
2004 
A spin-off is a pro rata distribution of the 
stock of a subsidiary to existing shareholders 
of the firm. The subsidiary may be an existing 
division or a newly created subsidiary of the 
parent. At the time of the spin-off, the 
subsidiary becomes a freestanding company. 
No funds are raised in a spin-off, and neither 
firm revalues its assets.  
 
* Security Data Company’s (SDC) 
Worldwide Acquisitions database. 
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Gertner R., 
Powers E. &  
Schartstein D.,  
2002 
In a spin-off, the parent company established 
one of its divisions as a new publicly traded 
company and distributes the shares of this 
company to the parent’s existing 
shareholders. It is almost always structured as 
a tax-free transaction with no cash flow 
implications to the parent, spin-off or 
shareholders.  
*Securities Data Corporation’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database  
 
Hite G. & 
Owers J., 1983 
A spin-off results in the creation of an 
independent firm with a corresponding 
reduction in the asset base of the divestor. The 
assets divested may be transferred to a newly 
organized and incorporated firm whose shares 
are distributed to the original shareholders of 
the divestor firm. Alternatively, the divestor 
may transfer the stock of an incorporated 
subsidiary to its shareholders. In either case, 
the distribution of the unit’s shares is on a 
pro-rata basis to the original stockholders.  
Standard and Poor’s Annual 
Dividend Record 
Krishnaswami 
S. & 
Subramaniam 
V., 1999 
A spin-off is a pro-rata distribution of the 
shares of a firm’s subsidiary to the 
shareholders of the firm. There is neither a 
dilution of equity nor a transfer of ownership 
form the current shareholders. Spin-offs 
involve no cash transactions. 
*Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP)  
*Firms in the National Automated 
Accounting Research System 
whose annual reports disclose 
spin-offs 
*news wires and articles on Lexis-
Nexis and the Wall Street Journal 
that report spin-off transactions by 
firms. 
Mauer D. & 
Lewellen W., 
1990 
In a spin-off, a separate new corporate entity 
is created to hold the assets relinquished by 
the firm undertaking the transaction, and the 
equity ownership interest in those assets is 
distributed, typically on a pro rata basis, to the 
stockholders of the previous parent company.  
No empirical data 
McConnell J., 
OzbilginM. & 
Wahal S., 2001 
Refer to Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) 
for the definition of CSO 
To compile the sample, they 
mimic the steps of Cusatis et al. 
(1993) 
* Moody’s Dividend Record  
* CRSP Monthly Master File 
*CCH Capital Changes Reporter 
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Mehrotra V., 
Mikkelson W. 
& Partch M.,  
2003 
In a corporate spin-off, managers break up a 
company by allocating a segment of a firm’s 
assets to a newly formed publicly traded 
company. Shares of the new company are 
distributed pro rata, as a stock dividend, to 
stockholders of the parent company.  
* Initial list of spin-offs came from 
Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar 
(1997)  
* Identified more recent spin-offs 
by searching The Wall Street 
Journal Index and obtaining a list 
of divestiture events from the 
Securities Data Corporation. 
Parrino R., 
1997 
A spin-off is the separation of a firm’s 
business through a pro rata distribution of the 
equity  
Marriot Spin-off 
Schipper K. & 
Smith A., 1983 
A spin-off divides one firm into two; current 
shareholders receive a pro-rata distribution of 
separate equity claims on a subset of the 
original firm’s net assets. 
* National Automated Accounting 
Research System (NAARS) 
*stock distributions coded as spin-
offs on the CRSP Daily Master 
File of ASE and NYSE firms 
*articles in the business press 
*Capital Changes Reporter 
Seward J. & 
Walsch J., 1996 
A spin-off divides the existing asset base of a 
corporation into two (or more) separate parts. 
The current shareholders receive a pro rata 
distribution of separate equity claims on the 
assets of each new corporate entity. There is 
no exchange of cash or financial securities for 
assets in this transaction. 
The Dow Jones News Retrieval 
Service 
 
 
Vijh A., 1994 A spin-off is a divestiture of a parent 
company that relinquished control of a 
subsidiary by simply distributing the 
subsidiary shares as a nontaxable stock 
dividend to current stockholders.  
Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) 
Woo C., 
Willard G. & 
Daellenbach U.,  
1992 
A spin-off occurs when a firm distributes to 
its existing shareholders all of the common 
stock it owns in a controlled subsidiary, 
thereby creating a separate publicly-traded 
company (Rosenfeld, 1984) 
*Standard and Poor’s on-line news 
service  
*review of Kudla and McIninsh’s 
study (1984) 
Wruck E. & 
Wruck K., 2002 
In a spin-off transaction, a parent firm’s assets 
are divided between two corporations. Each 
corporation is a separate public company. 
Shares of the new company are distributed 
directly to parent firm shareholders. Most 
spin-offs are structured as a tax-free return of 
capital to shareholders. 
The Securities Data Corporation 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database 
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The entrant perspective 
 
Author Definition  Data source 
Agarwal R., 
Echambadi R., 
Franco A. & 
Sarkar M., 2004 
A spin-out is a distinctive class of 
entrepreneurial entrants that inherit knowledge 
form industry incumbents through their 
founders. Founded by former employees of an 
incumbent firm, these stand-alone 
entrepreneurial ventures compete in the same 
industry as the parent but have no equity 
relationships with any incumbent.  
Disk/Trend Report (a market 
research publication that has 
covered the disk drive industry 
since 1977).  
Chesbrough H.,  
2003a 
A technology spin-off company is a particular 
type of spin-off company that is created for the 
purpose of commercializing one or more 
research discoveries outside the main business 
of the firm  
Technology spin-off 
companies that 
commercialized technology 
out of one of Xerox’s five 
research centers.  
Ito K., 1995 A spin-off is defined as a firm that is partially 
owned by the parent, but independently 
managed and sometimes listed on the various 
stock markets.  
* For the US firms, Moody’s 
Investors Service for New 
York Stock Exchange firms 
* For Japanes firms, a list was 
compiled from the charts of 
Yakura and Ikushima (1986) 
for Tokyo Stock Exchange 
firms. In addition, books on the 
corporate history of large 
Japanese firms were examined.  
Ito K. & Rose 
E.,  
1994 
A spin-off results in the separation of a business 
unit from the parent firm, but the parent usually 
maintains ownership of some percentage of the 
spin-off’s stock.  
Japanese parent firms and their 
spinoff subsidiaries were 
identified, based on 
Toyokeizai (1990) 
Klepper S., 
2002 
Spin-offs are stand-alone companies founded 
by employees of incumbent firms in the same 
industry 
US automobile industry 
Lindholm A.,  
1997a 
A corporate spin-off is based on product ideas 
originating from the founder’s earlier 
employment in private firms 
The MIT Center for Policy 
Alternatives sample (the 'CPA' 
sample), identified and used by 
Utterback and Reitberger 
(1982) and Utterback et al. 
(1988).  
Parhankangas 
A. & Arenius 
P., 2003 
This study focuses on new business formation 
based on the business ideas developed within 
the parent firm being taken into a self-standing 
firm.  
 
 
 
*The Talouselämä Journal 
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Sapienza H., 
Parhankangas 
A. & Autio E., 
2004 
A technology-related spin-off firm is a firm 
which exploits technological competencies 
developed internally within the parent firm and 
is active in industrial manufacturing or in 
technical services. A spin-off firm was 
considered independent if less than 50% of its 
stock was owned by other corporations. 
*The Talouselämä business 
weekly database.  
*Additionally, managers of the 
largest Finnish industrial firms 
and VC were contacted to 
identify additional SO. 
Sedaitis J., 1998 Spin-offs are defined as organizations where the 
controlling packet of stock (51% or more) was 
owned by one individual extant organization.  
Case studies were made of 
nine different commodity 
markets and the client base 
across seven cities in the 
European former USSR.  
Sorrentino M. 
&  
Williams M., 
1995 
No definition of CSO is mentioned STR4, the corporate start-up 
database of the PIMS (Profit 
Impact of Market Strategy) 
project 
Table 1: Overview of definitions of CSO 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Legal Perspective on Corporate Spin-Offs 
The “legal” definition of a CSO emphasizes the contractual basis of its founding 
as follows:   
In a spin-off, the parent company establishes one of its divisions as a new publicly 
traded company and distributes the shares of this company to the parent’s existing 
shareholders. It is almost always structured as a tax-free transaction with no cash 
flow implications to the parent, spin-off or shareholders (Gertner, Powers & 
Scharfstein, 2002: 2481).  
 
Following this definition, a CSO is a stand-alone company that did previously not 
have a capital structure and no debt allocation. Therefore, CSO form an ideal situation to 
look how certain variables (e.g. capital structure, management composition and assets) 
are put in place. Subsequent to the spin-off, the parent and the CSO trade as separate 
entities. This makes it possible to analyse their performance separately and examine the 
impact of certain variables, like the leverage choice (Mehrotra et al., 2003), change in 
focus (Desai & Jain, 1999), and institutional investor trading (Abarbanell et al., 2003) 
have on the performance of the CSO and/or the parent. Following the ‘legal’ definition, 
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the creation of a CSO does not change the equity ownership of the existing shareholders. 
Therefore, the design of internal governance and control mechanisms can be studied 
(Seward & Walsh, 1996). Moreover, CSO that qualify under IRS Section 355 Code1 are 
the only way to divest assets on a tax-free basis.  
For a spin-off to be a tax free transaction, the Internal Revenue Code section 355 
demands that the parent and the subsidiary must be engaged in an active trade or business 
for at least five years prior to the ex-date and the spin-off must have a substantial 
business purpose, separate from simply saving on income taxes. The reason for the active 
business requirement is to prevent a corporation from investing its surplus funds in a new 
business or in the stock of a corporation conducting a business and then spinning that 
stock off rather than paying dividends (Kudla & McInish, 1984). The business purpose 
requirement also implies that the purpose for the spin-off is germane to the business of 
the corporations. There must be a corporate purpose rather than a shareholder purpose 
motivating the spin-off.  The fact that the spin-off must be engaged in an active trade or 
business for at least five years prior to the spin-off date induces a certain degree of 
maturity of the spin-off business. A huge advantage of using the ‘legal’ definition is the 
relative ease of data collection since the Security Data Company’s (SDC) Worldwide 
Acquisitions database uses this definition to describe CSO. Table 1 provides an overview 
of the data sources used in the diverse articles.  
The use of the ‘legal’ definition of a CSO also has a few disadvantages. The legal 
definition does not consider the motive to set up a CSO. In particular, CSO set up for 
financial reasons can have a different effect on the performance of the firm and its parent, 
than CSO set up for incentive reasons. When collecting data, researchers have not taking 
the motivation into account. As a result, it is difficult to make reliable predictions about 
the growth ambitions of the corporate spin-offs. Next, the use of the legal definition 
leaves out a group of CSO, namely those that have been set up by employees based on 
knowledge gained while working in and for the parent firm. Also corporate spin-offs set 
                                                 
1
 Under Internal Revenue Code section 355, a spin-off is considered a tax-exempt distribution if after the 
spin-off the parent retains no more than a 20% interest in the voting power of all classes of voting stock and 
no more than a 20% interest in each class of nonvoting stock. In addition, the distribution may not be 
executed as a means of distributing dividends to the stockholders, and both corporations must be engaged 
in active business after the spin-off and for 5 years preceding the spin-off. Due to the strong tax incentive, 
most spin-offs involve the near-complete divestiture of the subsidiary. Thus, the parent allocates the assets 
and liabilities to a freestanding company. 
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up as private companies are not considered. To conclude, the use of the “legal” definition 
makes it easy to identify a certain group of CSO, but gives us little insight into the 
motives leading to their creation.  
 
2.1.2 Entrant Perspective on Corporate Spin-Offs 
A second group of studies views a corporate spin-off as a means for companies to 
explore new markets, new technology, or new methods of distribution (see table 1 for an 
overview).  We label this group ‘entrant’ CSO. In these studies, it is less clear what a 
corporate spin-off exactly is. Authors use several, related definitions to define a CSO. 
Parhankangas and Arenius (2003) offered perhaps the most comprehensive definition of a 
CSO. To them,  
“A CSO is a new business formation based on the business ideas developed within 
the parent firm being taken into a self-standing firm…” (Parhankangas and 
Arenius, 2003: 464).  
 
In the case of ‘entrant’ CSO, it is not always the parent who takes the initiative to 
create a CSO. A large number of the ‘entrant’ CSO is set up by employees of the parent 
firm. Employees of incumbent firms are in a position to start their own ventures using 
new knowledge created through incumbent investments (Agarwal et al., 2004). The 
potential for employee entrepreneurship results from incumbent firms being imperfect 
and permeable storehouses of knowledge which causes new organisations to emerge from 
other organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965). Scholars identified several reasons why 
employees found a CSO e.g. founders of CSO may have been frustrated with their prior 
employers’ unwillingness to pursue ideas they perceived to be promising (Klepper, 
2001), CSO may be triggered by change in leadership and the subsequent change in 
support for certain activities. Using the entrant CSO definition, researchers usually have a 
clear view of the motivation to set up a CSO.  
In most studies, researchers have singled out one motive e.g. CSO set up to 
explore a new technology (Chesbrough, 2003a; Sapienza et al., 2004), new markets 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Helfat & Liebermann, 2002), new methods of distribution, or new 
products/services.  Unfortunately, these studies have not employed the same definition to 
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select ‘entrant’ CSO, making it difficult to compare findings across studies. Chesbrough 
(2003a) and Sapienza et al. (2004) select only the corporate spin-offs which are created to 
exploit technological competencies developed internally within the parent firm (see table 
1 for the exact definition employed). Agarwal et al. (2004) select those corporate spin-
offs who are started by individuals who were employees of existing firms in the industry 
(incumbent firms) in the year prior to the spin-outs’ formation. They do not impose the 
criterion that the corporate spin-offs need to be based on a technological competency. In 
their study, Helfat and Liebermann (2002) go one step further and divide the group of 
entrant CSO into parent spin-off and entrepreneurial spin-offs. In a parent spin-off, the 
parent firm retains a financial interest and representation in the board of directors. 
Entrepreneurial spin-offs are stand-alone companies founded by employees of incumbent 
firms in the same industry. So, these studies select different subgroups of corporate spin-
offs. 
Another source of disagreement is the fact that there is no consensus about the 
percentage of shares the parent firm still owns after spin-off. According to Ito (1995),   a 
spin-off is defined as a firm that is partially owned by the parent, but independently 
managed and sometimes listed on the various stock markets. The parental ownership 
varies between 0 % and 100 % and the control exercised by the parent is flexible and 
differs in degree based on strategic, financial and human resources. Some studies poses 
more restrictive constraints by imposing that the parent firm can not own more that 49% 
of the stock (Sedaitis, 1998) or  less than 50% of the CSO’ stock can be owned by other 
corporations (Sapienza et al., 2004). The different definitions and the different percentage 
of shares used, make it difficult to compare the results of the studies performed.   
Another disadvantage of using the ‘entrant’ definition of CSO is the fact that there 
exists no publicly accessible database that uses the definition of ‘entrant CSO’. 
Researchers have therefore built their own database of entrant CSO (see table 1), 
focusing mostly on one particular industry (e.g. the disk drive industry (Agarwal et al., 
2004), the US automobile industry (Klepper, 2002)) or a particular region (e.g. Japan (Ito 
& Rose, 1994), Sweden (Lindholm, 1997a) and Finland (Parhankangas et al., 2003)). 
Generalization is therefore not possible. To conclude, the use of the definition of ‘entrant 
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CSO’ provides good insights into the motives to create a CSO, but does not allow a clear 
sampling of CSO.  
 
2.1.3 Integrative Perspective on Corporate Spin-Offs 
Going over the definitions and data sources summarized in table 1, one can notice 
that the group of CSO selected by the ‘legal’ and the ‘entrant’ perspective are almost two 
mutually exclusive groups. CSO in the ‘legal’ perspective will mostly be companies that 
are noted on the stock exchange market, while the ‘entrant’ perspective will rather select 
private owned companies. However, both types are labelled corporate spin-offs in the 
literature. To overcome this diversity, we propose the following definition of a CSO:  
“A corporate spin-off is a separate legal entity that is concentrated around 
activities that were originally developed in a larger parent firm. The entity is 
concentrated around a new business, with the purpose to develop and market new 
products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill.” 
 
The proposed definition has the advantage of being comprehensive. It integrates 
the two existing streams of definitions of CSO. Our definition includes those ‘legal’ CSO 
who are set up around new businesses. It includes daughter firms, set up to 
commercialize new products or services and joint ventures, which are based on 
technology developed in the parent firm. Our definition also includes most of the 
‘entrant’ CSO e.g. employee-based CSO where founders have left the parent firm due to 
a conflict or lack of support, but which are based on activities that were originally 
developed in the parent firm. Also CSO set up with support of the parent firm to explore 
new markets and new technologies are included.  
 Our definition excludes ‘legal’ CSO set up around existing business e.g. sales 
offices in foreign countries. All companies which are the result of external corporate 
venturing activities are also excluded e.g. spin-inns, since they are based on technology 
developed outside the parent firm. Forms of divestments like sell-offs or management 
buy-outs are excluded, since there are not concentrated around a new business. Our 
definition also excludes ‘entrant’ CSO that are not created with the purpose to develop 
and market new products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill.  
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The definition takes the angle of new business creation and start-ups. Start-ups 
have been found to contribute significantly to an economy in terms of exports, 
employment, taxes paid, research and development, and innovations (Utterback et al., 
1988) and play an important role in bringing new technologies to the market 
(Christensen, 1997; Henderson, 1993). Previous literature reports spin-off firms being 
important agents of knowledge transfer from established corporations to new businesses, 
hereby promoting the prosperity and well-being of regions, industry clusters and nations 
(Dorfman, 1983; Lindholm, 1997b, 2000; Pavitt, 1991). By preserving the relationship 
with its parent, the spin-off may combine the advantages of maintaining the 
entrepreneurship of a small firm and utilizing the existing assets of a large corporation 
(Teece, 1988). Spinning off businesses may benefit the parent firm by decreasing the 
administrative burden, releasing funds for the development of core businesses, and 
serving as a means for exploring new, revolutionary ideas at arm’s length from main 
stream businesses (Ito and Rose, 1994). We see corporate spin-offs as a means to create 
new businesses to commercialize a new technology or to explore new market 
opportunities. This can happen with or without the support of the parent firm. Now that 
we stated what we understand under corporate spin-offs, we can start to explore the key 
characteristics of a CSO and the dimensions that contribute to its performance.   
 
 
2.2 Key Characteristics of  Corporate Spin-Offs 
The bulk of the literature on corporate spin-offs has focused on one particular 
characteristic of a corporate spin-off and its relation to the corporate spin-off’s 
performance. Most studies that use the ‘legal’ perspective on corporate spin-offs (CSO) 
have linked the antecedents to create a CSO to the performance of CSO and their parents 
(see table 1 for an overview of the studies). Studies using the ‘entrant’ perspective have 
mainly focused on the knowledge relatedness between the CSO and the parent and its 
impact on performance. Little attempt has been made to integrate the two streams of 
literature into one model. However, if we want to understand the performance of CSO, 
we need to have insight in the different characteristics that influence this performance. 
We will first discuss the studies that focus on the ‘legal’ perspective of CSO, the results 
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they have found concerning the relationship between the characteristics of the CSO and 
its performance. Next, we give an overview of the findings of the studies focusing on the 
“entrant’ perspective. Then we will integrate both perspectives on CSO with existing 
literature to create an insight into the key characteristics of CSO and the way in which 
these characteristics influence its performance.  
 
2.2.1 Legal Perspective on Corporate Spin-Offs 
Studies employing the legal perspective of corporate spin-offs (CSO) are mainly 
published in financial journals e.g. Journal of Financial Economics, The Review of 
Financial Studies, and The Journal of Finance. Several of these studies have empirically 
analyzed the sources of shareholder gains around spin-offs (Cusatis et al., 1993; Daley et 
al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Hite and Owers, 1983; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 
1999; Schipper and Smith, 1983; Seward and Walsh, 1996). Hite and Owers (1983) 
report an event-period excess return of 3.30 % surrounding first announcements and 
7.00% over an extended period beginning fifty days before the first announcement and 
ending on the completion date when the spin-off becomes certain. Schipper and Smith 
(1983) document a two-day excess return of 2.84% and Daley et al. (1997) reports a two-
day announcement date return of 3.4%. Researchers have attributed these potential 
sources of gains to several motivations to create the CSO. These motivations can be 
classified as follows: 1) focus and restructuring motivation; 2) financial motivation; 3) 
incentive motivation; and 4) tax and regulatory motivation. In the following paragraph, 
we will discuss each of the motivations.  
Focus and restructuring motivation Practitioners and the popular press usually 
propose an information-related motivation for CSO. For instance, CEO of most firms 
engaged in CSO claim that the CSO improves the market value since investors are able to 
perceive value more clearly after the spin-off (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). 
Creating a CSO can allow the parent firm to focus its activities and to reduce 
asymmetries that might exist due to the numerous activities of the parent firm. CSO 
enhances value because separating the divisions of a firm into individually operated and 
traded entities mitigates the information asymmetry in the market about the different 
divisions’ profitability and operating efficiency (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). 
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Even when there are no negative synergies between divisions, information asymmetry 
can itself be a sufficient motivation for corporations to engage in spin-offs.  
Also Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) document a significant 
improvement in operating performance in the year after the event for spin-offs that 
separate divisions that operate in different industries. Desai and Jain (1999) use two other 
methods to identify focus improving spin-offs, and report that the improved operating 
and financial performance following spin-offs is robust to the classification scheme. Hite 
and Owers (1983) classify firms based on the reasons given by the firms for the spin-off 
and find that the subsample where the motivation was improvement in focus exhibits the 
largest abnormal returns in the period from 50 days prior to the announcement to the 
completion date of the spin-of. Indirect evidence for the focus improvement motive is 
provided by Allen et al. (1995). They examine whether the abnormal returns around spin-
offs is a consequence of the correction of a prior mistake. They show that when a spin-of 
is preceded by the acquisition of the division the positive abnormal returns around the 
spin-off represent the re-creation of value that was destroyed at the time of the earlier 
acquisition. 
Financial motivation It is not uncommon for parent firm documents to state that a 
corporate spin-off would allow heterogeneous business units to establish capital 
structures that are better suited to the nature of their assets or growth prospects. At the 
moment of spin-off, a stand-alone company is created that did previously not have a 
capital structure. Therefore, spin-offs offer the possibility to examine how the capital 
structure is build, and what the parent’s firm choice of leverage for the spin-off is. 
Dittmar (2004) found that parent firms choose lower leverage ratios (average debt to 
value) for the spin-offs. Lower leverage is attractive since low debt financing reduces the 
pressure to generate cash flow. However, spin-offs with more financial leverage were 
found to have a higher cash flow return on assets, lower variability of industry operating 
income and a greater proportion of fixed assets (Mehrotra et al., 2003).  
Parent firms may spin off to expropriate wealth from debt holders by allocating 
most of the debt to one of the entities (Dittmar, 2004). Parrino (1997) finds that this may 
have occurred in the 1993 Marriot spin-off. The Marriot spin-off transferred wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders and caused the total value of the company’s public securities 
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to decline. Conversely, Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper and Smith (1983) found no 
evidence of widespread bondholder expropriation. Firms in need of external capital show 
a higher propensity to engage in spin-offs since the total amount of capital raised 
increases significantly in the two years following a spin-off (Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999).  
Incentive motivation CSO can be used to improve the managers’ incentives 
(Glassman, 1988). The spin-off incentive policy exploits the fact that after a spin-off, the 
managerial productivity is much easier to evaluate than when the division belongs to the 
parent firm (Aron, 1991). The possibility of creating a CSO may motivate certain 
divisional managers to perform better, since they know that the division will be carefully 
examined to investigate a potential CSO. CSO can also be events through which top 
management is restructured. CSO can sometimes even serve as a mechanism of 
management dismissal, with the opportunity to manage a smaller, weaker firm serving as 
a “consolation prize” for managers leaving the parent firm (Wruck and Wruck, 2002).  
The characteristics of the spin-off’s top management team are important as they 
are significantly associated with the value created at the announcement of a spin-off 
(Wruck and Wruck, 2002). The study performed by Seward and Walsh (1996) confirms 
that a CSO facilitate the implementation of efficient internal governance and control 
mechanisms, but found no support for the fact that gains around spin-off announcements 
can be attributed to improvements in efficiency of governance practices. Further, 
Mehrotra et al. (2003) found no evidence that managerial incentives or governance 
characteristics affect the leverage ratios chosen for CSO. The pre-spin-off CEOs did not 
take on an unusually low or high level of financial leverage in the firms they managed 
following a spin-off. They found no support for agency theories that imply capital 
structure choices serve managers’ private interests.  
Tax and regulatory motivation Tax and regulatory factors can also form the basis 
to create a CSO. It can be a means to overcome legal obstacles which prevent the firm 
from accomplishing its objectives. A regulated firm may be able to spin-off a subsidiary 
in a fashion that results in either the parent or the subsidiary escaping the external 
constraint of regulation (Kudla & McInish, 1984). In some cases, significant tax benefits 
can be obtained by spinning off a CSO. A firm may also be able to spin-off an overseas 
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subsidiary to avoid paying U.S. taxes on the income from that division (Kudla & 
McInish, 1984). Although the benefits to firms from tax and regulatory motivations do 
exist, Schipper and Smith (1983) did not find any evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Mauer and Lewellen (1990) on the other hand, argue that an improvement in the value of 
the tax-timing option component of securities prices is a likely contributing factor to 
abnormal stock returns associated with CSO.  
 
Scholars have tried to explain the excess stock return caused by CSO by studying 
the motivations to set up a CSO. We should be cautious in interpreting the findings of 
these studies, since these studies focus on the short term performance. McConnel et al. 
(2001) is one of the few studies who investigates whether a strategy of buying parents 
and subsidiaries after spin-off would have earned excess returns. They study parents and 
spin-offs over 7 years following the completion of the analysis reported by Cusatis et al. 
(1993). The conclusions they drew depend upon the performance benchmark employed. 
When compared with the matched firm benchmark used by Cusatis et al. (1993) and the 
Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model, the strategy does not beat the benchmark. When 
compared with size- and book-to-market-matched portfolios, the strategy does beat the 
benchmark.  
The fact that most studies using the legal perspective on CSO apply a short time 
frame to test the performance of CSO and its parents has several limitations. First, no 
predictions can be made concerning the long term performance of CSO. The study of 
McConnell et al. (2001) does not find strong support for the existence of excess stock 
return on a long term basis. The authors however do not explain the potential causes of 
this finding. Second, most studies using the legal perspective on CSO would not be able 
to provide an explanation, since they do not take the resources of the CSO, the industry 
conditions of the CSO, or the potential ongoing relationship between the parent and the 
CSO into account.    
 
2.2.2 Entrant Perspective on Corporate Spin-Offs 
Studies using the entrant perspective on corporate spin-offs (CSO) are mainly 
published in journals like Strategic Management Journal, Research Policy, Journal of 
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Business Venturing, and Industrial and Corporate Change. These studies have mainly 
emphasized the relationship between parent and a CSO and its impact on the performance 
of a CSO. CSO form a distinct kind of start-ups in the sense that they originate from a 
parent firm. The initial stock of inherited knowledge (Huber, 1991) is likely to have long-
term effects on the CSO. Whenever people leave one firm to found a new company, there 
is a transfer of resources and routines (Phillips, 2002). This implies that the CSO may 
have some advantages over start-ups that lack a parent firm. Insight into the relationship 
between a CSO and its parent is therefore necessary in order to explain the performance 
of CSO. The relatedness between a CSO and its parent can be twofold: 1) knowledge 
relatedness and 2) governance relatedness.   
Knowledge relatedness Knowledge relatedness indicates the extent to which the 
knowledge bases of two firms overlap. Knowledge relatedness includes production, 
technology and marketing knowledge (Rumelt, 1974; Sapienza et al., 2004). Production 
knowledge involves the ability of spin-offs to meet variations in demand level and 
changes in customer specifications. CSO can learn techniques from the parent firm for 
efficient and effective customization of production. In case the CSO share some 
technological knowledge with its parent firm, it will be able to augment its technological 
knowledge base by learning from its parent. A solid technological knowledge base will 
allow the CSO to cut the development time from product idea to commercial product. To 
the extent that the CSO shares some knowledge with its parent firm about customer 
groups, distribution channels, and marketing strategies and expertise, it will be able to 
strengthen its marketing competencies by learning from its parent firm.   
Past research on the relationship between knowledge relatedness and performance 
of CSO has been inconsistent. Sapienza et al. (2004) found that production and 
technological knowledge relatedness is related to growth, but marketing knowledge 
relatedness was not found significant. On the other hand, Davis et al. (1992) found that a 
high level of marketing relatedness is associated with high sales growth. Other studies 
have reported positive relationships between technological relatedness and sales growth 
(Doutriaux, 1992), between overall relatedness and profitability (Woo et al., 1992) and 
between production relatedness and return on assets (Davis et al., 1992). Sorrentino & 
Williams (1995) found no significant differences in the market shares achieved by high-, 
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medium-, and low-related CSO and conclude that relatedness does not affect CSO 
performance. However, Agarwal et al. (2004) found that a parent firm’s capabilities at the 
time of a CSO’s founding positively affect the spin-out’s knowledge capabilities and its 
probability of survival. CSO have a higher survival edge in the market due to their 
entrepreneurial flexibility and their inherited knowledge.  
Governance relatedness A CSO can also be related to its parent through its 
governance structure. Especially in the case where the CSO is supported by its parent 
firm or in the case the parent firm invests in the CSO, it is likely that one or more 
members of the board of directors are full-time employed by the parent firm. Moreover, 
in case of support, it is likely that the CEO of the CSO will be a person with strong social 
ties to the parent firm executives. These CEOs can coordinate the parent’s interests more 
effectively than outside CEOs.  
The board members and top management teams put in place can have a serious 
impact on the performance of the CSO. Chesbrough (2003a) has identified several 
Xerox’ CSO and examined the impact Xerox had on them over time. He found that 
Xerox’s own initial equity position was negatively correlated with the performance of its 
CSO. This was not due to their equity per se, but to Xerox’s practices in managing its 
spin-offs. Xerox rarely invited outside members onto CSO boards when it had majority 
control and they usually inserted a Xerox manager into the CEO position. A balanced 
mix of insiders and outsiders in the board and the top management team can prove to be 
of vital importance. Also the network these members have and/or can build, can be 
important for the performance of the CSO (Sedaitis, 1998). 
 
The entrant perspective gives an insight into the relationship between the CSO 
and its parent and the potential benefits of such a relationship. However, little attention is 
devoted to the motivation to set up a CSO, its industry conditions or the strategy the CSO 
has followed. Moreover, it is difficult to compare the results of the studies since they use 
different measures to capture performance e.g. sales growth (Davis et al., 1992; Sapienza 
et al., 2004), market share (Sorrentino & Williams, 1995), growth in revenues and market 
value (Chesbrough, 2003a). This might partly explain the inconsistence in the results 
found by different studies. However in order to create a full understanding, we need to 
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consider multiple characteristics of the CSO and look at their combined impact on 
performance.  
 
2.2.3 Integrative Perspective on Corporate Spin-Offs 
The legal and the entrant perspective on CSO offer a quite complementary 
perspective on CSO and its parents. The studies using the legal perspective are mostly 
connecting the motivation to set up a CSO to the short term performance of the CSO and 
its parent. Studies using the entrant perspective have devoted more attention to the 
relatedness between the CSO and its parent and its influence on the performance of the 
CSO. In this chapter, we are interested in explaining the performance of CSO by 
considering the different characteristics of a CSO that influence this performance. The 
relatedness is one aspect that can explain the performance of CSO, but there are other 
aspects to consider in order to fully understand if and why CSO perform well. The 
motivation to create a CSO will influence the resources the CSO receive by start-up and 
will also be determining for a potential ongoing relationship between parent and CSO. In 
an attempt to incorporate all variables that determine the performance of a CSO, we have 
developed a model of antecedents and characteristics of CSO (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: A model of antecedents and characteristics of corporate spin-offs 
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2.2.3.1 Parent Resource and Industry Conditions 
Since a CSO is concentrated around activities originally developed in a parent 
firm, a first aspect to consider is the conditions of the parent firm. The conditions of the 
parent firm may seriously influence the motivation for a parent firm or an employee to set 
up a CSO. E.g. in case the parent firm is not doing well because profits and market share 
are declining, the parent firm may decide to focus on its core activities. A CSO can then 
become a means to get rid of certain activities. In case of focussing on core activities, 
certain activities within the parent firm will be terminated. An employee may 
consequently decide to continue with the activity by creating a CSO. CSO may be 
triggered by organizational crisis, change in leadership, or lack of upward mobility for 
employees (Brittain & Freeman, 1986; Garvin, 1983). Employees may become frustrated 
when they perceive their ideas and inventions are being shelved or killed due to resource 
constraints of the parent firm. The attitude and support the parent gives to explore new 
ideas can have a serious impact on the number of CSO created by employees. Recently, 
some scholars have looked at employee entrepreneurship in regard to CSO (Agarwal et 
al., 2004; Klepper, 2001).  
Also the dynamics within a parent’s industry can be the trigger to set up a CSO. 
Disruptive events in the parent industry often cause CSO to take place. E.g. in case the 
industry of the parent firm is altering huge changes, the parent firm may create a CSO to 
explore new technologies or new market opportunities. Studies in the legal perspective 
view have identified four motivations to create a CSO: 1) focus and restructuring 
motivation; 2) financial motivation; 3) incentive motivation; and 4) tax and regulatory 
motivation. However, in the literature on CSO, little attention has been devoted to use a 
CSO as a means to explore new markets, new technologies, new business models, or new 
production tools for the parent firm. To reduce the business risks associated with these 
activities, a parent firm could create a CSO to explore opportunities. This issue has been 
tackled by the literature on radical innovation.  
A persistent theme in the academic literature on technological innovation is that 
established firms have great difficulties crossing the abyss created by a radical 
technological innovation that revolutionizes competition in their industry (Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003). Hill and Rothaermel (2003) propose that the performance of an 
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established firm in response to a radical innovation will be higher if the firm establishes a 
loosely coupled, stand-alone division to commercialize new technology. Loosely coupled 
business units allow local adaptation and increased sensitivity to environmental changes. 
Without labelling the loosely coupled business units, the idea of CSO is obviously 
present. To the authors’ knowledge, no scholars have investigated CSO in this regard.  
The resources and industry conditions of the parent firm can seriously influence 
the motivation for a parent firm or an employee to set up a CSO. The motivation to create 
the CSO on the one hand, and the resources and industry conditions of the parent firm on 
the other hand, will impact the resources the CSO receives from its parent and the 
potential ongoing relationship between CSO and parent firm. E.g. in case the parent firm 
supports the CSO, one might expect the parent firm to provide the CSO with certain 
resources. However, if the parent firm is going in decline, it will probably give little 
resources to the CSO.  
 
2.2.3.2 Resources  
One of the main challenges for every new firm is to identify and assemble an 
initial resource base (Brush et al., 2001; Penrose, 1959). Corporate spin-offs are unique in 
the sense that they originate from an established firm. This implies that CSO may receive 
resources from the parent. Even in case there is no direct transfer of resources from the 
parent to the CSO, research has suggested that routines and resources transfer from old to 
new organizations through personnel migration (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Pfeffer & 
Leblebici, 1973). In line with the resource-based view, we identify four dimensions of 
resources: financial, physical, human and organizational resources (Barney, 1991). 
Organizational resources are the systems, the routines and the relationships embedded in 
the company. They represent the ways in which firms combine and transform their other 
initial resources (Galunic & Rodan, 1998). Financial resources include all the different 
money resources that firms can use such as capital from the entrepreneurs, from equity 
investors and debtors. Physical resources include the physical technology used in the 
firm, a firm’s plant and equipment, its geography and its access to raw materials. Human 
resources include the training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, and 
insight of individual managers and workers in the firm.  
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The resource mobilization task is challenging in the case of CSO, since a CSO is 
concentrated around a new business, with the purpose to develop and market new 
products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill. CSO need to overcome 
the scepticism of resource providers e.g. the parent or external parties, since the 
uncertainty and risk associated with the new venture is particularly heightened when the 
underlying product or technology is unproven (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). The amount and 
quality of the resources received from the parent can be an important signal for external 
parties to invest in the CSO. Some CSO will start with a formal transfer of technology 
from the parent in the form of a license or a patent. The formality of the technology 
transfer will also depend upon the parent support to the spin-off and the knowledge 
relatedness between parent and spin-off. A parent firm may provide the CSO with some 
necessary financial resources, human and technological resources. Moreover, affiliation 
with a high-status organization as a parent firm may make it easier for CSO to raise 
financial and other resources needed to start new ventures (Agarwal et al., 2004). 
The relationship between a CSO and its parent may extend beyond formation, e.g. 
transfer of rules, routines, and procedures from parent to CSO (Brittain & Freeman, 1986; 
Romanelli, 1991).The motivation to set up a CSO will heavily influence a potential 
ongoing relationship between the parent and the CSO. If the CSO is set up under hostile 
conditions, the chances for an ongoing relationship are very small. In case a CSO is 
created out of frustration by an employee, often the parent firm is not even aware of the 
fact that the CSO is created, so no ongoing relationship takes place. On the other hand, if 
the CSO is set up to explore a new market opportunity or a new technology, it is in the 
parent firm interest to keep a good ongoing relationship with the CSO.  
The relationship with the parent firm will influence the resource base of a CSO. A 
constructive relationship with its parent will allow the CSO to get some necessary 
resources from its parent, even after start-up. A good relationship with the parent may 
allow to continue to use certain resources of the parent. Particular in industries that 
requires expensive machinery, this can be a huge saving cost and translate in a 
competitive advantage. The relationship with its parent can also impede a CSO to get the 
necessary resources e.g. a parent firm can oblige the CSO to use the resources the parent 
firm has been using although the CSO would be better off using other resources. The 
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sharing of resources will also be dependent upon the knowledge relatedness between 
CSO and parent. Related knowledge will contribute to the efficiency of communicating 
and transferring knowledge from the parent firm to the spin-off’s knowledge base (Grant, 
1996). The effect of lineage can both empower and constraint the CSO. Too much 
resources acquired from the parent may give the CSO not enough independence to build 
up its own resource base. Too few resources may constraint the CSO since it first need to 
focus on gathering the necessary resources. Depending upon the situation, a tight or loose 
relationship might be preferable.  
 
2.2.3.3 Strategy  
CSO need a strategy to develop their resources over time to progress through the 
different phases of development and create significant wealth (Penrose, 1959; Barney et 
al., 2001). We have defined CSO as separate legal entities that are concentrated around a 
new business, with the purpose to develop and market new products or services based 
upon a proprietary technology or skill. At start-up, CSO often do not have a clear view on 
the market they wish to enter. In many cases, the market does not yet exist or the 
customers still need to learn to use the new product. CSO tend to operate in dynamic 
environments where customer tastes, product-service technologies and competitive 
weapons often change unpredictably. As a consequence, they can not build their strategy 
based on a detailed competitive analysis. They will rather have to rely on strategic 
alliances and pre-commitments from stakeholders as a way to reduce and/or eliminate 
uncertainty and to erect entry barriers. This assumes a dynamic decision making 
environment which tend to lead to an effectuation process.  
Effectuation processes take a set of means as given and focus on selecting 
between possible effects that can be created with that set of means (Sarasvathy, 
2001).The process of effectuation allows the CSO to create one or more several possible 
effects irrespective of the generalized end goal with which it started. The process not only 
enables the realization of several possible effects (although generally one or only a few 
are actually realized in the implementation) but it also allows a decision maker to change 
his or her goals and even to shape and construct them over time, making use of 
contingencies as they arise (Sarasvathy, 2001). It differs from a causation process in that 
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a causation process takes a particular effect as given and focus on selecting between 
means to create that effect e.g. the Porter model in strategy is a causation model. 
However, in the journey of discovering a new technology and transforming this 
technology into a market-ready product, numerous hurdles need to be taken. Most of 
these hurdles are unpredictable and can not be foreseen. Therefore, we argue that CSO 
will follow effectuation processes in defining their strategies.     
The CSO strategy will be influenced by its resource base and the relationship with 
its parent.  The effect of originating from a parent may influence the spin-off beyond 
formation, as the transfer of rules, routines, and procedures from parent to progeny 
organizations can both constrain and empower the spin-off (Brittain & Freeman, 1986; 
Romanelli, 1991). Operating at the forefront of innovation, corporate spin-offs can 
capitalize on knowledge gained from discoveries made during the course of their 
founders’ employment in established firms (Bhide, 2000). The prior employment 
affiliations may influence the initial resource base of the spin-off, but also the ability to 
build a strategy. Organizational blueprints can transfer across firm boundaries, in a 
manner analogous to the reproduction and transmission of biological genes (Winter, 
1991). These transfers may include unique insights and decision rules used to transform 
resources into action (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), cognitive dimensions of competency 
(Fiol, 1991), and specific knowledge and information (Boeker, 1997). While building 
their strategy, CSO will be constraint by the resources they have, the resources they need 
to acquire, the relationship with their parent firm and the external environment. The way 
CSO build their strategy has not been previously examined in the literature.  
 
2.2.3.4 Environmental Conditions and Control by the Parent Firm 
The effect of the external environment on a company's strategic choices is widely 
acknowledged in the literature (Boyd et al., 1993). CSO tend to operate in dynamic 
environments where markets and technologies often change unpredictably. Because 
product-market innovations are common in such firms, managers often find themselves 
dealing with a rather diverse array of customers, that is, with a heterogeneous market 
(Miller & Friesen, 1983). To cope with the very complex environment CSO often adopt a 
rather organic structure. Since CSO strive to be adaptive, their entrepreneurial efforts will 
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reflect the demands of their environments and their capacity to transform their resources. 
Different environments confront firms with different information processing tasks, which 
can have a varying complexity. The environmental conditions of a CSO e.g. dynamism, 
hostility and heterogeneity, will directly influence its strategy. Dynamism is characterized 
by the rate of change and innovation in the industry as well as the uncertainty or 
unpredictability of the actions of competitors and customers. Hostility represents the 
degree of threat to the firm posed by the multifacetedness, vigour and intensity of the 
competition and the downsizing and upswings of the firm’s principal industry. 
Heterogeneity or complexity encompasses variations among the firm’s markets that 
require diversity in production and marketing orientations (Miller and Friesen, 1983).  
Also the control exercised by the parent will influence the way a CSO’ strategy 
result in performance. An ongoing relationship with the parent can in some case impede 
the CSO to determine its own strategy. E.g. the parent firm may wish to only enter those 
markets that are of interest to the parent firm. However, the CSO might be better off 
entering other, non-related markets. Chesbrough (2003a) found that Xerox’s practices in 
managing its equity position diminished the CSO’ revenue growth and market value. In 
general, Xerox followed internal practices that promoted coordination with the CSO and 
its own internal resources. Xerox allocated capital to the CSO as part of the annual 
budget cycle. It recruited internal managers to serve as CEO of the CSO it controlled. 
Moreover, Xerox’s practices restricted the scope of search activities conducted by the 
CSO.  
The strategy of a firm reflects how well a firm is able to perform in the face of 
increased environmental challenge and complexity. It is dependent upon the resources 
acquired by the CSO, the relationship with the parent and the industry conditions of the 
CSO. In their attempt to explain the performance of CSO, scholars have devoted almost 
no attention to the environmental conditions of the CSO or the control exercised by the 
parent firm.  
 
2.2.3.5 Performance 
Research Based View-scholars have argued that firm-specific resources and 
capabilities, which are both rare and valuable, determine the competitive advantage of a 
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firm. When such resources are simultaneously not imitable (i.e. they cannot easily be 
replicated by competitors), not substitutable (i.e. other resources cannot fulfil the same 
function), and not transferable (i.e. they cannot be purchased in resource markets), those 
resources may produce a competitive advantage that is long lived (i.e. sustainable) 
(Barney, 1991). Resources are indeed important for a CSO to perform well. However, in 
examining the performance of CSO, we must take into account that they originate from a 
larger parent firm. Previous research has suggested that entrepreneurial origin is an 
important source of resource differences, strategies, and performance (Knight, 1989; 
McGrath &MacMillan, 2000; Shrader & Simon, 1997).  
In this study, we have tried to incorporate all factors that influence the 
performance of a CSO (see figure 1 for a graphic representation). Most studies on CSO 
have singled out one variable to examine the influence of this variable on the 
performance of a CSO. A few recent studies have considered the interaction of several 
variables on performance. Thornhill and Amit (2000) make a distinction between a non-
financial and a financial relationship and found that the non-financial dimension of the 
parent-CSO relationship has a higher impact on the success of the CSO than does the 
financial dimension. Tubke et al. (2004) has identified several factors influencing the 
CSO decision and the success of the CSO process. 
McGrath, Venkatraman & MacMillan (1994) pointed out that in case of new 
ventures, traditional financial measures of performance such as return on investments, 
return on equity, net profits, and cash flows, lose part of their value because they monitor 
only some aspects. The studies on the ‘legal’ perspective of CSO have focused on the 
financial performance of CSO, often by measuring the excess stock return. However, by 
focusing on the excess stock return, one measures the short term performance of a CSO, 
usually measured after one year of start-up. However, not all CSO are public companies. 
In contrary, most CSO studied by the ‘entrant’ perspective studies are private companies. 
Therefore, these studies have introduced different measures to capture performance. 
Sapienza et al. (2004) use sales growth to measure performance, since they believe sales 
growth represents the outcome of all three types of knowledge overlap (technological, 
production, and marketing-related knowledge) to a greater extent than does patenting or 
new product introduction. Other studies use markets share, since market share can be 
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considered a measure of the firm’s vitality, defined as its ability to face both market and 
competitive challenges in a dynamic environment (Sorrentino & Williams, 1995). 
Measuring the performance of CSO shares many of the difficulties associated 
with evaluating the performance of small, entrepreneurial firms. Covin and Slevin (1989) 
identified three reasons for using subjective performance measures of small-firm 
performance over more objective, hard numerical data: 1) the inability and/or 
unwillingness of firms to provide financial data, 2) the difficulty of interpretation and 
comparison of data due to differing firm objectives, and 3) the influence of industry 
effects. Their solution to the problem of performance evaluation was to create a weighted 
average performance index for firms based upon the product of ‘importance’ scores and 
‘satisfaction’ scores on a series of questions about various financial criteria (e.g. sales, 
cash flow, profit margin). A similar approach was used by Venkatraman (1990) who 
operationalized performance with three indicators, two of which reflect managerial 
satisfaction and a third that evaluates the performance of the competition.  
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter we propose a model that recognizes the role and importance of 
different factors to the performance of a CSO. This model allows us to better understand 
under what conditions CSO can add value to their shareholders and to their parent firms. 
To build this model, we have departed from a collection of studies on corporate spin-offs. 
We have assimilated the emerging findings from these studies within our model of 
“Antecedents and Characteristics of Corporate Spin-offs” (see figure 1). The 
accumulating findings point to three significant conclusions with respect to the 
performance of corporate spin-offs: 1) Identification of an additional motivation to create 
a CSO; 2) Break down of the relationship between CSO and its parent into different 
factors; 3) Recognition of the environment and the control exercised by the parent as key 
moderators. 
 1) Additional motivation to create a CSO The literature has identified four major 
motivations for a parent firm to create a CSO: focus and restructuring motivation; 
financial motivation; incentive motivation; and tax & regulatory motivation. We have 
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complemented the different motivations to set up a CSO as discussed in the literature, 
with the motivation to create CSO as a means to explore new markets, new technologies, 
new business models, or new production tools for the parent firm. To reduce the business 
risks associated with these activities, a parent firm could decide to create a CSO to 
explore opportunities. This would suggest that CSO could become an important part of a 
parent’s firm strategy in exploring new opportunities. To the authors’ knowledge, no 
scholars have investigated CSO in this regard.  
2) Different factors of the relationship CSO-parent Due to the unique nature of 
CSO, we have added the parent industry, conditions and resources to the resource-
strategy-performance framework in the setting of CSO. A hostile or friendly spin-off can 
have a serious impact on the resources, subsequent strategy and performance of a CSO. 
Moreover, besides the resources as identified in the Resource Based View, we also need 
to consider the knowledge relatedness with the parent as an important element in the 
resource base of a CSO.  
3) Recognition of the environment and the control exercised by the parent as key 
moderators The importance of the external environment on the strategy of a company has 
been recognized in previous literature (Miller & Friesen, 1983; Zahra & Bogner, 1999). 
In this chapter, we extend the link between environment and strategy-making to the 
setting of corporate spin-offs. Moreover, in case of a CSO, also the control exercised by 
the parent firm moderates the relationship between strategy and performance. 
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3 THE TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY OF CORPORATE 
SPIN-OFFS 
 
The previous chapter has reviewed the literature on corporate spin-offs (CSO). 
We have integrated the existing literature into a model of antecedents and characteristics 
of CSO. In this chapter, a part of this model is further developed. Hypotheses are derived 
to examine the relationship between resources, strategy and performance of CSO.  
According to Itami and Numagami (1992), technology is the most fundamental of 
the core capabilities of a firm. Managing technology effectively requires a company to 
develop a strategy that guides its use of technological resources and skills (Adler, 1989). 
CSO are brought on the market to commercialize a new technology. Developing new 
technologies, even breakthrough ones, is rarely sufficient to survive and achieve market 
success (McGrath 1994). New ventures, therefore, need also to employ effective 
technological strategies that allow them to financially benefit from their innovations 
(McGee, Dowling, and Meggison 1995). Spin-offs need to develop a technology strategy 
in order to be able to commercialize their new technology. These technology strategies 
must be set in conjunction with the resources the spin-offs possess, in order to achieve a 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
3.1 The Concept Technology 
Before we start elaborating on the technology strategy of CSO, we first want to 
clarify what we understand under the concept ‘technology’. Technology is a systematic 
body of knowledge based on the principles of how natural things behave as they do and 
how they interact with artificial things (Itami & Numagami, 1992). It is a logical system 
which combines this body of knowledge. The purpose of technology is to produce 
artificial things to satisfy basic human needs. As Thompson (1967) said, technology is a 
set of knowledge and beliefs on causal relations and thus a system of logic. When the 
entire logic becomes a closed system, technology becomes complete as an instrument. 
Technology encompasses not only articulated knowledge, but also tacit knowledge. 
Technology evolves as a system by incorporating new variables of which people are 
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unaware but become cognizant through production and use experiences (Burgelman & 
Rosenbloom, 1989; Jaikumar & Bohn, 1986; Rosenberg, 1982; Habermeier, 1990). As 
such, technology is a logical system which has its own tendency toward perfection and 
systematization.  
It is, however, different from science in the sense that, although science can 
remain in the abstract world, technology cannot and has to produce things to be used by 
people. Science is the establishment of facts and the development of quantitative rules or 
laws that relate those facts to each other (Allen, 1977). The goal of scientific activities is 
to enhance knowledge and understanding, or learning for its own sake. Technology, in 
contrast, is concerned with incorporating such knowledge into physical artifacts that 
benefit users (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). The output of science is information, but the output 
of technology has to be information to be embodied in products and services made 
available to society (Allen. 1977). Scientists care about contributions to knowledge per 
se, but technologists care about contribution to human life and markets (Bailyn. 1980). 
Thus, technology is very fundamentally oriented toward basic human needs. 
 
 
3.2 The Concept Technology Strategy  
The fundamental question in the field of strategic management is how firms 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997). The dominant paradigm 
in the strategy field during the 1980s was the competitive forces approach developed by 
Porter (1980). The competitive forces approach views the essence of competitive strategy 
formulation as ‘relating a company to its environment’. The key aspect of the firm’s 
environment is the industry in which it competes. The industry structure strongly 
influences the competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies potentially available 
to firms. In the competitive forces model, five industry-level forces (entry barriers, threat 
of substitution, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers, and rivalry 
among industry incumbents) determine the inherent profit potential of an industry or sub 
segment of an industry. The industry structure plays a central role in determining and 
limiting strategic action.  
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A second approach, referred to as a strategic conflict approach (e.g. Shapiro, 
1989) is closely related to the first in its focus on product market imperfections, entry 
deterrence, and strategic interaction. The strategic conflict approach uses the tools of 
game theory and thus implicitly views competitive outcomes as a function of the 
effectiveness with which firms keep their rivals off balance through strategic investments, 
pricing strategies, signaling, and the control of information. Both the competitive forces 
and the strategic conflict approach appear to share the view that rents flow from 
privileged product market positions. 
Another distinct class of approaches emphasizes building competitive advantage 
through capturing entrepreneurial rents stemming from fundamental firm-level efficiency 
advantages. These approaches have their roots in a much older discussion of corporate 
strengths and weaknesses; they have taken on new life as evidence suggests that firms 
build enduring advantages only through efficiency and effectiveness, and as 
developments in organizational economics and the study of technological and 
organizational change become applied to strategy questions. One strand of this literature 
is the resource-based perspective. The resource-based perspective emphasized firm-
specific capabilities and assets and the existence of isolating mechanisms as the 
fundamental determinants of firm performance (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1984). The 
resource-based approach sees firms with superior systems and structures being profitable 
not because they engage in strategic investments that may deter entry and raise prices 
above long-run costs, but because they have markedly lower costs, or offer markedly 
higher quality or product performance. This approach focuses on the rents accruing to the 
owners of scarce firm-specific resources rather than the economic profits form product 
market positioning.  
Another component of the efficiency-based approach is the dynamic capabilities 
approach. The efficiency-based approach identifies the dimensions of firm-specific 
capabilities that can be sources of advantage, and explains how combinations of 
competences and resources can be developed, deployed and protected. This approach 
stresses exploiting existing internal and external firm-specific competences to address 
changing environments. The term ‘dynamic’ refers to the capacity to renew competences 
so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environment; certain innovative 
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responses are required when time-to-market and timing are critical, the rate of 
technological change is rapid, and the nature of future competitions and markets difficult 
to determine. The term ‘capabilities’ emphasizes the key role of strategic management in 
appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational 
skills, resources, and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing 
environment.  
Teece et al. (1997) distinguish models of strategy that emphasize the exploitation 
of market power from models of strategy that emphasize efficiency. From the resource-
based perspective, firms are heterogeneous with respect to their 
resources/capabilities/endowments (Teece et al., 1997). The resource-based perspective 
focuses on strategies for exploiting existing firm-specific assets. Moreover, it also invites 
consideration of managerial strategies for developing new capabilities (Wernerfelt, 
1984). Indeed, if control over scarce resources is the source of economic profits, then it 
follows that such issues as skill acquisition, the management of knowledge and know-
how (Shuen, 1994), and learning become fundamental strategic issues. It is in this second 
dimension, encompassing skill acquisition, learning, and accumulation of organizational 
and intangible or invisible assets (Itami & Roehl, 1987) that lies the greatest potential for 
contributions to strategy. The resource view holds that the type, magnitude, and nature of 
a firm’s resources and capabilities are important determinants of its profitability (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993).  
In the dynamic capabilities perspective, dynamic refers to the capacity to renew 
competences so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environment. The 
term capabilities emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately 
adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, 
resources, and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing 
environment. In this chapter, we want to create insights in the technology strategy spin-
offs will follow, based on their technological resources and their link with the parent 
institute. Therefore, we will use the resource-based perspective and not the dynamic 
capabilities perspective, since the latter perspective goes one step further. The dynamic 
capabilities perspective can be used to describe how a firm uses and adjust its resources 
to adapt to its changing environment. In this chapter however, we want to focus on how 
 56 
firms deploy their resources to build their strategy, without considering the external 
environment.  
The resource-based perspective offers an alternative perspective by recognizing 
the inter-connectedness of a firm’s technological resources with its other assets. 
Following this view, the starting point in creating a competitive advantage is to identify 
and classify a firm’s resources, especially its technology (Grant, 1991). Next, the 
company should determine its technological capabilities by determining which of its 
resources surpass those of the competition as well as what the company does better, 
technologically, than its rivals. This view holds that technology strategy is a component 
or subset of the company's resources and capabilities that provide the foundation for a 
distinctive competence from which a competitive strategy can be developed. The 
resource view further suggests that a competitive advantage is achieved by the 
accumulation, integration, and effective deployment of technological resources. 
Resources serve as a foundation for building enduring, multifaceted capabilities that 
enable the firm to develop and pursue effective strategies. When integrated and 
effectively used, these capabilities enable a firm to develop and introduce new products, 
goods, and services efficiently and quickly. These variables can give the firm a key 
advantage over its rivals, thereby ensuring superior financial performance.  
 
 
3.2.1 Definition of the Concept Technology Strategy 
Technology strategy is one of the most important aspects of any firm’s strategic 
posture (Zahra & Bogner, 1999). It is often a basic requirement for strategy to capitalize 
on technology, because technology can act as a fundamental weapon for competition and 
can determine physical feasibility of alternative actions (Itami and Numagami, 1992).   
A firm’s choice of technology strategy will influence its current and future competitive 
position within an industry. In short, the technology strategy of a firm is a fundamental 
driver of its profitability and success.  
In the literature, we can see an evolution in the definitions of technology strategy. 
First, the concept ‘technology policy’ was used. Technology policy embodied the choices 
companies make about acquiring, developing and deploying technology to help reach the 
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goals of their business strategy (Adler, 1989; Zahra & Covin, 1993). Next, Zahra used the 
concept ‘technology strategy’ in several studies e.g. technology strategy is the plan that 
guides the accumulation and deployment of technological resources and capabilities 
(Zahra, 1996b); technology strategy is the plan that guides a new venture’s decisions on 
the development and use of technological capabilities (Zahra, 1996a); and technology 
strategy is the sum of a firm’s choices on how to develop and exploit its technological 
resources (Zahra & Bogner, 1999). Narayanan (2001) extended the definition into: 
  
Technology strategy can be defined as the revealed pattern in the technology 
choices of firms. The choices involve the commitment of resources for the 
appropriation, maintenance, deployment, and abandonment of technological 
capabilities. These technology choices determine the character and extent of the 
firms’ principal technical capabilities and the set of available product and 
process platforms (Narayanan, 2001, pp. 250). 
 
Narayanan’s definition of technology strategy captures two important points. 
First, technology strategy focuses on the kinds of technologies that a firm selects for 
acquisition, development, deployment, or divestment. Second, the definition uses the 
term revealed patterns, i.e. patterns that are not merely intended but also accomplished. 
Execution implies commitment of resources, commitments surrounding technology 
selection that define the technology strategy. In this thesis, we will define technology 
strategy as the plan that guides a spin-offs’ decision on the development and use of its 
technological resources (Borch et al., 1999).  
 
 
3.2.2 Dimensions of Technology Strategy 
The technological choices of a new venture are usually clarified in its technology 
strategy, i.e. the plan that guides the accumulation and deployment of technological 
resources and capabilities (Zahra, 1996b). Scholars have attributed different dimensions 
to technology strategy. In earlier studies, the concept ‘technology policy’ was used. Zahra 
& Covin (1993) define technology policy as the set of organizational decisions 
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concerning (1) aggressive technological posture, (2) automation and process innovation, 
and (3) new product development. The first dimension refers to the firm’s preference for 
or propensity to use technology proactively in positioning itself (Oster, 1990). The 
second dimension related to the level of automation of plants and facilities, the adoption 
of the latest technology in production, and capital allocations for new equipment and 
machinery (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). The third dimension refers to the intensity of 
a firm’s product development activities (Zahra, 1991). Maidique and Patch (1988) define 
a technology policy as consisting of six dimensions: type of technology, desired level of 
competence, internal versus external sources of technology, R&D investment, timing of 
technology introductions, and R&D organization.  
Next, Zahra & Sisodia (1994) defined several components of a technology 
strategy: a company’s technological posture (whether it pioneers or follows technological 
change in its markets); technology sourcing (internal to the company or external through 
acquisitions, strategic alliances or licensing agreements); technology portfolio (the 
technologies emphasized or offered by the organization over time); and distinctive 
technological skills and resources (such as talented experts or staff). Zahra (1996b) 
identifies 6 key dimensions of technology strategy: pioneering, number of products 
introduced to the market, internal and external R&D sources, level of R&D spending, 
portfolio of applied and basic research projects, and use of patenting. In a later study, 
Zahra & Bogner (1999) identified 5 key dimensions of technology strategy: 
innovativeness; intensity of product upgrades; level of R&D spending; use of external 
technology sources; use of copyrights and patents.  
Innovativeness implies that the firm will develop radically new product (or 
process) technologies and introduce them to the market ahead of the competition (Ali, 
1994). Intensive product upgrades refers to the large number of revisions or extensions of 
the venture’s existing products. R&D spending levels refers to the intensity of the 
venture’s investment in internal R&D activities by building the facilities, expertise, and 
skills needed for continuous innovations (Adler, 1989; Dowling and McGee, 1994). 
External sources refer to the venture’s use of strategic alliances, acquisitions, licensing 
agreements, and outright purchase of technology from outside sources (Adler, 1989; 
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Dowling and McGee, 1994). Last, ventures can use several approaches to protect their 
intellectual capital, including copyrights and trade secrets. 
Narayanan (2001) classifies the technology choices made by a firm along two 
dimensions: scope and leadership. Scope decisions refer to the answer firms develop to 
the question: What technologies should we be in? Technology leadership refers to a 
firm’s commitment to a pioneering goal in the development or exploitation of a 
technology as opposed to a more reactive goal.  
 
In defining the dimensions of technology strategy, authors have not always made 
a clear distinction between the dimensions of technology strategy and the different 
technological resources. The definition of the concepts is clearly stated in most studies, 
but the dimensions of both concepts intertwine. The construct ‘technological resources’ 
refers to the firm-specific products and technology, while technology strategy is the plan 
that guides a new venture’s decision on the development and use of its technological 
resources (Borch et al., 1999). The technology strategy must be set in conjunction with 
the technological resources the firm possess in order to achieve a competitive advantage. 
A similar technology strategy can lead to a different performance due to different 
resource endowments. A clear distinction between technological resources and 
technology strategy variables can therefore create more clarity in the impact of these 
variables on performance. 
The need to link a firm’s technological and strategic choices has been recognized 
for years in the literature (Zahra & Covin, 1993). Success in today’s dynamic markets 
requires the effective use of a company’s technological resources (Zahra & Sisodia, 
1994). Whether embedded in products, processes, equipment or the know-how of 
employees, technological resources are of little value unless they are linked to a 
company’s competitive strategy. Technological resources not only underlie a company’s 
strategy, they can also guide the development of its competitive advantage (Kusunoki, 
1997). Successful companies recognize the importance of this link for defining and 
building their technological skills and capabilities (Abetti, 1997). 
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When we look at the literature on technology strategy, technology strategy seems 
to be captured by two dimensions: scope and newness of the technology. The scope of a 
technology refers to the choice between focusing on a platform technology or a specific 
technology. A platform technology is a technology build on a broad technology platform, 
which can serve as a base for several products (Meyer et al., 1997). Some spin-offs 
develop one specific product, while others develop broad platforms which serve as the 
base architecture for a series of derivative products. Porter (1980, 1985) suggests that the 
breadth or scope of the venture’s business shapes the firm’s strategic choices, especially 
the technology strategy. Also Narayanan (2001) identifies scope as a dimension of 
technology strategy. The dimension scope of a technology is also implicitly comprised in 
several dimension of technology strategy previously stated in the literature: the product 
line breadth (Zahra & Covin, 1993), the intensity of product upgrades (Zahra & Bogner, 
1999) and the number of products introduced in the market.  
The newness of the technology refers to the innovativeness and uniqueness of the 
technology. The concept newness consists of two dimensions: technological innovation 
and the uniqueness of the technology. Technological innovation represents the 
intellectual component of the technology, which is largely intangible. Schoonhoven et al. 
(1990) distinguish between (1) innovation achieved through the creation of new 
knowledge, and (2) innovation created by knowledge synthesis, in which existing 
knowledge is combined in unique ways to create a new product. Hellmann & Puri (2000) 
make a distinction between innovators and imitators. An innovator is a firm that creates 
mainly new, proprietary knowledge. This new and proprietary knowledge could be 
licensed or sold on its own without translating it into products. An imitator, on the other 
hand, rather uses existing knowledge and focuses on making (minor) improvements to it 
or synthesizes several existing technologies in its own proprietary products. 
Technological innovation can be defined as a technology new to a given organization or 
to a given industry (Tornatzky et al., 1983). We will only consider technological 
innovation from the perspective of a given organization, seen the focus on spin-offs. 
The uniqueness of the technology refers to the tacit character of the technology 
e.g. if it is difficult or easy to transfer and codify the technological knowledge in a 
systematic way (Subramaniam & Venkatraman, 2001). A complex and critical part of 
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technology know-how is the “softer” side, which goes beyond codified knowledge 
available in scientific papers, formulae, technical specifications, blueprints, strategy 
reports, and hardware and is held by individual employees in the form of tacit knowledge 
and competence assets (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Teece, 1988). In case a technology is 
unique, it will augment the newness of the technology. The dimension newness of a 
technology is also implicitly comprised in several dimension of technology strategy 
previously stated in the literature:  the commodity-to-specialty products (Zahra & Covin, 
1993), technological leadership (Narayanan, 2001), innovativeness (Zahra & Bogner, 
1999) and pioneering (Zahra, 1996b).  
 
 
3.2.3 Definition of the Concept Technological Resources  
The resource based view of the firm is one of the most prominent theoretical 
perspectives in strategic management (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen, 1997;  Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Central to this perspective is the idea that 
firms differ in their resource positions, and that such resource heterogeneity is a source of 
performance differences across firms (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). The resource-based 
theory views a firm as a unique bundle of tangible and intangible resources and 
emphasizes the protection of firm core competencies comprising these resources. Several 
authors (Barney, 1991; Day and Wensley, 1988; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Wernerfelt, 
1984) have expanded the seminal work of Penrose (1959). Resources enable a firm to 
conceive and implement strategies that improve efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 
1991). Firm competitive advantage is rooted in resources that are valuable and inimitable, 
and the firm’s survival largely depends on how it creates new resources, develops 
existing ones, and protects its core competencies (Day and Wensley, 1988). For firm 
resources to hold the potential of sustained competitive advantage, they must have four 
attributes: (a) it must be valuable, in the sense that it exploit opportunities and/or 
neutralizes threats in a firm’s environment, (b) it must be rare among a firm’s current and 
potential competition, (c) it must be imperfectly imitable, and (d) there cannot be 
strategically equivalent substitutes for this resource that are valuable but neither rare or 
imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991).  
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In the language of traditional strategic analysis, firm resources are strengths that 
firms can use to conceive of and implement their strategies (Porter, 1980).  Amit & 
Schoemaker (1993) define the firm’s resources as stocks of available factors that are 
owned or controlled by the firm. Resources are converted into final products or services 
by using a wide range of other firm assets and bonding mechanisms such as technology, 
management information systems, incentive systems, trust between management and 
labor and more. Resources are defined as those attributes of physical and knowledge-
based assets that enable a firm to conceive and implement strategies that lead to 
differences in performance (Wernerfelt, 1984). Barney (1991) classifies resources into 
three categories: physical, human and organizational capital resources. Physical 
resources include the physical technology used in the firm, a firm’s plant and equipment, 
its geography and its access to raw materials. Human resources include the training, 
experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, and insight of individual managers and 
workers in the firm. Organizational resources include a firm’s formal reporting systems, 
as well as informal relations among groups within a firm and between a firm and those in 
its environment. Organizational resources include the systems, the routines and the 
relationships embedded in the company. They represent the ways in which firms combine 
and transform their other initial resources (Galunic & Rodan, 1998). Organizational 
resources are intangible, immobile and inherently difficult to imitate and are therefore 
particularly important for providing competitive advantage. Organizational resources 
cannot easily be acquired by new ventures but are built over time. 
‘Technological resources’ refers to the firm-specific products and technology 
(Borch et al., 1999) and can be seen as part of the physical resources. We will use the 
term ‘technological resources’ in this thesis since we are particularly interested in the 
technological resources and their influence on the technology strategy. Technology 
strategy can be defined as the plan that guides a new venture’s decision on the 
development and use of its technological resources. Insights in the technological 
resources and technology strategy are important since the literature has demonstrated 
technology’s growing importance in determining success in today’s marketplace. In one 
industry after another, companies have used their technologies to create an enduring 
competitive advantage by offering new products or utilizing new processes, revising the 
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rules of competition, or redrawing their industry’s boundaries (Utterback, 1994). 
Technology’s profound effect on the industrial landscape is pervasive and is felt in nearly 
every sector of the economy. 
 
 
3.2.4 Dimensions of Technological Resources 
As previously stated, authors have not always made a clear distinction between 
the dimensions of technology strategy and the different technological resources. The 
construct ‘technological resources’ refers to the firm-specific products and technology, 
while technology strategy is the plan that guides a new venture’s decision on the 
development and use of its technological resources (Borch et al., 1999). Based on the 
literature, in this study technological resources are classified as: internal R&D sources, 
collaboration in R&D consortia, technology transfer from the parent, and transfer of 
production knowledge from the parent.  
Internal R&D sources This variable refers to the intensity of internal R&D 
activities (Adler, 1989; McCann, 1991) by building the facilities, expertise and skills 
needed for continuous innovation (Zahra & Bogner, 1999). Internal R&D ensures 
ownership and control of key knowledge which can enable the spin-off to profitably 
exploit its innovations. It also allows building proprietary research platforms which can 
lead to future success (Helfat, 1994). The development of internal technologies is 
important, since internal technologies are not widely accessible, in contrary to external 
technologies that are also accessible to other firms (Garud & Nayyar, 1994). 
Collaboration in R&D consortia refers to the collaboration projects set up 
between spin-offs and universities or companies to jointly develop some parts of the 
technology. These partnerships can give the spin-off access to a large pool of 
technological resources and capabilities that can proof necessary to develop new products 
(Zahra & Bogner, 1999). Spin-offs often use external sources of technology to 
complement and enhance their internal technological capabilities. They may buy 
technologies from other companies, acquire technology-based businesses, and engage in 
licensing agreements to acquire or sell their technologies, or join technological alliances 
(McCann, 1991; Porter, 1980). Collaboration projects can offset weaknesses in the spin-
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off’s R&D, it can expedite product development and offer opportunities for learning 
(Dodgson, 1993). They can allow the firm to bundle its particular technological 
advantages with key product attributes (features) developed by other firms, and quickly 
bring a large number of new products to the market (Zahra & Bogner, 1999).  
Internal R&D sources and collaboration in R&D consortia are technological 
resources inherent to each company involved in technology commercialization. CSO 
form a distinct group of young companies since they originate from a parent institute. 
Consequently, in considering the technological resources of CSO, we need to recognize 
the fact that a transfer of knowledge from the parent firm may have taken place. 
Heterogeneity in a spin-off’s capabilities has been related to the prior affiliation and pre-
entry knowledge of firms (Carroll et al., 1996; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & 
Simons, 2000). Research has suggested that routines and resources transfer from old to 
new organizations through personnel migration (Almeida & Kogut, 1999) Areas of 
knowledge relatedness critical to growth include technology, market or production 
relatedness (Rumelt, 1974; Sapienza et al., 2004). Due to the unique nature of CSO, we 
need to take the transfer of technology and production knowledge into account when 
discussing the technological resources.  
Technology transfer from the parent refers to the degree in which the spin-off 
transfers technological knowledge from its parent firm. In case of technology transfer, a 
spin-off is able to augment its technological knowledge base by learning from its parent. 
A solid technological knowledge base will allow the spin-off firm to design products that 
offer greater technological performance than already available in the market and to cut 
the development time from product idea to commercial product (Sapienza et al., 2004). 
Parent firms may also formally transfer knowledge to the spin-offs firms i.e. in the form 
of a patent, a license, copyrights or trade secrets. Copyrights are among the spin-off’s 
most values assets because they enhance its reputation and strengthen its bargaining 
power (Zahra & Bogner, 1999). Patenting helps to delay imitation by other firms and 
protects the venture’s gains from R&D spending and product introductions (Teece, 
1986). Levin et al. (1987) observe that patenting represents the most effective means of 
protecting spin-off’s technological resources. Parent firms may transfer patents to the 
spin-off, since this can help the spin-off leverage its value.  
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Transfer of production knowledge from the parent refers to the degree in which the 
spin-off transfers production knowledge from its parent firm. Spin-offs can learn 
production techniques from the parent firm in order to realize efficient and effective 
customization of production. This knowledge can allow them to meet changes in 
customer specifications (Sapienza et al., 2004). The suitability of the production related 
resources held by the parent firm greatly increases the likelihood of spin-offs being able 
to produce products on a commercial scale by the time of the separation from the parent 
firm (Parhankangas, 1999).  
 
 
3.3 Corporate Spin-Offs versus University Spin-Offs 
Previous studies have examined young companies and the impact of their 
technology strategy on performance (Zahra, 1996a; Zahra, 1996b; Schrader & Simon, 
1997). These studies have split up the group of young companies into corporate ventures 
and independent ventures. Corporate ventures are defined as ventures owned by 
established firms, while independent ventures are ventures created by individual 
entrepreneurs. Independent ventures can be seen as all ventures that are not owned by 
their parent firm. These independent ventures form a heterogeneous group of companies 
on itself. They can be divided into different subgroups e.g. university spin-offs, corporate 
spin-offs, and independent start-ups.  
In the previous chapter, we have reviewed the literature on corporate spin-offs 
(CSO). We have made the distinction between the definition of a corporate spin-off from 
a legal perspective and from an entrant perspective. Next, we have developed our own 
definition of corporate spin-off. A corporate spin-off was defined as “a separate legal 
entity that is concentrated around activities that were originally developed in a larger 
parent firm. The entity is concentrated around a new business, with the purpose to 
develop and market new products or services based upon a proprietary technology or 
skill”. The advantage of using this definition is that it emphasizes the ‘new’ character of 
the CSO. Especially in the legal perspective, CSO can be based on a mature technology 
that exists already for quite some time. In this thesis, we wish to focus on those CSO 
which are set up around new businesses.  
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Corporate spin-offs are not the only group of new companies that originate from a 
larger parent institute. Also university spin-offs (USO) originate from larger parent 
institutes e.g. universities and research centers. Roberts & Wainer (1968) and Cooper 
(1971, 1973) were among the first to study the spin-off phenomenon. The study of 
Roberts examined spinouts from MIT laboratories and academic departments while 
Cooper’s work focused on corporate spinouts in what was to become Silicon Valley. 
Apart from a small number of studies (e.g., Louis et al., 1989; Roberts and Malone, 
1996), the majority have focused on a single university or on a very small number of 
institutions. Early research on university spin-offs was mainly US focused, but there has 
been a recent upsurge in European research on European university spin-offs (e.g. special 
issue of Research Policy, volume 34, 2005).  
In the US, legislative initiatives such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 helped to 
accelerate the rate of diffusion of new technologies from universities and federal 
laboratories to firms. Also in European countries, legislation was enacted to stimulate the 
commercialization of university-based research and technology. Licensing has 
traditionally been the dominant route for the commercialization of technology invented at 
universities and research institutes (Shane, 2004). Most university technologies are 
licensed to existing companies, since established firms have a variety of advantages in 
commercializing university technologies. For instance, they have market knowledge, 
relationships with customers, distribution systems and related products, all of which 
facilitate the creation and sale of new technology products and services (Lowe, 2002). As 
a result, established companies can often make money by commercializing technologies 
that do not justify the expense of creating a new firm.  
In his study on USO, Shane (2004) found that USO tend to be founded to exploit 
technologies that are radical, tacit, early stage and general-purpose. Radical technologies 
tend to provide the basis for the creation of university spin-offs, while incremental 
technologies are more likely to be licensed by established companies. Research has 
shown that, when a university technology is at a very early stage of development, and so 
is ‘unproven’, it cannot be licensed easily to established firms. As a result, early stage 
inventions tend to lead to the formation of spin-offs (Doutriaux and Barker, 1995). USO 
often need to overcome cultural obstacles since spin-off companies are often observed to 
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be diluting academic work and potentially risking the university’s reputation (Blair & 
Hitchens, 1998). University spin-offs generate several problems for the achievement of 
the traditional academic goals of the creation and dissemination of knowledge.  
 
 
3.3.1 Definitions of University Spin-Offs  
While going through the literature on university spin-offs (USO), one can notice 
that there is no universal definition of a university spin-off. Some authors define USO in 
a broad sense (e.g. Smilor et al., 1990), other authors prefer a more narrow definition 
(Lockett & Wright, 2005). Roberts (1991) has defined USO as companies founded by 
anyone who has studied or worked at the university. Smilor et al. (1990) define university 
spin-off companies in two ways: (a) the founder was a faculty member, staff member, or 
student who left the university to start a company or who started a company while still 
affiliated with the university; and (b) a technology or technology-based idea developed 
within the university. Shane (2004) uses a more narrow definition of university spin-off 
namely a university spin-off is a new company founded to exploit a piece of intellectual 
property created in an academic institution. Lockett & Wright (2005) define university 
spin-outs as new ventures that are dependent upon licensing or assignment of the 
institution’s intellectual property for initiation. They exclude all companies not based on 
technology assigned/licensed from the university, such as companies that may be 
established by graduates or university researchers that are not directly related to 
intellectual assets created from research funded by government or industry. 
Roberts’ definition of university spin-offs includes a wide range of new 
companies. It includes companies founded by people who attended or worked at a 
university many years earlier. This means that the factors leading to the formation and 
development of the new companies are distantly related to the university, at best. 
According to Shane’s definition, university spin-offs are a subset of all start-up 
companies created by the students and employees of academic institutions. Companies 
established by current of former members of a university, which do not commercialize 
intellectual property created in academic institutions, are not included in his definition. 
This in line with the distinction made by The Association of University Technology 
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Managers between “start-ups” and “spin offs”. The first group of companies is based on 
know-how developed at the university or research institute without formal transfer of 
technology, whereas the “spin-offs” are established with a formal transfer of technology. 
In this study, we will define a university spin-off as “a new company that is 
formed by a faculty, staff member, or doctoral student who left the university (research 
organization) to found a company or start a company while still affiliated with the 
university, and/or a core technology (or idea) that is transferred from the parent 
organization” (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Smilor et al., 1990; Steffenson et al., 1999). In 
this way, CSO and USO are both young companies set up to commercialize a new 
technology. An independent start-up can be defined as all new companies which are not 
based on a core technology or idea developed in a parent firm. These companies do not 
have a clear link with a parent organization. In the empirical part of this dissertation, we 
will focus on two groups of new product-based companies, CSO and USO. Past research 
has devoted limited attention to single out these two subgroups of independent ventures. 
 
 
3.3.2 Technology Strategy of Corporate and University Spin-Offs 
This dissertation wants to create a better understanding of the technology strategy 
of corporate spin-offs. The technology strategy must be set in conjunction with the 
resources the spin-off posses in order to achieve a competitive advantage. The resource 
inheritance of corporate spin-offs can be traced directly to their parents, who provide 
them with distinctive, but limited, knowledge (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). CSO inherit 
general technical knowledge from their parents that shapes their nature at birth. 
Researchers have suggested that entrepreneurial origin is an important source of resource 
differences, strategies, and performance (Knight, 1989; McGrath &MacMillan, 2000; 
Shrader & Simon, 1997). Organizational blueprints can transfer across firm boundaries, 
in a manner analogous to the reproduction and transmission of biological genes (Winter, 
1991). These transfers may include unique insights and decision rules used to transform 
resources into action (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), cognitive dimensions of competency 
(Fiol, 1991), and specific knowledge and information (Boeker, 1997). Since “what an 
organization knows at its birth will determine what it searches for, what it experiences, 
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and how it interprets what it encounters” (Huber, 1991: 91), one implication is that a 
spin-off’s capability accumulation may be linked to its inherited knowledge and that the 
agent of transfer may have an impact on the efficacy of transfer.  
CSO are not the only group of new ventures that inherited knowledge from their 
parents. Also USO transfer knowledge from their parent institutes e.g. universities or 
research centers. CSO and USO are similar in the sense that they both originate from a 
larger parent institute e.g. an established firm, a university or a research institute. They 
are both young companies, set up to commercialize a new technology. However, due to 
the nature of their parent, we expect USO and CSO to also show significant differences. 
Studying the technology strategy of both CSO and USO makes it possible to gain a richer 
understanding of the phenomenon. We have not performed an extensive literature study 
on USO, since Mustar et al. (2006) have recently done this in an excellent way.  
In the following paragraphs, we will develop the hypotheses on the technological 
resources, the technology strategy and the performance of CSO and USO. The 
hypothesized differences between the samples of CSO and USO are grounded in well-
established theory on institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 
1977).  
 
 
3.4 Hypotheses Development   
 
3.4.1 Hypotheses Development: Technological Resources of CSO and USO 
In the following paragraphs, we will develop hypotheses on the technological 
resources of CSO and USO.  
 
3.4.1.1 Internal R&D Sources 
Internal R&D sources refer to the intensity of internal R&D activities (Adler, 
1989; McCann, 1991). Internal R&D sources are important because technological 
knowledge usually develops in a path-dependent way (Dosi, 1988), and the knowledge 
gained at any one point in time can become a foundation for later R&D efforts. 
University spin-offs (USO) originate from universities or research institutes. Universities 
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typically have the aim to perform research at the cutting edge of the field. From their very 
nature, universities are typically more focused on performing fundamental research, 
while companies execute more applied research. While working for their parent 
organization, the main focus of the founders of the USO has been on technology related 
work. Moreover, most people working at research positions at the university really like to 
perform research and wish to continue performing research, after founding the spin-off. 
We therefore expect a USO to put a lot of emphasis on the internal R&D sources, since 
this is what they are most familiar with. 
A corporate spin-off (CSO) on the other hand can originate from all possible 
departments of a large established firm. The founders of the CSO can previously been 
employed in a technical department, but also in a production or marketing department. In 
any case, during their employment at the parent firm, they will have had some contact 
with the more commercial side of the business. Therefore, we expect CSO to have more 
attention for the commercial side and moderate the attention devoted to internal R&D 
sources. Therefore:  
 
H1: USO will have more internal R&D sources than CSO 
  
 
3.4.1.2 Collaboration in R&D Consortia 
Collaboration in R&D consortia represents the formation of collaborative 
arrangements between two or more firms to conduct research and development. 
Collaborative arrangements involve two or more firms in which the partners hope to learn 
and acquire from each other the technologies, products, skills and knowledge that are not 
otherwise available (Narayanan, 2001). The partners may range from suppliers and 
customers to competitors, unrelated firms or organizations in the public sector. Access to 
external sources of technology can also help spin-offs to safeguard themselves against 
competence destroying changes in their industry (Tushman and Anderson 1986) by 
licensing technologies from other firms, instead of relying solely on internal R&D (Link 
and Tassey 1987). 
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University spin-offs set up to commercialize a new technology, are often founded 
by people who previously did a Ph.D. at the university. These people have attended 
scientific conferences during their Ph.D. and build up a network within the scientific 
community. This network may allow them to build R&D collaborations with other 
universities and research institutes quite easily. They know other Ph.D. students and 
professors at these respective universities. Moreover, they are quite familiar with the way 
a university works. CSO on the other hand are not so familiar with the university 
environment. In some cases, their parent firms may have had some collaboration projects 
with universities, but in general, the founders of CSO are not so familiar with the way 
universities work.  
Universities are of course not the only institution with which USO or CSO can 
have R&D collaborations. A lot of collaboration projects for technical development take 
place between companies. The network of the CSO will rather be situated in the business 
world. CSO will have more links or access to other companies than USO. Therefore, we 
expect CSO to have more collaboration projects with other companies than USO. 
However, it is important to consider the conditions of spin-off firms at founding. The 
more they collaborate with other companies and universities, the more complex it 
becomes to arrange the issues concerning the intellectual property rights. It is possible to 
divide the technology into different aspects and set up collaborations with universities to 
further develop each aspect. However, it is more difficult to do the same with companies. 
Since the ultimate goal of a company is to generate profits, a company wants to see the 
potential benefits of engaging in a partnership. Universities are more interested in 
extending their scientific knowledge on a certain technological component. Moreover, 
collaborations with universities are often not that costly as collaborations with companies 
due to the profit orientation of companies. En plus, universities are not interested in 
bringing products to the market, while companies are. Since at founding, spin-off 
companies do not possess over numerous resources to exchange with other companies, 
we expect them to rather collaborate with universities than with companies. Seen the 
contacts and familiarity of USO with universities, we hypothesize that USO will have 
more R&D collaborations than CSO. Therefore:  
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H2: USO will have more collaboration in R&D consortia than CSO 
 
 
3.4.1.3 Technology Transfer from the Parent 
Technology transfer from the parent refers to the degree to which the spin-off 
transfers technological knowledge from its parent firm. The transfer of technology from 
the parent to the spin-off can be formal (e.g. patents and licenses) or informal. Strong 
intellectual property protection can be important for spin-off companies because it may 
be the only competitive advantage available to the spin-off at the time of the company’ 
creation. When a new firm is founded, it does not have advantages based on superior 
manufacturing or marketing and distribution, which allow it to out-compete other firms 
(Teece, 1986). The existence of strong intellectual property protection may enable the 
founder of the spin-off to build the value chain for the new firm before competitors have 
copied its new technology. The formal transfer of technology from the parent to a CSO or 
USO will be highly dependent upon the fact if the parent supports the spin-off or not. For 
example, in case the CSO is set up by employees who are unhappy with the current way 
of doing at the parent firm, they can transfer technological knowledge to the spin-off 
company, but there will probably be no patents or licenses transfer. Having no formal 
transfer of technology does not mean that the importance of technology transfer from the 
parent can not be high. 
A CSO is often created in response to a market pull. This makes it easier to be 
more precise in the technology that needs to be transferred. Most USO on the other hand, 
are brought on the market under a technology push. Most academics create new 
technologies as a byproduct of their research activities, not because they are asked to 
come up with technical solutions to specific customer problems (Shane, 2004). This 
requires that they need to transfer more technological knowledge since they do not yet 
know what specific technological aspects they will need to bring products to the market. 
Moreover, in case of USO, the technology may be more radical in nature, which implies 
that a greater amount of technological knowledge needs to be transferred in other to 
transform the radical technology into a market ready product. In case of a technology 
push, strong intellectual property protection can prove to be of vital importance. In recent 
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years, universities have put a lot of effort in setting up technology transfer offices in order 
to create value out of the technologies developed within the universities. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3: Technology transfer from the parent will be more prevalent in the case 
of USO than CSO 
 
 
3.4.1.4 Transfer of Production Knowledge from the Parent 
Transfer of production knowledge from the parent refers to the degree in which 
the spin-off transfers production knowledge from its parent firm. Academia has a large 
numbers of people with excellent research skills who have a comparative advantage in 
the invention of new technology (Shane, 2004). However, academia lacks people with 
product development skills. Production machinery is more likely to be found in a private 
company than in a university (Lindholm, 1997a). Production knowledge the USO may 
inherit from its parent can be the skill of using certain laboratory equipment which might 
prove useful in the production process. Companies on the other hand do posses 
production units, and especially in case the CSO originates from a production unit, we 
expect the transfer of the production knowledge to be high. Most founders of CSO have 
at least had limited contact with the production units of the parent firm. In case the CSO 
is supported by the parent, it might be possible for the CSO to continue using certain 
machinery after the spin-off. Therefore:  
 
H4: The transfer of production knowledge will be higher in case of a CSO 
than a USO 
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3.4.2 Hypotheses Development: Relationship between Technological 
Resources and Technology Strategy  
 
Effective management of a company’s technological resources requires the 
development and implementation of a sound technology strategy (Zahra & Sisodia, 
1994). Studies on the technology strategy of companies have mainly focused on large 
companies. Limited research (Zahra & Bogner, 1999; Zahra, 1996b) has been conducted 
on the technology strategy of young companies. This study focuses on two groups of new 
product-based companies: corporate spin-offs and university spin-offs. Corporate spin-
offs and university spin-offs offer a unique setting since they both have a link with their 
parent organization. However, both spin-offs can be created for very different purposes. 
University spin-offs are often put on the market as a technology push, while corporate 
spin-offs will rather approach the market from a market-pull perspective. These two 
different dynamics can lead to the execution of different technology strategies. Research 
indicates that a firm’s history matters (e.g. Stinchcombe, 1965) and that the pre-
organizational contexts and efforts vary across newly founded firms (Teece et al., 1997).  
In the previous paragraph, we have developed hypotheses that make the different 
resource endowments of CSO and USO obvious. A USO is more likely to emphasize 
internal R&D sources, and collaborations in R&D consortia. USO will have more chance 
to a formal technology transfer. CSO on the other hand have the possibility to transfer 
production knowledge from their parent. Since the CSO and USO are likely to emphasize 
different technological resources, we might expect the technology strategy, that is set in 
conjunction with the technological resources, to also differ for both groups of spin-offs. 
As defined earlier, technology strategy consists of two dimensions: scope and newness of 
the technology. The scope of the technology may vary from a narrow scope to a broad 
scope. The newness of a technology may differ from a low level of newness to a high 
level of newness.  
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3.4.2.1 Internal R&D Sources 
Internal R&D ensures the venture’s ownership and control of key knowledge 
(Zahra & Bogner, 1999). More internal R&D sources may lead to a broader exploration 
of the possibilities of a certain technology and has the potential to lead to a broader 
product scope. In case the internal R&D sources are very limited, the R&D people will 
have little space to experiment with new technological opportunities. Limited resources 
will often lead to copying rivals’ technologies and using incremental innovation to 
enhance customers’ value (Ali, 1994). More internal resources on the other hand, can 
create the possibility to experiment with and try out several innovative technologies.  A 
high amount of internal R&D sources may allow investing more time and resources in 
developing a unique technology, which is difficult to imitate. This may allow the spin-off 
to leads its industry in creating new technologies, which requires radical product or 
process innovations (Ali, 1994). Being a pioneer demands extensive investments in R&D 
(Ali, 1994).  
 
H5a: A high amount of internal R&D sources is positively associated with 
a broad scope of technology  
H5b: A high amount of internal R&D sources is positively associated with 
a high level of newness of technology 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Collaboration in R&D Consortia 
It can be advantageous for spin-offs to gain and seek access to a larger, more 
diverse pool of technological capabilities through external linkages and partnerships 
(Tyler and Steensma, 1995). Developing certain technologies into market-ready products 
can be a very demanding task, especially for young companies who do not possess a 
broad resource base and huge financial means. In order to lower the development time 
and the development cost of the technology, young companies often seek to collaborate 
with other partners. Collaborative arrangements can be particularly useful for spin-offs to 
pool resources, to share risk of technological development and to leverage its own 
capabilities (Narayanan, 2001). Spin-offs can collaborate with universities and/or 
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companies. The choice of a collaboration partner will depend upon the requirements 
necessary to develop the technology. Seen the nature of the research performed at 
universities and established firms, a spin-off will rather approach a university to 
collaborate in case they want to deepen their knowledge of certain basic components of 
the technology. Collaboration with established firms typically focuses on shorter term 
projects which are clearly defined. External sources can give the ventures quick access to 
multiple technologies (Dodgson, 1993).  
Spin-offs often use external sources of technology to complement and enhance 
their internal technological capabilities. They may buy technologies from other 
companies, acquire technology-based businesses, and engage in licensing agreements to 
acquire or sell their technologies, or join technological alliances (Dussauge et al., 1992; 
McCann, 1991; Porter, 1980). Spin-offs can combine technologies secured from external 
sources with internal resources to offer radically new products or upgrade existing ones. 
This bundling of external and internal technologies can enhance the spin-off’s capacity to 
introduce highly differentiated products quickly and economically (McGrath, 1994).  
 
H6a: Collaboration in R&D consortia will be positively associated with a 
broader scope of technology 
H6b: Collaboration in R&D consortia will be positively associated with a 
high level of newness of technology 
 
 
3.4.2.3 Technology transfer from the parent 
Corporate and university spin-offs originate from a larger parent institute and are 
created to commercialize a new technology. The idea to commercialize this technology 
started while working for a parent firm or university. The chance of some technology 
being transferred from the parent organization to the spin-off is therefore quite high. This 
transfer of technology can be formal or informal. The formality of technology transfer 
will be dependent upon the support of the parent firm, but also upon the technology itself. 
Some technologies e.g. biotechnology leads itself more to being patentable than other 
technologies e.g. software. Patents and copyrights can give the venture some control over 
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the fate of its discoveries which it can exploit through licensing agreements or other 
means. They may also enhance the venture’s reputation, strengthen its bargaining power 
with venture capitalists, and obtain the funds necessary to support internal R&D (Bell and 
McNamara, 1991). Patents and copyrights are useful also in joining strategic alliances, 
while protecting the venture’s intellectual property, which increases the new venture’s 
ability to gain market share and achieve growth. 
 A large amount of technology transfer from the parent may indicate that the 
technological activities of the spin-off are not yet focused. In case the spin-off pursues a 
specific technological opportunity, there may be less need to transfer a large amount of 
technological knowledge. A large transfer of technological knowledge may also point to 
a more radical technology. Since a radical technology is often still in development at the 
moment of start up, it is less clear what specific technological components will be 
necessary to transform the technology into a market-ready product. Therefore, more 
technological knowledge than strict necessary may be transferred to the spin-off. 
Moreover, in case patents and licenses are taken, we might expect the technology to be 
radical. There is less interest in protecting an incremental technology. Therefore:  
 
H7a: Transfer of technology from the parent is positively associated with a 
broad scope of technology 
H7b: Transfer of technology from the parent is positively associated with 
a high level of newness of technology 
 
  
3.4.2.4 Transfer of production knowledge from parent 
In case production knowledge and/or production equipment is available for spin-
offs, the spin-off may have the tendency to adapt/adjust their technology to the available 
knowledge and equipment. The spin-off may have the tendency to exclude the 
technology that does not match the transferred production knowledge, and focus on those 
specific technologies that do match. Transfer of production knowledge may point to the 
fact that the technology is rather incremental and it is more obvious which production 
knowledge is required to produce the product. The transfer of a large amount of 
 78 
production knowledge from the parent to the spin-off might prevent the spin-off to come 
up with new, innovative solutions. In case the familiarity with the production technology 
is high, it might hinder innovative thinking.  
 
H8a: Transfer of production knowledge from the parent is negatively 
associated with a broad scope of technology 
H8b: Transfer of production knowledge from the parent is negatively 
associated with a high level of newness of technology 
 
 
3.4.3 Hypotheses Development: Technology Strategy of CSO and USO 
In the following paragraphs, we will develop hypotheses on the technology 
strategy of CSO and USO.  
 
3.4.3.1 Scope of Technology 
A broad scope of technologies, or platform technologies as practitioners often call 
them, provide a good basis for starting a spin-off company because they allow founders 
to change market applications if the first application that they pursue turns out to be a 
dead end (Tornatzky et al., 1995). This flexibility is important to the survival of new 
companies, which have no existing products to fall back on should an application for a 
new technology prove to be unviable. Second, a broad scope of technologies allows spin-
offs to diversify risks and amortize their costs across different market applications, both 
of which are important to the establishment of successful new firms. It provides the new 
firm with potential market applications that are achievable at different points in time: 
some in the short term, others in the medium term, and still others in the long term 
(Nelson, 1991). This flexibility allows the founders of the spin-offs to match the pursuit 
of market applications to resource assembly over time and so better manage the firm 
creation process.  
From their very nature, universities are typically more focused on performing 
basic research, while companies execute more applied research. Basic research includes 
more fundamental research, which heighten the changes of creating a broader scope of 
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technology. Since USO will rather collaborate with other universities and put more 
emphasis on internal R&D sources, we expect USO to rather focus on a broad scope 
technologies. In his study, Nelson (1991) found that university spin-offs tend to exploit 
general-purpose technologies, or basic inventions with broad applications in many fields 
of use. CSO are often started under a market pull, they see a market opportunity and 
develop the new technology in order to fulfill this market need. Due to their previous 
working experience in their parent firm, they will have build up technological skills and 
production knowledge. This will encourage them to focus on a more narrow scope of 
technology in order to address the identified market opportunity. Therefore: 
 
H9: USO will have a broader scope of technology than CSO 
 
 
3.4.3.2 Newness of Technology 
University spin-offs tend to be founded to exploit technologies that are radical, 
tacit, early stage and general-purpose, which provide significant value to customers, 
represents major technical advances and have strong intellectual property protection. 
Several academic studies show that radical technologies tend to provide the basis for the 
creation of university spin-offs, while incremental technologies are more likely to be 
licensed by established companies (Shane, 2004). Many university inventions lead to the 
formation of spin-offs because they are early stage technologies that are little more than 
‘proof of concepts’ when the researcher discloses the invention to the university 
technology-licensing office. Research has shown that, when a university technology is at 
a very early stage of development, and so is ‘unproven’, it cannot be licensed easily to 
established firms. As a result, early stage inventions tend to lead to the formation of spin-
offs (Doutriaux and Barker, 1995). Roberts (1991) found that most university spin-offs 
lack prototypes of their products at the time of spin-off even if they have achieved proof 
of principle in the laboratory.  
Corporate spin-offs are also created to commercialize a new technology. Due to 
their previous working experience, we might expect CSO to rather engage in incremental 
technologies in order to get the products out as fast as possible in order to generate 
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revenues. The transfer of production knowledge may further enhance the focus on 
incremental technologies. Therefore:  
 
H10: USO will have a higher level of newness of technology than CSO   
 
 
3.4.4 Hypotheses Development: Relationship between Technology Strategy 
and Performance  
Technology’s growing importance in determining success in today’s marketplace 
has been widely recognized in the literature (Zahra, 1996a). In one industry after another, 
companies have used their technologies to create an enduring competitive advantage by 
offering new products or utilizing new processes, revising the rules of competition, or 
redrawing their industry’s boundaries (Utterback, 1994). Technology strategy is 
important for new ventures’ market survival and financial success since poor 
technological choices can undermine the success of ventures (McCann, 1991). 
Consequently, some companies have designed technology strategies to articulate their 
plans to develop and deploy technological resources to achieve superior performance 
(McCann, 1991). Having a good product or a sophisticated technology alone does not 
always guarantee success in the marketplace (Bell and McNamara, 1991; McGrath, 
1994). Schrader & Simon (1997) found that success is less a function of the different 
resources independent and corporate ventures have, but more a function of what 
strategies the firms choose based upon their resources. Technology strategy must 
therefore be part of a comprehensive strategy to manage that technology as an ongoing, 
living resource (Zahra & Bogner, 1999).  
 
3.4.4.1 Scope of Technology 
The scope of technology will influence the venture’s performance (Grant, 1996). 
The breadth of a portfolio depends on the company’s technology posture, risk orientation, 
environmental perceptions, financial resources and the capacity to manage the portfolio’s 
complexity (Zahra, 1996a). A broad portfolio enables a company to pursue many market 
opportunities, reduces its vulnerability to rivals’ technologies, and permits it to capitalize 
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on the convergence of different technologies in creating new markets. A broad 
technology platform may encompass several promising applications, which can lead to a 
large number of products. A large number of products is not always conducive to short-
term profitability, but it entails the ability to augment the long term performance of spin-
offs. A broad portfolio however can tax the company’s organization, resources and 
management. Intense product development and introductions require significant resource 
commitments, often without a guarantee of success. A broad scope of technology may 
imply that the attention is scattered over many products and potential product 
applications. This may make it more difficult to single out a few technologies and 
develop them into market-ready products. Spin-offs need to carefully determine the 
breadth of the product portfolio, based on an examination of customers' needs and their 
company's resources, capacity, and risk-taking orientation (Zahra, 1996a).  
Spin-offs are often created to commercialize a new technology. In the initial 
phase of developing the technology, it is not always clear what the potential applications 
may be. Therefore, a broader scope of technology may heighten the chances of 
developing some successful applications. Therefore:  
 
H11: A broad scope of technology will be positively associated with 
performance 
 
 
3.4.4.2 Newness of Technology 
A high level of newness of technology may allow a spin-off to break the 
technological competences and power of established competitors and realize extreme 
growth. Being at the forefront of innovation may guarantee a long time success (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986). A high level of newness of technology can allow a company to 
fulfill a unique place in the technology and market needs of certain customers. 
Developing and introducing radically new products may be a proactive, aggressive 
attempt to push out the edge of the technological frontier in an industry (Kerin et al., 
1992). However, developing radical technologies may be risky because it demands 
extensive investments in R&D, market development and customer education (Ali, 1994).  
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Even in case the company succeeds in bringing the technology to the market, it is not 
sure that the company will be able to reap the fruits of their breakthrough technology. 
Radical new technologies usually take longer to develop than incremental technologies. 
A high level of newness of technology may therefore lead to longer development times 
and consequently to a lower short-term performance. An incremental technology on the 
other hand, may allow using existing technological knowledge and production knowledge 
to transform the technology more rapidly into a market-ready product. Once products are 
on the market or a technology can be proven, revenues can be generated by selling the 
product or technology or by licensing the technology out.  
On the other hand, a high level of newness may enhance performance by creating 
a period of monopoly where the ventures can position themselves and protect their 
products from imitation (Zahra et al., 1995). Pioneering can preempt the competition and 
strengthens the position of spin-offs. Therefore: 
 
H12: A high level of newness of technology will be positively associated 
with performance  
 
 
3.4.5 Hypotheses Development: Performance of CSO and USO 
Rapid growth seems to be a prominent characteristic of CSO and USO. Corporate 
spin-offs are estimated to produce an above average net employment growth of at least 
8% (Moncada et al., 1999), while the average American university spin-off generates 
approximately $10 million in economic value (Cohen, 2000). The technology strategy 
CSO and USO follow, may lead to a different performance due to the fact that they start 
with different resources and a different knowledge inheritance. Entrepreneurial origin 
combined with prior founder affiliation is found to have different survival implications 
for spin-offs (Agarwal et al., 2004; Phillips, 2002). According to Stinchcombe (1965), 
founding conditions “imprint” an organization on various levels—including its structure, 
strategy, technology, routines, and culture (Sastry & Coen, 2000)— and continue to have 
long-term effects. Differences in initial endowments may position firms on 
heterogeneous developmental paths (Shane & Stuart, 2002). These heterogeneous 
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resource positions may explain why firms perform differently (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994; Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Knott, 2003: Zott, 2003). Since CSO and USO differ in 
their technological resources and their technology strategy, we expect them to also differ 
in performance. 
USO originate from universities who are traditionally more occupied with 
research on radical technologies. USO tend to exploit basic technologies with broad 
applications in many fields of use (Nelson, 1991). They are often created under a market 
push. A broad scope of technologies allows the founders to change market applications if 
the first application they pursue turns out to be a dead end (Tornatzky et al., 1995). This 
flexibility may be important for the performance of new companies, since they have no 
existing products to fall back on in case an application for a new technology proves to be 
unviable. Moreover, a broad scope of technology combined with a high level of newness 
of technology allows the spin-off to diversify risks and amortize their costs across 
different market applications that are achievable at different points in time (Shane, 2004). 
CSO are often created from a market pull, they spot an opportunity and decide to go after 
it. CSO tend to have a more narrow scope of technology and a focus on more incremental 
technologies. This focus may allow them to transform the technology faster into market-
ready products. Moreover, CSO often understand better the pressure to take their 
technologies quickly to the market and create the revenues and cash flow necessary to 
survive. This technology strategy may lead to a short term advantage, but may prove 
difficult to sustain on a longer term. Therefore:  
 
H13: USO will have a higher performance than CSO  
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In Chapter 4, issues related to the research methodology are being discussed. The 
main focus of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodology used to carry out 
the study. First, the choice of research design is being discussed. Next, the sampling and 
data gathering procedures are presented. Then, the data analysis technique is being 
discussed, followed by the operationalization of the variables and constructs.   
 
 
4.1 Research Design 
 
The choice of a research design should be dictated by the nature of the research 
questions this study wants to address. In case the problem evolves from the literature, 
indicating that there exist a substantial body of knowledge on which the researcher can 
build, a quantitative study is preferable. In case there exist little information on the topic 
and the research problem still needs a considerable amount of exploration, a qualitative 
study may be more appropriate. The selection of a certain research design is also likely to 
be influenced by various characteristics of the researcher e.g. training, experiences and 
psychological attributes (Creswell, 1994). In this dissertation, we want to address the 
following research questions:  
Research question 1: 
Which factors influence the performance of corporate spin-offs?  
 
Research Question 2:  
Do corporate and university spin-offs follow different technology strategies in 
order to achieve a competitive advantage? 
 
  
To tackle these research questions, this study adopts a survey design associated with the 
quantitative approach.  
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4.2 Sampling Procedure 
 
It is difficult to compare the performance of CSO found in several studies, since 
these studies have used different databases to identify CSO. Studies focusing on the legal 
perspective of CSO mostly use data compiled from the Security Data Company database. 
As a consequence, these studies single out only part of the CSO, namely those CSO that 
were announced publicly and added to the SCD database. Studies focusing on the entrant 
perspective of CSO have compiled their own databases since there exist no databases that 
contain variables of relatedness between a CSO and its parent. These self-composed 
databases tend to be focused on certain geographic areas, which makes comparison of the 
results obtained by these studies difficult. The advantage of these samples is that they 
contain CSO from public and private firms. 
To identify corporate and university spin-offs in Flanders, we used the HITO 
database as a starting point. This database is a comprehensive database containing almost 
all research-based start-ups founded in Flanders between 1991 and 2002. A research-
based start-up is defined as a new venture, that has its own R&D activities and develops 
and commercializes new products or services based upon a proprietary technology or 
skill. For information about the compilation of the HITO database, the response rate and 
the possible bias, we refer to Heirman (2004), chapter 2.4. Research-based start-ups form 
a heterogeneous group of companies on itself. They can be divided into different 
subgroups e.g. university spin-offs, corporate spin-offs, and independent start-ups. A 
corporate spin-offs has been defined as “a separate legal entity that is concentrated 
around activities that were originally developed in a larger parent firm. The entity is 
concentrated around a new business, with the purpose to develop and market new 
products or services based upon a proprietary technology or skill.” A university spin-off 
has been defined as “a new company that is formed by a faculty, staff member, or 
doctoral student who left the university or research organization to found the company or 
started the company while still affiliated with the university, and/or a core technology (or 
idea) that is transferred from the parent organization” (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Smilor 
et al., 1990; and Steffenson et al., 1999). An independent start-up can be defined as all 
new companies which are not based on a core technology or idea developed in a parent 
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firm. These companies do not have a clear link to a parent organization. We use the 
corporate and university spin-offs identified in this database to address our research 
questions.  
 
 
4.3 Data Collection 
 
A quantitative approach can consist of two types of research instrument: 
experiments and surveys. In this study, a survey was used to gather the appropriate 
information. Survey questionnaires provide a large amount of information about specific 
issues in a most efficient manner (Churchill, 1992). They are valuable as a research tool 
for their flexibility and versatility (Mouly, 1978). Once the researcher has decided that a 
survey based research instrument is appropriate, a choice has to be made as to whether 
the questionnaire is to be personal, telephone, or mail based (Kinnear and Taylor, 1996). 
In the first round of data collection performed to compile the HITO database, all firms 
were visited by two researchers to conduct a personal interview with the founder. After 
the interview, the structured information was put into a database and the case history was 
written down in an interview report. The structured questionnaire and the manual for the 
database can be found in Heirman (2004), Appendix II and III.  
The HITO database comprised some data on technological resources. However, 
no data was available on the transfer of knowledge from the parent to the spin-off. 
Therefore, a new questionnaire was designed to collect the necessary data and complete 
the missing data. After the identification of the corporate and university spin-offs in the 
HITO database, each of the companies was contacted by telephone. The founders were 
targeted since they typically possess the most comprehensive knowledge on the transfer 
of knowledge that had been taken place between the parent firm and the spin-off. The 
questionnaire was used to measure the constructs as presented in paragraph 4.5. In some 
cases, open ended interview questions were added. This information is mainly used in the 
interpretation of the results.  
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4.4 Data Analysis Technique 
 
4.4.1 Factor Analysis 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is performed a to check the validity of the 
constructs and measures. The primary use of PCA is data reduction with a view of 
defining the underlying structures and constructs. PCA procedures are based on the initial 
computation of a complete table of intercorrelations among the variables. The correlation 
matrix is then transformed through estimation of a factor model to obtain a factor matrix 
containing factor loadings for each variable on each derived factor. The loadings of each 
variable on the factors are then interpreted to identify the underlying structure of the 
variables (Hair et al., 2006).  
To test the appropriateness of the PCA, we performed the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) test and the Bartlett test of sphericity. The 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy is a measure to quantify the degree of intercorrelations 
among the variables and the appropriateness of factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006). This 
index ranges from 0 to 1, reaching 1 when each variable is perfectly predicted without 
error by the other variables. The MSA value should be above 0.50 in order to proceed 
with the principal components analysis. The Bartlett test of sphericity is a statistical test 
for the presence of correlations among the variables. It provides the statistical probability 
that the correlation matrix has significant correlations among at least some of the 
variables (Hair et al., 2006). 
The eigenvalues or the scree test can be used to assist in selecting the number of 
factors.  The eigenvalues should be greater than 1.0, since a value lower than 1.0 means 
that the factor explains less information than a single item would have explained. We 
performed a VARIMAX rotation to achieve a simpler, theoretically more meaningful 
component pattern. Orthogonal rotation methods are the preferred method when the 
research goal is data reduction. The VARIMAX method has proved to be successful as an 
analytical approach to obtain an orthogonal rotation of factors (Hair et al., 2006). Next, 
the factor loadings in the VARIMAX matrix need to be analyzed. A factor loading 
represents the correlation between an original variable and its factor. For samples with 
100 respondents, factor loadings of 0.55 and above are significant (Hair et al., 2006).  
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4.4.2 Partial Least Squares Method 
To test the hypotheses and the proposed framework, we will use the Partial Least 
Squares method. Partial least squares is one of the structural equation modeling (SEM) 
techniques. Wold (1974) developed the fixed-point estimation technique for structural 
variables with latent variables as an alternative to the LISREL program. In partial least 
squares, the set of model parameters is divided into subsets estimated by use of ordinary 
multiple regressions that involve the values of parameters in other subsets (Fornell & 
Bookstein, 1982). An iterative method provides successive approximation for the 
estimates, subset by subset, of loadings and structural parameters (Fornell & Bookstein, 
1982). The Maximum Likelihood estimation used in the LISREL program (Jöreskog and 
Sörbom, 1989) is based on factor construct concept that requires significantly more 
statistical specification than PLS and thus places more demands on the data. PLS, on the 
other hand, is based on a component construct concept. PLS requires minimal demands 
on measurement scales, sample size, normality of the data and residual distribution 
(Wold, 1985). While both techniques (LISREL and PLS) will provide acceptable 
parameter estimates, two-stage least squares requires the use of single measures for all 
dependent variables. In contrast, PLS permits multiple measures of both dependent and 
independent variables (Birkinshaw et al., 1995). 
PLS provides a clear advantage over regression for two reasons: (1) it considers 
all path coefficients simultaneously to allow the analysis of direct, indirect, and spurious 
relationships; and (2) it estimates the individual item weightings in the context of the 
theoretical model rather than in isolation (Birkinshaw et al., 1995). PLS is most 
appropriate when sample sizes are small, when assumptions of multivariate normality and 
interval scaled data cannot be made, and when the researcher is primarily concerned with 
prediction of the dependent variable (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). PSL requires only 
that the basic assumptions of least-squares estimation are satisfied. The estimation is 
distribution-free, does not pose identification problems, can be used with small samples, 
and permits the same freedom with respect to measurement scales as ordinary regression 
(Cool et al., 1989). These advantages have encouraged PLS applications in an increasing 
number of fields, including economics, education, chemistry and marketing (Cool et al., 
1989). Generally, PLS results are presented in two stages. In the first stage, the researcher 
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ensures that the measures used as operationalizations of the underlying constructs are 
both reliable and valid. Once convinced of the adequacy of the measurement model, the 
researcher can then proceed to interpret the resulting model coefficients (Birkinshaw et 
al., 1995). In the result section, we will elaborate on the assessment of the measurement 
and the structural model.  
 
 
4.5 Constructs and Variables 
 
In this section, we will discuss the operationalization of the constructs and 
variables. Whenever possible, measures were adopted from previous studies. New 
measures were constructed where existing measures were not available and to facilitate 
multiple measurement of the constructs. Principal components analysis and Cronback 
alpha reliability coefficients were used to confirm the unidimensionality and inter-item 
reliability of the constructs.  
 
The independent variables are the technological resources 
- internal R&D sources 
- collaboration in R&D consortia 
- technology transfer from the parent company 
- transfer of production knowledge from the parent company 
 
The technology strategy variables are  
- scope of technology 
- newness of technology 
 
Performance is operationalized as 
- annual growth in revenues 
- annual growth in employees 
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4.5.1 Venture Origin 
An important variable for this study is the venture origin. A corporate spin-off is 
defined as a separate legal entity that is concentrated around activities that were 
originally developed in a larger parent firm. The entity is concentrated around a new 
business, with the purpose to develop and market new products and services based upon a 
proprietary technology or skill. A university spin-off is defined as a new company that is 
formed by a faculty, staff member, or doctoral student who left the university (or research 
organization) to found the company or start the company while still affiliated with the 
university, and/or a core technology (or idea) that is transferred from the parent 
organization. The database comprises 48 corporate spin-offs and 73 university spin-offs.  
 
 
4.5.2 Technological Resources 
 Based on the literature, we classified the technological resources as internal R&D 
sources, collaboration in R&D consortia, technology transfer from the parent and transfer 
of production knowledge from the parent. All technological resources are measured at the 
moment of founding.  
 
Internal R&D sources refer to the intensity of internal R&D activities by building 
the facilities, expertise and skills necessary for continuous innovation. This construct was 
operationalized as the number of people working in R&D to the total number of people 
working in the spin-off.  
 
Collaboration in R&D consortia refers to the collaboration projects set up 
between a corporate or university spin-off on the one hand and universities or companies 
on the other hand to jointly develop some technology components. Spin-offs can use 
partnerships to complement and enhance their internal technological capabilities. They 
can collaborate with universities, research institutes and companies. This construct was 
measured using three items in which we probed to the number of partnerships developed 
in order to develop the first product, the number of partnerships the spin-offs is engaged 
in for technology development with other companies and with universities and research 
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institutes. The items were based on measures used by Lee et al., (2001) and Heirman 
(2004).    
 
Technology transfer from the parent company refers to the degree in which the 
spin-off transfers technological knowledge from its parent firm. The degree of transfer of 
technology was measured using statements about the relatedness between the 
technological competencies of the spin-off and those of the parent firm. These items were 
derived from the studies conducted by Parhankangas et al., (2003) and Sapienza et al., 
(2004).  
 
Transfer of production knowledge from the parent company refers to the degree in 
which the spin-off transfers production knowledge from its parent firm. The transfer of 
production knowledge was operationalized in terms of the compatibility of the production 
facilities of the parent firm to the needs of the spin-off venture. These items were derived 
from the studies conducted by Sorrentino & Williams (1995), Parhankangas et al., (2003) 
and Woo et al., (1992).  
 
 
4.5.3 Technology Strategy 
Based on the literature, we identified two dimensions of technology strategy, the 
scope of technology and the newness of technology. The technology strategy variables 
are measured at the moment of founding. 
 
The scope of technology refers to the choice of a company to focus on a 
technology platform or a specific technology. The scope of technology measures to what 
extent the technology is being developed with the purpose of one specific technology or 
in contrast for a broad platform of technologies with many applications. This item was 
based on measures used by Meyer et al., (1997) and Heirman (2004). 
  
The newness of technology entails the innovativeness and uniqueness of the 
technology the spin-off would like to commercialize. Schoonhoven et al., (1990) make a 
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distinction between innovation achieved through the creation of new knowledge and 
innovation created by knowledge synthesis, in which existing technological knowledge is 
combined or synthesized in unique ways to create a new product. The uniqueness of the 
technology captures the degree to which capable competitors can copy the technological 
developments of the spin-off. This measure was based upon the study performed by 
Zander & Kogut (1995).  
 
4.5.4 Performance 
Performance is a complex and multi-dimensional concept that is difficult to cover 
with any single measure. The most commonly used objective measures of success include 
growth measures and profitability measures. Several scholars have argued that traditional 
accounting-based indicators of profitability are inappropriate for young companies 
(Shane & Stuart, 2002). Traditional financial measures like return on investments, return 
on equity, net profits and cash flow, lose part of their value in case of spin-offs since 
these measures only monitor certain aspects and thus do not completely explain the 
wealth creation realized by spin-offs (McGrath, Venkatraman & MacMillan, 1994). 
Profitability, such as return on investment, may not be an appropriate performance 
indicator for new business ventures, because many of them are still in the stage of 
product development (Lee et al., 2001). Abnormal return and market valuation from the 
stock market are not useful for this study, since most of our spin-offs are not enrolled on 
the stock market.  
Sales, on the other hand, is often a preferred measure of firm growth and financial 
performance of new ventures (Ardishvili et al., 1998; Hoy et al., 1992) because it is 
relatively accessible, it applies to (almost) all sorts of firms, and it is relatively insensitive 
to capital intensity and degree of integration (Delmar et al., 2003). Sales growth indicates 
the market acceptance of a venture’s products. Spin-offs that are able to grow their 
revenues at a faster rate in their early years are offering goods and services that customers 
quickly choose to buy (Chesbrough, 2003a). These spin-offs are more likely to turn 
profitable sooner, to consume less cash and are more likely to achieve a profitable 
liquidity event for their investors (Bhide, 1992). Growth in sales has been used in several 
studies on CSO (Parhankangas & Arenius, 2003; Sapienza et al., 2004; Agarwal et al., 
 93 
2004; Zahra, 1996b). Sales growth was operationalized as total sales revenue in Euro in 
2005, controlling for total sales revenue at founding.   
The performance of spin-offs can also be measured on a non-financial basis. 
Growth in employees is a good indicator of the speed by which a new venture is able to 
grow. In the case of spin-offs, it is possible that assets and employment grow before any 
substantial sales and revenues are generated or profitability is obtained. Arguments have 
been offered for employment as a much more direct indicator of organizational 
complexity than sales (Delmar et al., 2003). Resource-based scholars value employment-
based measures as a highly suitable indicator of firm growth e.g., Hanks et al. (1993) and 
Brüderl & Preisendörfer (2000) did not focus so much on financial measures of 
performance, but on exponential growth in employment. Employment growth was 
operationalized as the employment in 2005, controlling for the total employment at 
founding.  
 
4.5.5 Control Variables 
The age of the spin-off, the size, the start capital, the technology domain and the 
experience of the founding team were included as control variables. The age was 
measured as the number of years the spin-off already existed as an independent entity. In 
practice, we counted the number of months that had elapsed between the official spin-off 
date and the time of the interview. Next, we divided this number of months by 12 in order 
to obtain the age of the spin-off. The size of the spin-off was measured as the number of 
founders of the spin-off, according to Roberts (1991). The start capital of the spin-off is 
the total capital represented in the company during the first year of activities. To 
categorize spin-offs in different technological domains, we used the International Patent 
Classification System. This system distinguishes eight classes namely (A) Human 
Necessities; (B) Performing Operations, Transporting; (C) Chemistry, Metallurgy ; (D) 
Textiles, Paper; (E) Fixed Constructions ; (F) Mechanical Engineering, Lighting, 
Heating, Weapons, Blasting; (G) Physics; and (H) Electricity. The experience of the 
founding team was measured  by the number of years of experience in R&D and the 
number of years of experience in a commercial function (marketing or sales; business 
development).  
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Coding Theme Name of variable Description Level of 
measure- 
ment 
Source (where 
applicable) Value Meaning 
Venture 
origin 
Institutional link The spin-off is classified as a 
corporate spin-off (CSO) or a 
university spin-off (USO) 
Nominal Roberts & Malone, 
1996 
Smilor et al., 1990 
Steffenson et al., 
1999 
1 
0 
CSO 
USO 
Internal R&D 
sources 
Employees in R&D divided by 
total number of employees 
Interval  Ranges from 0 to 1 
Collaboration in 
R&D consortia 
Partnerships  
- to develop first product 
- with other companies for 
technology development  
- with universities and research 
institutes in R&D projects and 
technology exchange programs  
Ordinal Lee et al., 2001; 
Heirman, 2004 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
No partners 
 
One partner 
 
Two or more 
partners 
Technology 
transfer from the 
parent company 
The technological competencies 
- are based upon the core 
technologies of the parent firm 
- complement those of the 
parent firm 
- are based upon the 
technological strengths of the 
parent firm 
Ordinal Parhankangas et al., 
2003;  
Sapienza et al., 
2004 
Likert-scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) 
Technological 
resources 
Transfer of 
production 
knowledge from 
the parent company 
The spin-off 
- is able to use the production 
facilities of the parent firm 
- shares production facilities 
with the parent firm 
Ordinal Sorrentino & 
Williams, 1995; 
Parhankangas et al., 
2003;  
Woo et al., 1992 
Likert-scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) 
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Scope of 
technology 
Broadness of the technology at 
founding 
Ordinal Meyer et al., 1997 
Heirman, 2004 
Likert-scale ranging from 1 
(specific product) to 5 
(platform technology) 
Technology 
strategy 
Newness of 
technology 
- The extent to which new 
technological knowledge was 
created 
 
- The extent to which 
technological knowledge was 
synthesized 
- The ease by which the 
technology can be copied 
Ordinal Schoonhoven et al., 
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
Zander & Kogut, 
1995 
- Likert-scale ranging from 
1 (new technological 
knowledge) to 5 (existing 
technological knowledge) 
-Likert-scale ranging from 
1 (no synthesis) to 5 
(elaborate synthesis) 
- Likert-scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) 
Performance Growth - Annual revenue growth 
- Annual employee growth 
Ratio Lee et al., 2001; 
Delmar et al., 2003  
 
Table 2: Overview of the constructs and the variables 
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4.5.6 Principal Components Analysis  
The primary goal of performing the PCA is to confirm that the items of the 
technological resources do indeed produce the four constructs we deduced from the 
literature. Table 3 shows the results of the PCA carried out on the statements relating to 
the technological resources. The overall MSA value falls in the acceptable range (above 
.50) with a value of .606. The Bartlett test shows that nonzero correlations exist at the 
significance level of .0001. Three components were extracted which accounted for 
66.944 % of the variance. However, if we examine the communalities, we observe 2 
variables that have a communality lower than 0.50. Also the factor loading of the variable 
“internal R&D sources” is problematic, since it does not attain the required 0.55. 
However, we distracted four technological resources from the literature. Therefore, we 
have performed a second principal components analysis by increasing the number of 
factors to four. The results from this second PCA are shown in Table 4. The MSA value 
(0.606) and the Bartlett test (p<0.0001) are satisfactory. The communalities of the 
variables are all higher than 0.50. The eigenvalue of component 1 is 0.901 which is quite 
close to 1. Therefore, we can consider including this component. The four components 
account for 76.953% of the variance and are in accordance to the four technological 
resources identified in the literature. In addition, the reliability of the components is 
highly satisfactory.  
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Statements Component 1 
 
Component 2 
 
Component 3 
 
Communality  
 
Internal R&D sources 0.452 -0.283 -0.268 0.357 
Number of partnerships to develop first product -0.049 0.147 0.777 0.628 
Number of partnerships with other companies for technology development  -0.047 0.042 0.746 0.561 
Number of partnerships with universities and research institutes in R&D 
projects and technology exchange programs 0.298 -0.037 0.756 0.661 
Our technological competencies are based on the core technologies of the 
parent firm. 0.872 0.169 0.125 0.805 
Our technological competencies and those of our parent firm complement 
each other. 0.570 0.370 -0.001 0.461 
The technology we have developed is based on the technological strengths 
of our parent firm. 0.852 0.255 0.150 0.814 
Our company  is able to use the production facilities of the parent firm  0.186 0.901 0.089 0.855 
Our company and the parent firm share production facilities  0.198 0.917 0.057 0.883 
  
   
Eigenvalue 3.057 1.685 1.283  
% of variance explained 33.967 18.727 14.250  
     
Table 3: Principal Components Analysis relating to the technological resources 
 
Notes. (a) Cumulative % of variance explained is 66.944% 
 
(b)
 KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.606 
 
(c)
 Barlett’s Test of Sphericity = χ2 = 309.023, p < 0.0001 
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Statements 
Component 1: 
Internal R&D 
sources 
Component 2: 
Collaboration 
in R&D 
consortia 
Component 3: 
Technology 
transfer 
 
Component 4: 
Transfer of 
production 
knowledge 
Communality 
 
Internal R&D sources 0.939 -0.075 0.084 -0.041 0.895 
Number of partnerships to develop first product 0.031 0.813 -0.105 0.218 0.720 
Number of partnerships with other companies for 
technology development  -0.334 0.688 0.061 -0.028 0.680 
Number of partnerships with universities and research 
institutes in R&D projects and technology exchange 
programs 
0.085 0.781 0.250 -0.011 0.590 
Our technological competencies are based on the core 
technologies of the parent firm. 0.187 0.131 0.867 0.115 0.817 
Our technological competencies and those of our parent 
firm complement each other. -0.127 -0.055 0.685 0.252 0.552 
The technology we have developed is based on the 
technological strengths of our parent firm. 0.068 0.130 0.898 0.167 0.856 
Our company  is able to use the production facilities of the 
parent firm  -0.017 0.097 0.217 0.917 0.898 
Our company and the parent firm share production 
facilities  -0.028 0.061 0.237 0.926 0.917 
 
  
 
 
 
Eigenvalue 0.901 1.283 3.057 1.685  
% of variance explained 10.009 14.250 33.967 18.727  
Cronbach’s alpha 
 
 0.669 
 
0.791 
 
0.912 
 
Table 4: Second Principal Components Analysis relating to the technological resources 
 
Notes. (a) Cumulative % of variance explained is 76.953%   
(b)
 KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.606 
 
(c)
 Barlett’s Test of Sphericity = χ2 = 309.023, p < 0.0001 
 99 
5 THE POPULATION OF CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS  
 
This chapter first presents descriptive statistics on the population of corporate 
spin-offs (CSO) and university spin-offs (USO). Next, we take a more detailed look at the 
population of CSO in our database. We identify two groups of CSO, namely 
restructuring-driven spin-offs and entrepreneurial spin-offs. Finally, we provide 
descriptive statistics and insights into the two groups of CSO.  
 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Corporate and University Spin-Offs 
Spin-offs are important agents of knowledge transfer from established 
corporations and universities to new businesses, promoting the prosperity and well-being 
of regions, industry clusters and nations (Roberts & Wainer, 1968; Dorfman, 1983; 
Pavitt, 1991; Lindholm, 1997b; Parhankagas & Arenius, 2003). University and corporate 
spin-offs are on average, high performing companies. In a study on European corporate 
spin-offs, Moncada et al. (1999) found that CSO represented around 12.9 % of new firm 
formation in Europe. At the European level, corporate spin-offs are estimated to produce 
an above average net employment growth of at least 8% (Moncada et al., 1999).  
According to the Association of University Technology Managers, from 1980 to 1999, 
American university spin-offs generated $33.5 billion in economic value added (Cohen, 
2000). Thus, the average American USO generated approximately $10 million in 
economic value. Further, the indirect effects of the economic impact of USO may even be 
larger than their direct effects (Shane, 2004). While there does not exist any research that 
estimated the indirect effects of USO on local economic development, there does exist 
some case study evidence. For example, Goldman (1984) found that 72 percent of the 
high technology companies in the Boston area in the early 1980s were based on 
technologies originally developed at MIT laboratories. As a result, the Route 128 
economic infrastructure might not have existed in the absence of MIT and its spin-offs, 
though most of these spin-off companies were not based on technologies formally 
licensed from MIT.  
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In comparison to other types of start-ups, corporate spin-offs combine 
considerably lower failure rates with the high growth of a new company. A failure rate of 
15% for corporate spin-offs has been found in a French study (Moncada et al., 1999, 
p.33). Also the survival rate of USO is extremely high. Of the 3376 USO founded 
between 1980 and 2000, 68 percent remained operational in 2001 (Pressman, 2002). This 
number is much higher than the average survival rate of new firm in the United States 
(Shane, 2004). Also in countries outside the United States, USO tend to have a high 
survival rate. Between 1960 and 1993, about 240 direct USO companies have been 
generated from Chalmers University of Technology. In 1993, 87% of these were still in 
business or had been acquired, and the remaining 13% had been lost through bankruptcy 
or termination (Lindholm, 1997b).  
Currently, there exist several databases that contain partial lists of corporate and 
university spin-offs. The Thompson database reports 2106 announced CSO between 1980 
and 2005, of which 1128 have been effectively completed. Yet, the Thompson database 
only lists those CSO that are publicly announced, excluding employee-based spin-offs 
and spin-offs from private firms.  Therefore, we might expect far more CSO than those 
identified by the Thompson database to exist.  For example, we do not know how many 
CSO are created by medium sized companies, even though Cooper (1971) found that 
firms with less than 500 employees and small subsidiaries have about ten times as high 
spin-off rates as large firms. In line with these findings, Bruno and Tyebjee (1984) found 
in a study of high-tech start-ups, that for the most recent employer, 42% of the 
respondents had been at a company with less than 400 employees, and 23% at a firm with 
more than 1000 employees.  
Also more and more universities in the US and other countries have become 
active in spinning off new firms.  Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 until 
2000, 3376 academic spin-off companies were established in the USA (Pressman, 2002).  
USO are important economic entities because they create jobs, particularly for highly 
educated people (Shane, 2004). According to the Association of University Technology 
Managers, from 1980 to 1999, spin-offs from American academic institutions generated 
280 000 jobs (Cohen, 2000). At an average of 83 jobs per spin-off, this rate of job 
creation shows that the average USO creates more jobs than the average small business 
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founded in the US. Estimating the total population of university spin-offs is not an easy 
task since it if difficult to identify the academics who took the ‘from profs to profits’ 
route (Piccaluga, 1992), and to measure the exact degree of university ‘leakage’ through 
informal channels (Birley, 1992). In this respect, Chrisman et al. (1995) argue that any 
attempts at measurement will underestimate the extent of faculty entrepreneurship. 
A survey of 100 of the 1989 ‘Inc 500” fastest growing private companies found 
that 71% had replicated or modified an idea encountered through previous employment 
(Bhide, 1994). While there does not yet exist studies that estimate the whole population 
of corporate and university spin-offs, we expect them to be a considerably large group of 
companies. In the next section, we will provide descriptive statistics of our sample of 
Flemish corporate and university spin-offs. Our database comprises 48 corporate spin-
offs and 73 university spin-offs. Next, we will discuss the age of the spin-offs, the size, 
the  start capital, the industry sector and the experience of the founding team.  
 
 
5.1.1 Age 
The age of a corporate spin-off can be defined in several ways. The most 
traditional way to define the age of a spin-off is to measure the period between the time 
of the interview and the year of the establishment of the spin-off. Another way to 
measure the age of a corporate spin-off is to count the years from the initiation of the 
idea, or the number of years the founders of the spin-off were already working on the 
technology. In this way, the pre-spin-off period is not neglected. In most cases, the spin-
off has been operating for several years within the parent firm prior to the foundation of 
the spin-off. However, it is often very difficult to state the exact start date from the 
project. Therefore, we measured age as the number of years the corporate spin-off 
already exist as an independent entity, so the number of years that had elapsed since the 
official spin-off date. Figure 2 illustrate the age distribution of our sample of CSO and 
USO. From Table 5 we can conclude that the average age of CSO is higher than the 
average age of USO.  
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Figure 2: Age of corporate and university spin-offs 
 
 
 USO CSO 
Mean 5.143 6.149 
Median 4.500 6.000 
Std. Deviation 3.061 2.842 
Minimum 1.000 0.420 
Maximum 13.500 14.000 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the age of CSO and USO 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Size 
The number of founders of a corporate spin-off may influence the amount of 
knowledge that can be transferred from the parent company to the spin-off. Whenever 
personnel leave one organization to found a new organization, there is a transfer of 
resources and routines (Phillips, 2002). Founders are constrained by their organizational 
experiences and consequently, constrained by the characteristics of the founder’s 
previous organization, population and employment (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Phillips, 
2002). A spin-off with more founders is more likely to transfer resources and routines 
from the parent organization. Moreover, Roberts (1991) found that the size of the 
founding team affects the success of a firm. Therefore, the size of the spin-off was 
measured as the number of founders of the spin-off. Figure 3 illustrates the number of 
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founders of our sample of CSO and USO. In Table 6 we can see that on average, USO 
start with a higher number of founders than CSO.  
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Figure 3: Number of founders of corporate and university spin-offs 
 
 
 USO CSO 
Mean 2.600 2.020 
Median 3.000 2.000 
Std. Deviation 1.441 1.211 
Minimum 1.000 1.000 
Maximum 7.000 6.000 
 Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the number of founders  
                of CSO and USO 
 
 
 
5.1.3 Start Capital 
Previous research suggests that the amount of initial capital invested is positively 
related to new venture survival and success (Cooper et al., 1994). Insufficient financial 
resources are often cited as a primary reason why new ventures fail. Firms with greater 
financial resources can invest more in product/services development, production facilities, 
and marketing strategies. Start capital is measured as the total amount of capital present in 
the spin-off during the first year of activities, including capital from the founders, equity 
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investors and debtors. From Table 7 we can conclude that USO tend to have a higher start 
capital than CSO.  
 
 USO CSO 
Mean 1 155 301.129 337 412.830 
Median 274 750.000 61 973.370 
Std. Deviation 2 265 230.274 828 207.067 
Minimum 3000.000 6197.340 
Maximum 15 000 000.000 5 000 000.000 
  Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the start capital of CSO and USO 
 
 
 
 
5.1.4 Industry  
 The industry class of each corporate spin-off was defined based on the 
International Patent Classification System (IPC), which classifies patents in eight 
technical areas, namely (A) Human Necessities, (B) Performing Operations, 
Transporting, (C) Chemistry, Metallurgy, (D) Textiles, Paper, (E) Fixed Constructions, 
(F) Mechanical Engineering, Lighting, Heating, Weapons, Blasting, (G) Physics, (H) 
Electricity. For analytical purposes, the technology domain of spin-off firms were 
aggregated in four classes namely Medical Related, Micro-Electronics, Software and 
Other. For more information on the classification of the technology domain of CSO and 
USO, we refer to Heirman (2004), Appendix VI. We controlled for industry effects 
because industries might vary in their performance (including profitability and growth), 
technological opportunities, regimes of appropriation and opportunities to capitalize on 
particular market niches. The industry representation of USO is more or less equally 
divided over the four distinguished classes of technology domains (Figure 4). In the case 
of CSO, we get another picture, CSO are well represented in software and other industry 
sectors. In comparison to USO, CSO are less well represented in the Medical Related and 
Micro-Electronics industry (Figure 5).  
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Figure 4: Industry sector of university spin-offs 
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Figure 5: Industry sector of corporate spin-offs 
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5.1.5 Experience of the Founding Team 
Founders of a spin-off can have business and technical experience. Relevant 
technical experience can prove of vital importance in order to develop a technology but 
also the appropriate business experience can matter. Having experience in bringing 
products to the market and in transforming technologies into market-ready products can 
be crucial for the survival of a spin-off. The founder’s skills and experience are found to 
be related to new firm success (Cooper et al.1994). Technical experience was measured 
as the cumulated numbers of years of R&D experience of all the founders. Business 
experience was measured as the cumulated numbers of years the founders had worked in 
a commercial function (marketing or sales, business development). Table 8 and Table 9  
illustrates the business and technical experience of CSO and USO. As expected, the 
founders of CSO have an average more business experience, while the founders of USO 
possess more technical experience. 
 
 USO CSO 
Mean 3.070 6.020 
Median 0.000 0.000 
Std. Deviation 5.841 10.267 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 20.000 47.000 
  Table 8: Business experience of the founding team of CSO and USO 
 
 
 USO CSO 
Mean 20.541 11.415 
Median 16.000 9.000 
Std. Deviation 19.292 11.627 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 100.000 38.000 
  Table 9: Technical experience of the founding team of CSO and USO 
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5.2 Corporate Spin-Offs in Flanders: A Detailed Look  
In the literature, several classifications of corporate spin-offs can be found. Most 
studies on corporate entrepreneurship and corporate spin-offs have taken the established 
firm as a point of departure. These studies start with the assumption that established firms 
support entrepreneurial actions taking place within their organization (Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999; Covin & Miles, 1999). However, most established firms are not willing 
to support entrepreneurial initiatives. Therefore, other studies have looked at 
entrepreneurial spin-offs that are created by employees who wish to pursue business ideas 
that are not supported by the parent company (Agarwal et al., 2004). Established firms 
with abundant, but underexploited knowledge are especially fertile grounds for spin-off 
formation (Agarwal et al., 2004). As Stinchcombe (1965) puts it, the potential for 
employee entrepreneurship results from parent firms being imperfect and permeable 
repositories of knowledge and causes new organization to emerge from other 
organizations. In this dissertation, we will take the main driver to create a corporate spin-
off as the basis to classify the different types of corporate spin-offs. In case the 
established firm is the main driver to create the CSO, we will label it a restructuring-
driven spin-off. In case the corporate spin-off is initiated by an employee, we will label it 
an entrepreneurial spin-off. The labels are in accordance with previous literature (Tubke 
et al., 2004; Lindholm, 2001; Parhankangas et al., 2003). 
 
 
5.2.1 Restructuring-Driven Spin-Offs 
Restructuring-driven spin-offs are CSO that are initiated by the parent firm. They 
are often undertaken as a consequence of restructuring and refocusing activities within 
the parent firm (Tubke et al., 2004). The parent firm wishes to focus on certain core 
activities and consequently decide to dispose of certain other activities. This disposal is 
often the trigger to create a CSO, e.g., the established firm may decide that certain 
technological activities will no longer be pursued and that it might be better to create a 
separate entity to further develop and commercialize these technologies. In this case, the 
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parent firm gives active support to create the corporate spin-off and often a transfer of 
resources takes place.  
An example of a restructuring-driven spin-off from our database is the following 
company that is active in the construction of machinery. This company was contacted by 
a nearby hospital to develop a new transport system for hospital beds. This was a rather 
unusual request for the company, since their core activities are concentrated around the 
manufacturing of cranes. Nevertheless, the company decided to start with the 
developments of this new transport system and soon a prototype was available that could 
be tested in hospitals. The director of the hospital who requested the new transport 
system, was extremely enthusiastic and shared his enthusiasm with other colleagues. 
Consequently, other colleagues began to be interested in purchasing the same transport 
system for their hospital beds. The CEO was put for a dilemma: Would he continue the 
development of hospital beds within the current company although these developments 
did not fit with the core activity of the company, or should he create a separate company 
to house these activities? Seen the large amount of potential interested customers, he 
decided to create a spin-off to further commercialize the transport system for hospital 
beds. Today, this new company has an established reputation in the hospital 
transportation industry.                
Restructuring-driven spin-offs can also be created to get a faster and more direct 
access to attract money in order to be able to commercialize certain technologies. These 
restructuring-driven spin-offs often have a formal connection with their parent firm 
through a license or shareholder structure. E.g. a company active in the sport industry has 
created a spin-off in order to be able to commercialize a certain technology faster. This 
company had met another company active in time measure systems. The latter company 
was specifically interested in further developing a particular technology of the first 
company. Consequently, the CEO of the first company decided to create a corporate spin-
off to house this technology. This allowed to further develop the technology, while 
creating the opportunity for the second company to invest in the newly created company. 
In this way, both companies could cooperate optimally and the speed of development of 
the technology was much higher.  
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Restructuring-driven spin-off can also be used to commercialize radical 
technologies. Little attention has been devoted to examine the possibility to create a 
corporate spin-off to commercialize new technologies, to explore and develop new 
market opportunities or to develop new production systems. Nevertheless, CSO may be 
an elegant solution for established firms to reduce the risks associated with these 
activities. Established firms often experience difficulties in managing radical innovation 
projects since these projects deviate from the daily business of the firm. In case business 
units need to downsize, radical innovation projects are often the first to be killed. 
However, each established firm needs innovations if it wants to stay competitive on the 
long term. In our database of corporate spin-offs, we did not found a CSO that was 
created by an established firm to commercialize a radical technology.  
 
 
5.2.2 Entrepreneurial Spin-Offs 
Entrepreneurial spin-offs are initiated by one or more employees in order to 
exploit an opportunity they have spotted while working for their parent firm. The parent 
firm does not always embrace these opportunities. In many cases, the employee does not 
get the option to pursue the opportunity, especially not if the opportunity is not in line 
with the strategy of the parent firm. Consequently, some employees decide to create a 
CSO to pursue the opportunity themselves. In this case, the employees often do not 
receive support from the parent firm to create the CSO. In some case, the employees may 
even experience resistance from the parent firm to set up the CSO.  
Entrepreneurial spin-offs are often created by employees, who leave their parent 
firm since the parent firm does not allow them to pursue certain opportunities. An 
important trigger for entrepreneurial spin-offs is the recognition of a market opportunity. 
Here, we can mention a researcher that had developed a new drug for a large 
pharmaceutical company. The next step in the development process of the drug was the 
synthesis of the prototype of the drug. This step was being outsourced by the parent 
company. However, the researcher was convinced that it might be more opportune to 
perform the synthesis within the company itself. He had a discussion with the 
management to explore the possibility of creating a department to do the synthesis within 
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the company.  The management argued that performing the synthesis within the company 
was not in line with its core activities and did not fit the strategy. As a consequence, the 
researcher resigned and started his own company to perform the synthesis of drugs.          
In some cases, the employee does not communicate the spotted opportunity with 
its employer, but decides to create a new company to pursue the opportunity himself. The 
sales manager of a large chemical company found out that there existed a huge need for a 
particular type of synthetic powder. He decided not to communicate this opportunity with 
his parent company, but to leave the parent company to pursue this opportunity himself. 
Through his network of customers, the manager was able to perform an thorough analysis 
of the market demand for this synthetic powder. He quickly discovered that there existed 
a huge market for such powders. Consequently, the sales manager resigned and started 
his own synthetic powder manufacturing company.  
Entrepreneurial spin-offs can also be created in response to restructuring activities 
within the parent firm. Restructuring activities often include that certain activities will no 
longer be continued. In 1991, a French telecom company started to commercialize a new 
decode system for electronic data exchange. The company spent more than 250.000 Euro 
to marketing and sales in order to realize the commercialization of this decode system. 
After a first evaluation in 1993, the decode system turned out to be a commercial failure, 
so the telecom company decided to get the decode system off the market. An employee of 
the telecom company got informed about the termination of the commercialization of the 
decode system. He really believed in the market opportunities of the decode system, and 
decided to buy the IP rights of the decode system from the telecom company. He started 
his own company in 1994 to further develop and commercialize the decode system.  
A similar motivation to create an entrepreneurial spin-off is the case where a 
parent company is taken over by another company. In this case, it often happens that 
employees can no longer identify themselves with the culture of the new company. They 
therefore decide to set up their own company based on their previous working 
experience. This happened in a company that was active in the research, development and 
manufacturing of optica for high-power lasers. After the acquisition of the company, the 
new parent firm decided to terminate all research activities in Belgium and to transfer all 
research activities to the new headquarters in the United States. The researchers in 
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Belgium could choose between a research position in the United States or a job as sales 
representative in Belgium. A couple of researcher refused to become sales representatives 
and began to explore the possibilities to continue the research projects in another 
company. The result was a new company that carries on some of the research activities 
that were initiated in the previous parent company. This new company is a direct 
competitor of the American firm.  
In some cases, an employee decides to create a corporate spin-off since he no 
longer wishes to work for a parent firm, but prefers to work on an independent basis. 
These employees are real entrepreneurs who feel the desire to create their own company 
and to become self-employed. They often rely on experience they build up while working 
for the parent firm. In the late nineties the board of directors of a Flemish IT-company 
decided to expand the company, seen the success of the company. This expansion would 
mostly take place through the acquisition of smaller IT companies. The CEO of the IT 
company did not share the enthusiasm of the board of directors to acquire these 
companies. Subsequently, during a particular acquisition, the board of directors decided 
to continue with the acquisition without the approval of the CEO. As a result of this 
acquisition, there was a shift in responsibilities within the new company. From now on, 
the CEO had to share his responsibilities with a managing director. This new situation 
quickly led to frictions, so the CEO decided to resign and start a new career as self-
employed software consultant. 
 
 
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Flemish Corporate Spin-Offs 
Our database consists of 20 restructuring-driven spin-offs and 28 entrepreneurial 
spin-offs. Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics of the age, size, start capital and 
experience of the founding team for the two groups of CSO. The average entrepreneurial 
spin-off is slightly older than the restructuring-driven spin-off. Entrepreneurial spin-offs 
also tend to have more founders than restructuring-driven spin-offs. However, the start 
capital of restructuring-driven spin-offs tend to be significantly higher than the start 
capital of entrepreneurial spin-offs. This may be explained by the fact that restructuring-
driven spin-offs are supported by their parent firm and therefore often receive financial 
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resources from the parent firm. The founders of entrepreneurial spin-offs have an average 
more business experience, but less technical experience than the founders of 
restructuring-driven spin-offs.  
 
  Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Entrepreneurial 
spin-offs 
6.71 6.75 2.91 1.83 14.00 
Age 
Restructuring-
driven spin-offs 
5.37 5.33 2.61 0.42 9.17 
Entrepreneurial 
spin-offs 
2.11 2.00 1.13 1.00 6.00 
Number of 
founders Restructuring-
driven spin-offs 
1.90 1,50 1.33 1.00 5.00 
Entrepreneurial 
spin-offs 
110407.10 18592.22 274271.60 6197.34 1214678 
Start 
capital Restructuring-
driven spin-offs 
410328.20 99157.41 527038.50 6197.34 5000000 
Entrepreneurial 
spin-offs 
6.74 0.00 11.63 0.00 47.00 
Business 
Experience 
of the 
founding 
team 
Restructuring-
driven spin-offs 5.05 0.00 8.27 0.00 30.00 
Entrepreneurial 
spin-offs 
10.24 10.00 10.52 0.00 32.00 
Technical 
Experience 
of the 
founding 
team 
Restructuring-
driven spin-offs 13.00 8.50 13.09 0.00 38.00 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of the age, size and start capital of entrepreneurial and 
restructuring-driven spin-offs 
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Figure 5 has indicated that the industry sectors of the CSO in our sample are not 
evenly distributed in the four classes of technology domains. CSO are less well 
represented in the Medical Related and the Micro-Electronics industry. Therefore, we 
have taken several industry sectors together and made a distinction between two classes: 
(1) Software & Micro-Electronics, and (2) Other Industry Sectors. Table 11 gives an 
overview of the entrepreneurial and restructuring-driven spin-offs according to their 
industry sectors.   
 
 
Software and 
microelectronics Other Industry Sectors 
Entrepreneurial spin-offs 13 15 
Restructuring-driven spin-
offs  
11 9 
Table 11: Industry sector of  entrepreneurial and restructuring-driven spin-offs 
 
 
 
5.3 Performance of the Two Groups of Corporate Spin-Offs 
 
5.3.1 Growth in Revenues and Employees  
In order to get a better insight into the performance of corporate spin-offs, we 
have compared the performance of the entrepreneurial spin-offs with the restructuring-
driven spin-offs. Figure 6 demonstrates the growth in revenues and employees for both 
groups of corporate spin-offs. We can clearly see that entrepreneurial spin-offs 
demonstrate a higher growth in revenues and employees. A possible explanation can be 
found in the motivation of the employees working in entrepreneurial and restructuring-
driven spin-offs. The founders of entrepreneurial spin-offs possess the entrepreneurial 
drive to set up and run their own company. They consciously choose to become an 
entrepreneur and create their own company. They look forward to the challenge of it. On 
the other hand, founders of restructuring-driven spin-offs often do not have a choice. In 
case they were working on the project and/or technology that is being spun off, they are 
requested to join the spin-off. These employees often do not have an entrepreneurial 
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drive. Consequently, they do not feel the drive to grow, but prefer to take few risks and 
keep the company financially healthy.  
An alternative explanation can be found in the fact that entrepreneurial spin-offs 
are rather created from a market pull, in comparison to restructuring-driven spin-offs. The 
entrepreneurs spot a market opportunity they can not pursue within the parent company 
and decide to exploit the opportunity themselves. At the time the employees create the 
spin-off, he is convinced of the market opportunity. From our data, we can conclude that 
the entrepreneur is capable of estimating the right value of the opportunity. This allows 
them consequently to grow. The creation of a restructuring-driven spin-off is not always 
connected to a market opportunity. Restructuring-driven spin-offs are often created 
because of parent firm wants to focus on certain core activities and thus terminate certain 
other activities. In these cases, no market opportunity lies at the basis for the creation of 
the spin-off. This is often being translated in a lower performance for restructuring-driven 
spin-offs. 
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Entrepreneurial spin-offs Restructuring-driven spin-offs
500000
520000
540000
560000
580000
600000
620000
640000
660000
680000
Annual Growth in
Employees
Annual Growth in
Revenues
 
Figure 6: Growth in revenues and employees of entrepreneurial and restructuring-driven 
spin-offs 
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5.3.2 Growth in Cash Flow  
Growth in revenues and employees are important indicators to measure the 
performance of entrepreneurial and restructuring-driven spin-offs. However, it can also 
be interesting to look at the liquidity of these spin-offs. Liquidity refers to the ability of a 
company to pay its debts as they become due. Liquidity measures the company’s 
possibility to fulfill short-term obligations. We use cash flow as a measure for the 
company’s liquidity. In contrast to static liquidity measures such as the current and quick 
ratio, cash flow is a more dynamic measure that captures the ongoing liquidity of a 
company’s operations (Kamath, 1989). The cash flow takes the timing of incomes (e.g. 
revenues, financial income…) and charges (remunerations, trade debtors…) into account.  
Figure 7 shows that during the first year the cash flow of restructuring-driven 
spin-offs is higher than for the entrepreneurial spin-offs. We can explain this by the fact 
that restructuring-driven spin-offs are often set up with support of their parent company. 
This support often entails that financial resources are being transferred from the parent 
company to the spin-off. Once the CSO are independent entities, the financial support 
disappears what explains the decline in cash flow during the second and third year. On 
the long term, we see a moderate increase in cash flow for the restructuring-driven spin-
offs. Entrepreneurial spin-offs on the other hand often start with little cash flow. They do 
succeed in generating cash flow fairly quickly and especially after the fourth year, they 
experience a high increase in cash flow. The first years are often used to explore the 
market and to build up a client base. But once they are launched, this group of spin-offs 
experiences a high growth in cash flow. Again we can attribute this high growth to the 
market pull under which the entrepreneurial spin-offs are created. Moreover, the founders 
of these spin-offs often have a real entrepreneurial spirit, that allow the discovery of 
better opportunities that in its turn can translate into a higher cash flow.  
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Figure 7: Liquidity of entrepreneurial spin-offs and restructuring-driven spin-offs 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Knowledge Transfer from the Parent Institute 
An important characteristic of a corporate spin-off is the link between the 
corporate spin-off and its parent company. The support a CSO receives from its parent 
company can have a huge impact on the performance of the CSO. Past research has found 
that the initial transfer of knowledge from the parent to the CSO can have long-lasting 
effects on the performance of CSO (Huber, 1991). If employees leave the parent firm to 
create a CSO, some kind of knowledge transfer takes place (Phillips, 2002). This implies 
that CSO have an advantage over other start-ups who do not have a parent company. So it 
is important to create an insight into the relation between a CSO and its parent company.  
  A knowledge based relationship refers to the way in which the knowledge base 
of both companies overlap. This overlap can take place on a production, technology and 
marketing level (Rumelt, 1974; Sapienza et al., 2004). The transfer of production 
knowledge from the parent firm can be valuable in helping spin-offs to realize production 
systems and techniques and to adjust them to customer needs. The transfer of 
technological knowledge from the parent to the spin-off may allow the spin-off to possess 
a more solid technological knowledge base. This can help the spin-off to shorten the 
development time from product idea to commercial product. A transfer of marketing 
knowledge from the parent firm allows the corporate spin-off to better focus on certain 
customer groups and distribution channels, and create more efficient marketing strategies.  
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 Several researchers have examined the relationship between a CSO and its parent 
firm. The results from these studies have been inconsistent. In their study, Sapienza et al. 
(2004) found that a transfer of production and technological knowledge does have an 
influence on the growth of CSO. They did not find any support for the impact of the 
transfer of marketing knowledge on performance. On the other hand, Davis et al. (1992) 
find that a transfer of marketing knowledge is associated with a higher sales growth. 
Sorrentino & Williams (1995) found no significant difference between the market share 
of high, medium and low related corporate spin-offs and conclude that the relationship 
between a corporate spin-off and its parent company has no effect on performance. 
Agarwal et al. (2004) show that the capacities of the parent company do have a positive 
effect on the knowledge and survival chances of corporate spin-offs.  
 Table 12 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the knowledge transfer of 
entrepreneurial and restructuring-driven spin-offs.  Table 13 shows the results from the 
Mann-Whitney U-test in which we have tested the difference in transfer of production, 
technological and marketing knowledge for restructuring-driven and entrepreneurial spin-
offs. From the results we can conclude that the transfer of production and technological 
knowledge differs significantly for both groups of spin-offs. The restructuring-driven 
spin-offs transfer considerably more technological knowledge and production know-how. 
This result is not surprising, since restructuring-driven spin-offs are often set up with 
active support of their parent company, which makes the transfer of knowledge easier and 
more acceptable. When we look at the transfer of marketing knowledge, we can conclude 
that entrepreneurial spin-offs transfer on average slightly more marketing knowledge than 
restructuring-driven spin-offs, but the difference is not significant.  
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 Mean Median Std. deviation 
 Entrepre 
neurial 
spin-offs 
Restructuring-
driven  
spin-offs 
Entrepre
neurial 
spin-offs 
Restructuring-
driven  
spin-offs 
Entrepre
neurial 
spin-offs 
Restructuring-
driven  
spin-offs 
Technology 
transfer from 
the parent 
F Tech 1 
2.71 4.79 1.00 6.50 2.305 2.723 
Technology 
transfer from 
the parent 
F Tech 2 
2.81 5.86 1.00 7.00 2.337 1.703 
Technology 
transfer from 
the parent 
F Tech 3 
2.33 5.07 1.00 6.50 1.932 2.495 
Transfer of 
production  
knowledge 
from the parent 
F Prod 1 
1.67 3.36 1.00 1.00 1.713 2.872 
Transfer of 
production  
knowledge 
from the parent 
F Prod 2 
1.38 3.60 1.00 2.00 1.203 2.794 
Transfer of 
marketing 
knowledge 
from the parent 
F Mark 1 
2.45 1.75 1.00 1.00 2.259 1.865 
Transfer of 
marketing 
knowledge 
from the parent 
F Mark 2 
1.30 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.342 1.732 
Transfer of 
marketing  
knowledge 
from the parent 
F Mark 3 
2.10 1.92 1.00 1.00 1.774 1.730 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics of the knowledge transfer of entrepreneurial and 
restructuring-driven spin-offs 
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Transfer of technological 
knowledge 
Transfer of 
production 
knowledge 
Transfer of marketing 
knowledge 
 
F Tech 
1 
F Tech 
2 
F Tech 
3 
F Prod 
1 
F Prod 
2 
F Mark 
1 
F Mark 
2 
F Mark 
3 
Mann-Whitney U 82.50 40.00 59.50 101.00 83.50 98.50 116.00 119.00 
Wilcoxon W 313.50 271.00 290.50 332.00 314.50 176.50 326.00 329.00 
Z -2.306 -3.721 -3.087 -2.022 -2.787 -1.056 -0.371 -0.045 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.021 0.000 0.002 0.043 0.005 0.291 0.711 0.964 
Table 13: Mann-Whitney U-test for the knowledge transfer of entrepreneurial and 
restructuring-driven spin-offs 
 
 
 
5.3.4 Relationship between Knowledge Transfer and Performance  
 Corporate spin-offs are a unique group of new ventures since they are based upon 
activities that were originally developed in a larger parent firm. This allows them to 
transfer unique knowledge from the parent firm into the CSO. An important question that 
comes to rise is whether this knowledge transfer contributes to the performance of CSO. 
In Chapter 3 we have developed several hypotheses regarding the transfer of 
technological and production knowledge from the parent firm to the CSO.  In the result 
section, these hypotheses are tested using the partial least squares method. The 
interpretation is written down in the conclusion section.  
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6  RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical tests of the hypotheses, formulated 
in Chapter 3.  First, the hypotheses on the technological resources of CSO and USO are 
tested. Next, the relationship between the technological resources, the technology 
strategy and the performance is tested. Then, we look at the performance of CSO and 
USO. Finally, we provide a summary of the results of the hypotheses tests.  
 
 
6.1 Technological Resources of CSO and USO 
 
Hypothesis 1 through hypothesis 4 predicted the differences in technological 
resources of CSO and USO. We predicted that USO will have more internal R&D 
sources, will collaborate more in R&D consortia and transfer more technology than CSO. 
CSO on the other hand will transfer more production knowledge. Table 14 contains the 
descriptive statistics of the measures of the technological resources of CSO and USO.   
   
  Minimum Maximum 
Mean 
CSO 
Mean 
USO 
Std. 
Deviation 
CSO 
Std. 
Deviation 
USO 
Internal R&D sources 
FTERD_FTE 0 1 0.42 0.57 0.359 0.375 
Collaboration in R&D 
consortia 
NPD1 
1 3 1.39 1.64 0.754 0.804 
Collaboration in R&D 
consortia 
REc3PBLRD1 
1 3 1.21 1.65 0.512 0.699 
Collaboration in R&D 
consortia 
Rec3PBLt1 
1 3 1.45 1.33 0.751 0.653 
Technology transfer 
from the parent 
F Tech 1 
1 7 3.23 5.37 2.591 1.819 
Technology transfer 
from the parent 
F Tech 2 
1 7 3.69 4.82 2.553 1.965 
Technology transfer 
from the parent 
F Tech 3 
 
1 7 3.11 5.16 2.459 1.897 
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Transfer of production  
knowledge from the 
parent 
F Prod 1 
1 7 2.29 2.82 2.420 2.571 
Transfer of production  
knowledge from the 
parent 
F Prod 2 
1 7 2.17 2.28 2.281 2.351 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of the technological resources of CSO and USO  
 
 
We then performed a Mann-Whitney U-test to examine if the difference for CSO 
and USO is significantly different. As the results in Table 15  show, CSO and USO do 
significantly differ in their technology transfer, their internal R&D sources and in two of 
the three collaboration items. No significant difference was found for the transfer of 
production knowledge.  
 
 Technology transfer 
Transfer of 
production 
knowledge 
Collaboration in R&D 
consortia 
Internal 
R&D 
sources 
  
F Tech 
1 
F Tech 
2 
F Tech 
3 
F Prod 
1 
F Prod 
2 NPD1 
Rec3
PBLt1 
REc3PB
LRD1 
FTERD_
FTE 
Mann-
Whitney U 
501.50 709.00 501.50 810.50 912.00 1238.0 1481.0 1040.00 1363.50 
Wilcoxon 
W 
1096.50 1304.00 1096.50 1405.50 1507.00 2228.00 3966.0 2121.00 2539.50 
Z -3.933 -2.169 -3.912 -1.582 -.625 -1.944 -.949 -3.728 -1.984 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .030 .000 .114 .532 .052 .342 .000 .047 
Table 15: Mann-Whitney U-test for the technological resources of CSO and USO 
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6.2 Technology Strategy of CSO and USO  
 
Strategies must be set in conjunction with the spin-off’s resources in order to 
achieve a competitive advantage. Barney and Zajac (1994) argue that firm performance is 
determined by the firm’s strategy and the firm’s resources base. The better the fit 
between a firm’s strategy and its resources, the better the firm’s performance (Edelman et 
al., 2005). To best capture the theoretical interdependencies between resources, strategies 
and spin-off performance, we analyzed the data using the partial least square (PLS) 
technique. The partial least square technique is one of the structural equation modeling 
(SEM) techniques that was developed by Wold (1974) as an alternative to the LISREL 
program. Generally, PLS results are presented in two stages. In the first stage, the 
researcher ensures that the measures used as operationalizations of the underlying 
constructs are both reliable and valid. Once convinced of the adequacy of the 
measurement model, we can then proceed to interpret the resulting model coefficients 
(Birkinshaw et al., 1995).  
 
 
6.2.1 Assessment of the Measurement Model: Reliability and Validity 
The acceptability of the measurement model was assessed by looking at the 
reliability of individual items, the internal consistency between items expected to 
measure the same constructs, and the discriminant validity between constructs. The tables 
displayed, are the results obtained from the CSO sample.  
 
6.2.1.1 Item reliability 
Individual item reliability was determined by examining the loadings of measures 
on their corresponding constructs. A rule of thumb employed by many researchers is to 
accept items with loadings of 0.7 or more (Hulland, 1999), which implies that there is 
more shared variance between construct and its measure than error variance. Since 
loadings are correlations, this implies that more than 50 percent of the variance in the 
observed variable is due to the construct.   
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Internal 
R&D 
sources 
Collaboration 
in R&D 
consortia 
Technology 
transfer 
Production 
knowledge 
transfer 
Scope of 
technology 
Newness 
of 
technology 
Perfor- 
mance 
Age 
Expe-
rience 
Start 
capital 
Size 
Techno- 
logy 
domain 
FTERD_FTE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NPD1 0 0.9349 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PBLt1 0 0.5271 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BLRD1 0 0.7346 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F Tech 1 0 0 0.9157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F Tech 2 0 0 0.9000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F Tech 3 0 0 0.9534 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F Prod 1 0 0 0 0.9793 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F Prod 2 0 0 0 0.9828 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TechScopeFou 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Know1New 0 0 0 0 0 0.7682 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KnowSynth 0 0 0 0 0 0.8157 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tacit_7 0 0 0 0 0 0.8507 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
ExpCom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
TotalCap0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
N_Founders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
TechDomain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
YFTEGrowth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9705 0 0 0 0 0 
YRevGrowth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8733 0 0 0 0 0 
 Table 16: Item reliability of the respective constructs 
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Table 16 presents the item reliability of the respective constructs for the sample of 
CSO. We can see that one of the measures for the construct collaboration in R&D 
consortia has an item reliability of 0.5271, which is less than the required 0.7. All other 
measures show an item reliability that is higher than the required 0.7. In practice, it is 
common to find that at least several measurement items have loadings below the 0.7 
threshold. These measures should be carefully examined, since they may add little 
explanatory power to the model while attenuating the estimates of the parameters linking 
the constructs (Nunnally, 1978). In practice, items with loadings of less than 0.5 should 
certainly be dropped. In further analyses, we have dropped the variable with the lower 
item reliability.  
 
 
6.2.1.2 Convergent Validity 
When multiple measures are used for an individual construct, the researcher 
should be concerned not only with individual measurement item reliability, but also with 
the extent to which the measures demonstrate convergent validity. Traditionally, 
researchers using PLS have generally reported one or both of two measures of convergent 
validity (also referred to as composite reliability): Cronbach’s alpha and the internal 
consistency measure developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981). Fornell and Larcker argue 
that their measure is superior to alpha since it uses the item loadings obtained within the 
nomological network (or causal model). Low internal consistency can result from a 
variety of underlying causes, including poor construct definition and/or construct 
multidimensionality. Nunnally (1978) suggests 0.7 as a benchmark for ‘modest’ 
composite reliability. From Table 17 we can conclude that the constructs demonstrate 
convergent validity. For the construct Internal R&D sources, Scope of technology and the 
control variables, we only use one measure to capture the construct. This implies that the 
convergent validity for these constructs is 1.  
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 Composite Re 
Internal R&D sources 1 
Collaboration in R&D consortia 0.7867 
Technology transfer 0.9455 
Production knowledge transfer 0.9809 
Scope of technology 1 
Newness of technology 0.8531 
Performance 0.9200 
Age  1 
Experience 1 
Start capital 1 
Size 1 
Technology domain 1 
Table 17: Composite reliability of the constructs 
 
 
 
6.2.1.3 Discriminant Validity 
The traditional methodological complement to convergent validity is discriminant 
validity, which represents the extent to which measures of a given construct differ from 
measures of other constructs in the same model. In a PLS context, one criterion for 
adequate discriminant validity is that a construct should share more variance with its 
measures than it shares with other constructs in a given model. To assess discriminant 
validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest the use of Average Variance Extracted (i.e. 
the average variance shared between a construct and its measures). This measure should 
be greater than the variance shared between the construct and other constructs in the 
model. This can be demonstrated in a correlation matrix which includes the correlations 
between different constructs in the lower left off-diagonal elements of the matrix, and the 
square roots of the average variance extracted values calculated for each of the constructs 
along the diagonal. For adequate discriminant validity, the diagonal elements should be 
significantly greater than the off-diagonal elements in the corresponding rows and 
columns. Table 18 demonstrate that this is the case for our constructs.   
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Internal 
R&D 
sources 
Collaboration 
in R&D 
consortia 
Techno-
logy 
transfer 
Production 
knowledge 
transfer 
Scope of 
technology 
Newness 
of 
technology 
Perfor-
mance 
Age 
Expe-
rience 
Start 
capital 
Size 
Techno- 
logy 
domain 
Internal R&D 
sources 
1            
Collaboration 
in R&D 
consortia 
0.2945 0.7509           
Technology 
transfer 
0.3948 0.2650 0.9233          
Production 
knowledge 
transfer 
0.2216 0.2372 0.7064 0.9811         
Scope of 
technology 
-0.0616 0.3042 0.3040 0.0958 1        
Newness of 
technology 
0.2514 0.3571 0.5844 0.5041 0.6183 0.8123       
Performance 0. 1477 0.3373 0.0279 0.0279 -0.0170 0.1961 0.9232      
Age  0.035 0.0883 0.1882 0.2121 -0.074 0.1385 0.2999 1     
Experience -0.0441 -0.0958 -0.1547 0.0363 0.0176 0.0953 0.2959 -0.0521 1    
Start capital 0.0029 0.1313 0.2622 -0.0286 0.0779 -0.0031 0.0099 -0.1595 -0.0666 1   
Size -0.3118 0.0096 -0.0593 0.015 0.1888 0.1368 0.138 -0.0051 0.0628 -0.1884 1  
Technology 
domain 
-0.0013 0.2966 -0.1134 -0.1344 0.0834 -0.1821 -0.0361 -0.0887 -0.0527 0.086 -0.0172 1 
Table 18: Discriminant validity of the constructs 
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6.2.1.4 Goodness of Fit 
LISREL and other covariance structure analysis modeling approaches involve 
parameter estimation procedures which seek to reproduce as closely as possible the 
observed covariance matrix. In contrast, PLS has as its primary objective the 
minimization of error (or, equivalently, the maximization of variance explained) in all 
endogenous constructs. The degree to which any particular PLS model accomplished this 
objective can be determined by examining the R2 values for the dependent (endogenous) 
constructs.  
 
 
 R Square 
Internal R&D sources 0 
Collaboration in R&D consortia 0 
Technology transfer 0 
Production knowledge transfer 0 
Scope of technology 0.2560 
Newness of technology 0.3986 
Performance 0.2429 
Age  0 
Experience 0 
Start capital 0 
Size 0 
Technology domain 0 
Table 19: R2 values of the dependent constructs 
 
 
 128 
6.2.2 Assessment of the Structural Model 
The assessment of the structural model involves estimating the path coefficients 
and the R2 value. Path coefficients indicate the strengths of the relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables, whereas the R2 value is a measure of predictive 
power of a model for the dependent variables (Ko et al., 2005). The sign of the path 
coefficients indicates the direction of the relationship. Smart PLS 2.0 was chosen using a 
bootstrap resampling method to determine the significance of the paths within the 
structural model. The bootstrap technique represents a nonparametric approach for 
estimating the precision of the PLS estimates. The bootstrap technique is considered 
more efficient than the jackknife technique (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). Table 20 
represents the significance of the paths using the bootstrap technique, while Table 21 
illustrates the path coefficients. The variance explained, the sign and significance of the 
path coefficients, and examination of the measurement loadings can be used to assess the 
model specification (Milberg et al., 2000). Figure 8 shows the relationship between the 
technological resources, the technology strategy and performance. The tests of the 
hypotheses will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
 Original Sample Sample Mean Standard Dev T Statistics 
Internal->scope -0.3077 -0.3094 0.1111 2.7684 
Internal->newness -0.0122 -0.0087 0.0727 0.1673 
Collaboration->scope 0.3197 0.3152 0.1115 2.868 
Collaboration->newness 0.2113 0.2105 0.1037 2.0387 
Technology ->scope 0.5558 0.5645 0.0971 5.7216 
Technology ->newness 0.4204 0.441 0.1089 3.86 
Production->scope -0.3045 -0.316 0.114 2.6708 
Production->newness 0.1597 0.1444 0.1033 1.5461 
Scope->Performance -0.1856 -0.1762 0.1139 1.6291 
Newness->Performance 0.2327 0.2112 0.1342 1.7335 
Age->Performance 0.2931 0.3 0.0793 3.6959 
Experience->Performance 0.2936 0.3058 0.0831 3.5335 
Start capital->Performance 0.1142 0.1177 0.0713 1.6014 
Size->Performance 0.1467 0.1519 0.1048 1.4001 
Tech domain->Performance 0.0559 0.0458 0.1148 0.4871 
Table 20: Significance of the path coefficients using the bootstrap technique 
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Internal 
R&D 
sources 
Collaboration 
in R&D 
consortia 
Techno-
logy 
transfer 
Production 
knowledge 
transfer 
Scope of 
technology 
Newness 
of 
technology 
Perfor-
mance 
Age 
Expe-
rience 
Start 
capital 
Size 
Techno- 
logy 
domain 
Internal R&D 
sources 
0 0 0 0 -0.3077 -0.0122 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Collaboration 
in R&D 
consortia 
0 0 0 0 0.3197 0.2113 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Technology 
transfer 
0 0 0 0 0.5558 0.4204 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Production 
knowledge 
transfer 
0 0 0 0 -0.3045 0.1597 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Scope of 
technology 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.1856 0 0 0 0 0 
Newness of 
technology 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2327 0 0 0 0 0 
Performance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2931 0 0 0 0 0 
Experience 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2936 0 0 0 0 0 
Start capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1142 0 0 0 0 0 
Size 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1467 0 0 0 0 0 
Technology 
domain 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0559 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 21: Path coefficients 
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Figure 8: The relationship between technological resources, technology strategy and performance 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Analysis of the Hypotheses on Technology Strategy 
We developed several hypotheses on the relationship between the technological 
resources and the technology strategy of CSO and USO. CSO and USO must both set their 
technology strategy in conjunction with their technological resources in order to achieve 
performance. From the tests performed in paragraph 6.1 we can conclude that the 
technological resources of CSO and USO are indeed different. Since CSO and USO have 
different technological resources, there exist a high probability that their technology strategy 
will also differ since their strategy is set up in concurrence with the resources. We have 
therefore performed the analyses for the sample of CSO and USO separately. This allows us 
to create a deeper understanding of the co-alignment of technological resources, technology 
strategy and performance for the two groups of spin-offs. Table 22 presents the path 
coefficients of the proposed model. For each type of spin-off, two models were tested: a base 
model (including only control variables) and a full model (including control variables plus 
the technological resources, technology strategy and performance variables).  
 
Performance 
Scope of 
technology 
Internal R&D sources 
Collaboration in R&D 
consortia 
Technology transfer from 
the parent 
Transfer of production 
knowledge from the parent 
Newness of 
technology 
Technological resources 
Technology strategy 
Age Experience 
Control variables 
Start capital 
Tech domain Size 
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CSO USO 
 
Base model Full model Base model Full model 
Internal R&D sources ->scope  -0.3077***  0.1821** 
Internal R&D sources ->newness  -0.0122  0.2898*** 
Collaboration ->scope  0.3197***  0.2963*** 
Collaboration ->newness  0.2113**  0.1865*** 
Technology transfer ->scope  0.5558***  0.1016 
Technology transfer ->newness  0.4204***  0.5168*** 
Production ->scope  -0.3045**  0.0035 
Production ->newness  0.1597  -0.0856 
Scope ->Performance  -0.1856*  0.2716*** 
Newness ->Performance  0.2327*  -0.1514* 
Age ->Performance 0.3372*** 0.2931*** 0.2313*** 0.1895** 
Experience ->Performance 0.3154*** 0.2936*** -0.0054 -0.0475 
Start capital ->Performance 0.1128 0.1142 0.5932*** 0.6065*** 
Size ->Performance 0.1464 0.1467 0.177 0.1773* 
Tech domain ->Performance -0.0063 0.0559 -0.1251 -0.1219 
R2 0.2190 0.2429 0.4082 0.4507 
Table 22: Results of the PLS analysis (* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01) 
 
  
6.2.3.1 The Base Model 
The control variables we considered are (1) the age of the spin-off; (2) the experience 
of the founding team; (3) the start capital of the spin-off; (4) the size of the spin-off; and (5) 
the technology domain of the spin-off. The control variables could not be bundled in one 
overall construct, since they each represent a distinct construct. Indeed, if we perform the 
analyses by putting all control variables in one overall construct, the item reliability of the 
measures is very low. Only age has a high item reliability. We have therefore separated the 
control variables into different constructs.   
An experienced, well-balanced team is preferably present to guide the 
commercialization of a new technology. The necessary experience may be two folded, (1) the 
team needs technical experience in order to develop the technology into a market ready 
product and (2) the team needs business experience to bring the product on the market 
according to the customer’s needs. The experience of the founding team was measured by 
two items e.g. the number of years of technical experience and the number of years of 
business experience. In both groups of spin-offs, the item reliability of technical experience is 
very low (e.g. 0.0414 and 0.1557), while the item reliability of business experience is very 
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high (e.g. 0.9912 and 0.9836 for CSO and USO respectively). Therefore, we have omitted the 
item technical experience from the construct experience and performed the analyses with 
business experience only. 
For the sample of CSO, the control variables age and experience have a strong and 
significant influence on performance (p< 0.01). Also in the sample of USO, age has a strong 
and significant influence on performance. Surprisingly, experience is not significantly related 
with performance, not even on a 0.1 level. In case of USO, experience does not seem to 
contribute to performance. For USO, also start capital contributes significantly to 
performance (p< 0.01).  
 
 
6.2.3.2 The Full Model 
In the full model, we have included the control variables, the technological resources, 
the technology strategy and the performance variables. Both in the case of CSO and USO, the 
full model yields a higher explained variance of performance than the base model. The 
difference in R2 values of the base and the full model allows us to examine the substantive 
impact of adding the technological resources and technology strategy variables to the model. 
The effect size f2 can be calculated as (R2full – R2excluded)/(1-R2full). This indicator provides the 
substantive impact of adding the constructs. Cohen (1988) suggested 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 as 
operational definitions of small, medium and large effect size respectively. The f2 of the 
performance of CSO is 0.032, while the f2 of performance of USO is 0.077. Thus, the 
technological resources and the technology strategy prove to have a substantial effect on the 
performance of CSO and USO.  
 
 
The relationship between the technological resources and the technology strategy  
In hypothesis 5a we predicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
internal R&D sources and the scope of the technology. In case of USO, we found a path 
coefficient of 0.1821 (p< 0.05), indicating strong support for this hypothesis. Surprisingly, in 
case of CSO we found a negative, but highly significant relationship between the internal 
R&D sources and the scope of technology (path coefficient of -0.3077, p< 0.01). In 
hypothesis 5b predicted a positive and significant relationship between the internal R&D 
sources and the newness of the technology. In case of USO, strong support was found (path 
coefficient of 0.2898, p< 0.01). In case of CSO, no significant result was found.  
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Hypothesis 6a and 6b predicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
collaboration in R&D consortia and the scope and newness of technology. In both cases, we 
found strong support for the hypotheses with path coefficients of 0.3197 (p<0.01) and 0.2113 
(p<0.05) in case of CSO, and path coefficients of 0.2963 (p<0.01) and 0.1865 (p<0.01) in 
case of USO.  
  In hypothesis 7a we predicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
transfer of technology from the parent and the scope of technology. For the sample of CSO, 
we found strong support for this hypothesis with a path coefficient of 0.5558 (p<0.01).  
However, in case of USO, we found no support for this hypothesis. For hypothesis 7b, in 
which we predicted a positive and significant relationship between the transfer of technology 
from the parent and the newness of technology, we found strong support for both groups of 
spin-offs. In the sample of CSO, we found a path coefficient of 0.4204, at a significance level 
of p<0.01. The USO sample has a path coefficient of 0.5168 that was significant at p<0.01. 
Hypothesis 8a predicted a negative and significant relationship between the transfer of 
production knowledge from the parent and the scope of technology. In case of CSO, this 
hypothesis was supported with a path coefficient of -0.3045 (p<0.05). The hypothesis was not 
supported in the sample of USO. Hypothesis 8b predicted a negative and significant 
relationship between the transfer of production knowledge from the parent and the newness 
of technology. In both groups of spin-offs, the hypothesis was not supported.  
 
 
The relationship between the  technology strategy and performance  
In hypothesis 11, we predicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
scope of technology and performance. In the case of CSO, this hypothesis is not confirmed as 
the path coefficient is    -0.1856 at a significance level of 0.10. We found a significant, but 
negative relationship between the scope of technology and performance for the sample of 
CSO. Hypothesis 11 was strongly supported in the case of USO, with a path coefficient of 
0.2716 (p<0.01). 
Hypothesis 12 predicted a positive and significant relationship between the newness 
of technology and performance. For the group of CSO, this hypothesis was confirmed with a 
path coefficient of 0.2327 (p<0.10). However, this hypothesis was not confirmed for the 
group of USO as the path coefficient is -0.1514 at a significance level of 0.10. We found a 
significant, but negative relationship between the newness of technology and performance for 
the sample of USO.  
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6.2.3.3 Technology Strategy of CSO and USO 
We have also formulated hypotheses concerning the technology strategy followed by 
CSO and USO. In hypothesis 9 and 10 we predicted that USO will have a broader scope of 
technology and a higher level of newness of technology than CSO. Table 23 contains the 
descriptive statistics of the technology strategy variables.  
 
 
  Minimum Maximum 
Mean 
CSO 
Mean 
USO 
Std. 
Deviation 
CSO 
Std. 
Deviation 
USO 
Scope of technology 
TechScopeFounding 
1 5 3.18 3.40 1.752 1.637 
Newness of technology 
Know1New 
1 5 3.20 3.05 1.400 1.386 
Newness of technology 
KnowSynthesis 
1 7 2.88 2.58 1.364 1.379 
Newness of technology 
Tacit 
1 5 3.82 3.52 1.740 1.881 
   Table 23: Descriptive statistics of the technology strategy of CSO and USO 
 
 
 
Next, we performed a Mann-Whitney U-test to examine if the technology strategy of 
CSO and USO is significantly different. Table 24 shows that CSO and USO do not differ 
significantly in their technology strategy. Our hypotheses are not confirmed.  
  
 TechScopeFounding Tacit Know1New KnowSynthesis 
Mann-Whitney U 1209.000 783.000 1249.000 1156.000 
Wilcoxon W 2029.000 2268.000 3394.000 3301.000 
Z -0.627 -0.960 -0.554 -1.175 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.530 0.337 0.580 0.240 
Table 24: Mann-Whitney U-test for the technology strategy of CSO and USO 
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6.3 Performance of CSO and USO 
 
Our last hypothesis predicted that USO would have a higher performance than CSO. 
Table 25 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of the performance of CSO and USO.  
 
  Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
CSO 550576.056 190476.190 1131079.931 -105217.391 6336142.000 Annual 
Growth in 
Revenue 
USO 292139.810 82191.781 606102.691 -109090.909 3500000.000 
CSO 2.932 1.153 5.078 -5.000 18.000 Annual 
Growth in 
Employees 
USO 3.115 1.350 4.758 -6.000 19.377 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics of the performance of CSO and USO 
 
 
 
Table 26 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney U-test. We can see that the annual 
growth in revenue differ significantly for both groups of spin-offs. CSO have an annual 
growth rate that is significantly higher than that of USO. The annual growth in employees of 
CSO and USO does not differ significantly, although the descriptive statistics do indicate that 
USO tend to grow slightly faster in employees. These results contradict our hypothesis.  
 
 
  
Annual Growth in 
Revenue 
Annual Growth in 
Employees 
Mann-Whitney U 1224.000 1598.000 
Wilcoxon W 3639.000 2726.000 
Z -1.905 -0.511 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.057 0.609 
Table 26: Mann-Whitney U-test for the performance of CSO and USO 
 
 
 136
6.4 Summary of the Results 
 
The results of the hypotheses tests of this study is summarized in Table 27. Hypotheses 
1, 2 and 3 were supported, indicating that USO have more technological resources than CSO. 
Only hypothesis 4 on the transfer of production knowledge, was not supported. We found 
mixed support for hypotheses 5a till 8b. Moreover, we also found differences in support for 
the two groups of spin-offs. We found no support for hypothesis 9 and 10, implying that the 
technology strategy of CSO and USO does not differ significantly. Contrary to hypothesis 11, 
the scope of technology was negatively associated with performance for the group of CSO. 
Hypothesis 12 was supported in case of CSO. Interestingly, we found that in the case of 
USO, hypothesis 11 was supported, while for hypothesis 12 the newness of technology was 
negatively associated with performance. Finally, hypothesis 13 was not supported. The 
results are discussed more in-depth in Chapter 7.  
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Results  Hypothesis Description 
CSO USO 
1 USO will have more internal R&D sources than 
CSO 
Supported 
2 USO will have more collaboration in R&D 
consortia than CSO 
Supported 
3 Technology transfer from the parent will be more 
prevalent in the case of USO than CSO 
Supported 
4 The transfer of production knowledge will be higher 
in case of a CSO than a USO  
Not supported 
5a A high amount of internal R&D sources is 
positively associated with a broad scope of 
technology 
Not 
supported: 
contrasting 
result 
Supported 
5b A high amount of internal R&D sources is 
positively associated with a high level of newness  
of technology 
Not 
supported 
Supported 
6a Collaboration in R&D consortia will be positively 
associated with a broader scope of technology 
Supported Supported 
6b Collaboration in R&D consortia will be positively 
associated with a high level of newness of 
technology  
Supported Supported 
7a Transfer of technology from the parent is positively 
associated with a broad scope of technology 
Supported  Not 
supported 
7b Transfer of technology from the parent is positively 
associated with a high level of newness of 
technology 
Supported Supported 
8a Transfer of production knowledge from the parent is 
negatively associated with a broad scope of 
technology 
Supported Not 
supported 
8b Transfer of production knowledge from the parent is 
negatively associated with a high level of newness 
of technology 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
9 USO will have a broader scope of technology than 
CSO 
Not supported 
10 USO will have a higher level of newness of 
technology than CSO 
Not supported 
11 A broad scope of technology will be positively 
associated with performance 
Not 
supported: 
contrasting 
result 
Supported 
12 A high level of newness of technology will be 
positively associated with performance 
Supported Not 
supported: 
contrasting 
result 
13 USO will have a higher performance than CSO Not supported 
Table 27: Summary of the results 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has sought to shed light on the group of corporate spin-offs (CSO). We 
have developed a model of antecedents and characteristics of corporate spin-offs by 
identifying the key dimensions that contribute to the performance of CSO. Next, we have 
empirically tested the relationship between technological resources, technology strategy and 
performance. In this chapter, the results of this study and their implications for theory and 
practice are discussed. Also the limitations of the study are presented.   
 
 
7.1 Discussion of the Empirical Results 
One of the fundamental tenets of the resource-based view is that competitive 
advantage stems from resource heterogeneity between firms and from the sustainability of 
this heterogeneity over time (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Barney, 1991; Helfat, 1994). The aim of 
this empirical study was to explore the relationship between the technological resources, the 
technology strategy and performance of CSO and USO. We expect to observe differences in 
this relationship for CSO and USO,  due to the fact that they originate from different types of 
parent organizations and therefore will count on different resources. After all, intimate 
knowledge about technology and markets is being transferred across organizations from a 
parent to a spin-off. When employees leave to start new ventures, they walk out with tacit 
knowledge. This initial stock of inherited knowledge (Huber, 1991) is likely to have long-
term effects on a spin-off. We formulated several hypotheses which will be discussed more 
in-depth in the following paragraphs.  
  
 
7.1.1 Technological Resources of CSO and USO 
Our first hypotheses centered on whether there are differences in the technological 
resources of CSO and USO. Empirical evidence shows that CSO and USO do indeed differ in 
their technological resources. Hypotheses 1 to 3 are confirmed, USO have more internal 
R&D sources, they collaborate more in R&D consortia, and they transfer more technology 
from their parent than CSO. The fact that USO have more technological resources than CSO 
suggest that it might be easier for USO to transfer the technological resources from their 
parent universities. Indeed, USO are often supported by their parent university to 
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commercialize their technologies. Some CSO especially restructuring-driven spin-offs, also 
receive support from their parent company, but entrepreneurial spin-offs often do not. This 
might make it more difficult to transfer technological resources. Hypothesis 4 predicted that 
the transfer of production knowledge would be higher in case of a CSO than a USO. This 
hypothesis was not supported. Contrary to expectations, the CSO in our sample did not 
transfer a large amount of production knowledge. A possible explanation is that CSO may 
prefer not to transfer a large amount of production knowledge to make sure that the spin-off 
is not hindered in coming up with new, innovative solutions.  
 
 
7.1.2 Relationship between Technological Resources and Technology Strategy 
A fundamental premise of strategic management theory is that differing resources 
may lead to the selection of different strategies (Barney, 1991). Specific hypotheses regarding 
the relationship between technological resources and technology strategy are developed. 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted a positive and significant relationship between the internal 
R&D sources and the scope and newness of technology. In case of USO, both hypotheses are 
supported. However, in case of CSO, the hypotheses are not supported. For CSO, the 
relationship between internal R&D sources and the newness of technology is not significant, 
while the relationship between internal R&D sources and the scope of technology is 
significant but negative. A possible explanation may be that CSO are often set up in 
anticipation of a market opportunity. In order to respond to this market opportunity, specific 
technologies need to be developed. A high amount of internal R&D sources may allow a 
more focused approach to rapidly develop these specific technologies, hereby promoting a 
more narrow scope of technology.  
Hypotheses 6a and 6b predicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
collaboration in R&D consortia and the scope and newness of technology. Both in case of 
CSO and USO, the hypotheses were confirmed. Collaborating with universities and other 
companies is positively related to the technology strategy of spin-off companies. 
Collaboration projects offer possibilities to work on different aspects of technology, and 
hereby entail the possibility of broadening the scope and increasing the level of newness of 
technology. This finding conforms to Zahra’s study (1996a) who also found that the use of 
external technology sources is well justified. 
Hypotheses 7a and 7b predicted a positive and significant relationship between the 
transfer of technology from the parent and the scope and newness of technology. The transfer 
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of technological skills leads to knowledge and expertise in certain technological domains. If 
the founders of the spin-off transfer a lot of technology skills to the spin-off, this can allow 
them to focus their technology around certain assets and further build on the skills being 
transferred. In case of CSO, these hypotheses are confirmed. In case of USO, the transfer of 
technology has a very significant and positive relationship with the newness of technology. 
However, it has no significant relationship with the scope of technology. An explanation can 
be found in the fact that technology that is being transferred from universities can be two- 
fold. On the one hand, it can be a broad technology platform on which researchers have been 
working. In this case, the USO might be set up with the goal of developing several products 
from this platform. On the other hand, research at universities may also be focused on a very 
specific niche technology. In case the knowledge of this niche technology is being transferred 
to a USO, a huge transfer of technology may take place, while the scope of technology will 
be rather narrow.  
Hypotheses 8a and 8b predicted a negative and significant relationship between the 
transfer of production knowledge from the parent and the scope and newness of technology. 
Weak support is found for the relationship between the transfer of production knowledge and 
the technology strategy. For the sample of CSO, we only found support for the relationship 
between the transfer of production knowledge from the parent and the scope of technology. 
This relationship proved to be significant and negative, as predicted.  In the case of USO, we 
found no support for the hypotheses. This may be explained by the fact that universities are 
organizations where typically production know-how plays a much smaller role than in the 
case of CSOs.  
 
 
7.1.3 Relationship between Technology Strategy and Performance 
The effect of originating from a parent organization may influence the spin-off 
beyond formation, as the transfer of rules, routines, and procedures from parent to progeny 
organizations can both constrain and empower the spin-off (Brittain & Freeman, 1986; 
Romanelli, 1991). USO and CSO follow a different trajectory before they are spun off and 
the motivation to create the spin-off often differs. The most straightforward way for a 
university to commercialize its technology is through licenses to existing companies (Shane, 
2004). Several academic studies show that radical technologies tend to provide the basis for 
the creation of university spin-offs, while incremental technologies are more likely to be 
licensed by established companies. Most USO are brought to the market under a technology 
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push. Established firms are typically less involved in performing fundamental research. 
Therefore, CSO are more likely to be created to commercialize incremental technologies. 
Moreover, CSO are often created in response to a market opportunity. 
Hypothesis 11 predicted a positive and significant relationship between the scope of 
technology and performance, while hypothesis 12 predicted a positive and significant 
relationship between the newness of technology and performance. In contrast to the 
expectations, the scope of technology is negatively associated with performance for CSO. 
The results did support hypothesis 12; we found a positive and significant relationship 
between the newness of technology and performance for the sample of CSO. When we look 
at the results of the USO sample, we see that hypothesis 11 is supported, but that in this case 
the newness of technology is negatively associated with performance. An explanation may be 
found in the organizational origin of the spin-off companies.  
Spin-offs inherit general technical knowledge from their parents that shapes their 
nature at birth (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Universities are often occupied by performing 
research that is on the leading edge of technology. When a USO is created, often the 
technology still needs considerable development time in order to turn the technology into a 
market-ready product. University inventions are typically quite embryonic and high risk 
(Shane, 2004). A strategy of a high level of newness of technology in combination with a 
radical technology may lead to long development times. Moreover, the market for this 
technology may not yet be ready or even exist. This may explain the negative relationship 
between the newness of technology and performance in the case of USO.  
Researchers working at universities often have little business experience. They 
frequently start developing specific products based on the technology without probing to the 
market needs. Later on, they sometimes come to the conclusion that the product is not well 
adjusted to the customer’s needs or that the market is not yet ready. Therefore, in case of 
USO, it might be better to keep a broader scope of technology and to develop several 
products at the same time. A broad platform of technology allows USO to change market 
application in case the first application they pursue turns out to be a dead end (Tornatzky et 
al., 1995). Moreover, it heighten the chances that some products may be brought on the 
market at several points in time: some in the short term, others in the medium term, and still 
others in the long term (Nelson, 1991). This may explain the positive relationship between 
the scope of technology and performance in the case of USO.  
Established firms are seldom occupied by performing research on the leading edge of 
the field. Most of the time, their research activities are more short term focused and related to 
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the customer and market needs. The founders of CSO often have business experience and are 
more experienced in addressing customer needs. Therefore, it might be beneficial for them to 
focus on few specific products since they can position them better in the market. CSO 
experience less the necessity to keep a broad scope of technologies. They seem to be capable 
of selecting the right market applications. Developing a broad scope of technology may only 
delay the CSO in getting its products on the market. This may explain the negative 
relationship between the scope of technology and performance in the case of CSO.  
Abetti (2002) found that the best strategy for a CSO is to practice technological 
innovations that attack new market niches where the parent lacks core competencies or is 
uninterested. CSO need to be able to differentiate themselves from their parent firm in order 
to succeed (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). The similarities can not remain too high. Therefore, a 
certain degree of newness of technology is required. This may explain the positive 
relationship between the newness of technology and performance for CSO.  
The results of hypothesis 11 and 12 reinforce the importance of the organizational 
origin. The initial inheritance of CSO and USO play a major role in the effect its technology 
strategy has on performance. CSO originate from a business environment, which is more 
focused on applied technologies. USO on the other hand originates from universities which 
are more focused on basic research and radical technologies. Therefore, the initial stage of the 
technology the CSO and USO start with often differs. An average, a USO start with a 
technology that is more radical than the technology of a CSO. Consequently, if USO choose a 
high level of newness, it will probably take a long time before any products can be brought to 
the market. In the case of a USO, a high level of newness might not be the best choice to 
create revenues during the first years of existence. However, if CSO choose a high level of 
newness, this may have advantages for them since they start with a more incremental 
technology. A higher level of newness might help to differentiate themselves from their 
parent firm and acquire their own market niche. CSO need to differentiate themselves from 
their parents in order to succeed (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). A broad scope of technology 
may imply that the USO has more potential to develop a least some technologies that can be 
commercialized. In case of CSO, the technologies are already more adapted to the market 
needs, which implies that it might be more efficient to focus on a few products and thus have 
a more narrow scope of technology.  
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7.1.4 Technology Strategy of CSO and USO 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that USO will have a broader scope of technology than CSO, 
while hypothesis 10 predicted that USO will have a higher level of newness of technology 
than CSO. Both hypotheses were not supported, no significant difference was found. The 
previous working environment has an influence on the technological resources and strategy 
of spin-offs and the transfer of routines and culture from the parent organization (Phillips, 
2002). The results suggest that even if CSO and USO select the same technology strategy, the 
execution of this strategy will differ due to the differences in resource inheritance. In case 
CSO and USO choose the same technology strategy; e.g., a broad scope of technology and a 
high level of newness of technology, this technology strategy will have a different 
relationship with performance. This may explain why we found no significant difference 
between the technology strategy of CSO and USO. 
 
 
7.1.5 Performance of CSO and USO 
Zahra and Covin (1993) have underscored the importance of a company’s technology 
strategy for achieving superior performance. Hypothesis 13 predicted that USO will have a 
higher performance than CSO. This hypothesis was not supported. The annual growth in 
revenues is significantly higher for CSO than for USO. The annual growth in employees did 
not differ significantly for CSO and USO, but the descriptive statistics did indicate that USO 
tend to grow slightly faster in employees. Our results are in line with Lindholm (2001) who 
found that CSO outperform USO in terms of revenue growth. However, our results contradict 
those found by Zahra et al., (2006) who concluded that USO experienced significantly higher 
revenue growth rates than CSO. In an earlier study, Lindholm (1997b) found that CSO 
demonstrate a higher growth in employment than USO, which also contradicts our findings. 
The corporate spin-offs in our sample have an average employment growth of 2.93% which 
is lower than the average employment growth of at least 8% found at a European level. A 
possible explanation might be found in the fact that the average age of the Flemish CSO is 6 
years, compared to the average of 22 years in the European study.  
Based upon the technology strategy CSO and USO follow, we predicted that USO 
would have a higher performance than CSO. However, a technology strategy of a broad 
scope and a high level of newness is likely to take a longer period of time before being able 
to generate revenues, especially in the case of USO, who tend to start with a radical 
technology. The average age of USO in our sample is 5 years, which may be too short to reap 
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the benefits of following such a technology strategy. CSO on the other hand tend to be set up 
in response to a market opportunity. Their strategy proves to be more successful in order to 
realize growth in revenues during the first years of existence. Moreover, corporate spin-offs 
are likely to bring in routines and processes and links with customers that enable them to 
better overcome liabilities of newness (Phillips, 2002). In addition to having technological 
and marketing knowledge, corporate spin-off founders are likely to benefit from their 
previous employer’s contacts and from network ties (Higgins & Gulati, 2003).  
Our findings support the contingency perspective that posits that the technology 
strategy should be set in conjunction with the technological resources in order to achieve a 
competitive advantage. It is the unique exploitation of resources through appropriate 
strategies that yields the productive value for the firm (Penrose, 1959; Edelman et al., 2005). 
The imprinting effect of technological resources can affect performance over time. It is the 
internal co-alignment between technological resources and technology strategy that drives the 
performance of spin-off companies.  
 
 
7.1.6 Influence of the Control Variables 
The control variables we included in this study are (1) the age of the spin-off; (2) the 
experience of the founding team; (3) the start capital of the spin-off; (4) the size of the spin-
off; and (5) the industry sector of the spin-off. In all scenarios, age has a significant and 
positive relationship with performance. This result is in line with expectations. The older the 
spin-offs are, the more time they have had to develop their technology, to identify customers, 
to bring their products on the market and consequently generate revenues. A spin-offs’ focus 
on technology commercialization is expected to increase as they approached adolescence. 
Moreover, as they age, spin-offs are expected to become less similar from their parent 
organization, leading to a greater diversity in the innovations they pursue and consequently 
leading to higher performance (Klepper, 2001).  
An interesting finding is the fact that start capital has a very strong and significant 
relationship with the performance of USO, while the relationship between start capital and 
performance is not significant for CSO. It makes sense that start capital is very influential for 
the performance of USO, since USO tend to focus on radical technology, which often takes a 
long time to develop. In order to bridge this development time, a large amount of start capital 
may prove to be of vital importance. Start capital may be less important for CSO, since they 
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tend to focus on technologies which can be brought faster to the market. This allows them to 
generate revenues more rapidly.  
We also considered the size of the founding team. Although Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven (1990) found that the size of the founding team influences the performance of 
new firms, we only found a significant relationship between the size of the founding team and 
performance for USO in the full model. We also took the experience of the founding team in 
consideration. Klepper (2001) found that the main reason a number of new firms became 
leaders of their industry appears to have been due to the backgrounds of their founders. 
Having founders with industry experience had enduring effects on firm performance, 
suggesting that founders of new firms left strong imprints on their organizations (Klepper, 
2002). In the case of CSO, experience has a significant and positive relationship with 
performance. However, experience has no significant relationship with the performance of 
USO.  
An explanation can be found in the background and previous working experience of 
the founders of CSO and USO. Founders of USO tend to be individuals from within the 
university community, who have usually worked for the university on a research project for 
several years before founding the spin-off. While working on these research projects, they 
enhanced their technical experience. In most cases, the heart of these researchers in really 
located on the technical side and consequently they possess little business experience. In 
contrast, the founders of CSO have been less focused on performing fundamental research 
and more focused on performing applied research in a more commercial environment. 
Therefore, the founders of CSO often understand better the pressure to take their technologies 
quickly to the market and the necessity to have commercial experience to guide this process. 
CSO managers are likely to have better and more extensive marketing expertise due to their 
previous working experience. Moreover, CSO founders and managers may also be better 
connected to other companies’ networks which may allow them to draw formally and 
informally upon market expertise or even hiring consultants or other professionals to lead or 
manage these activities. Having experience in bringing products to the market and in 
transforming technologies into market-ready products can be really important for the survival 
of a spin-off. 
From Table 8 and Table 9 we can conclude that the founding team of USO on average 
has less business experience and more technical experience than CSO. The fact that the 
founding team of USO in our sample does not possess a lot of business experience may be 
responsible for its low impact on performance. An alternative explanation may be that since 
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USO often commercialize a technology that is radical, this technology needs quite some 
development time before being brought to the market. Therefore, business experience is of 
less importance since the technology is too immature to start developing potential market 
applications. 
  
 
7.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions of the Dissertation 
Several new ventures have contributed significantly to the national economy (Cooper 
1993). This has inspired researchers to identify the key determinants of their performance 
(Carter et al., 1994; Chandler & Hanks 1994; McDougall et al., 1992).  In this study, we have 
focused on a specific group of new ventures namely the group of corporate spin-offs. First, 
we have performed an extensive literature study on CSO, since the literature on CSO 
infrequently builds upon one another, with little efforts at accumulation. In order to gain 
insight into the key dimensions that contribute to the performance of CSO, we have designed 
a model of antecedents and characteristics of CSO.  
Technology's growing importance in determining success in today's marketplace has 
been widely recognized in the literature (Zahra, 1996a). In one industry after another, 
companies have used their technologies to create an enduring competitive advantage by 
offering new products or utilizing new processes, revising the rules of competition, or 
redrawing their industry's boundaries (Utterback 1994). Whether founded by entrepreneurs or 
established corporations, spin-offs consider technological innovation their lifeblood (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1990) and use their technological resources to create a competitive advantage 
(Ng, Pearson & Ball, 1992). Developing new technologies, even breakthrough ones, is rarely 
sufficient to survive and achieve market success (McGrath 1994). New ventures, therefore, 
need also to employ effective technological strategies that allow them to financially benefit 
from their innovations (McGee, Dowling, and Meggison 1995). In his study, Zahra (1996a) 
found that the payoff from technology strategy dimensions varies from one environment to 
the other. We have extended this argument by stating that the payoff from technology 
strategy dimensions also varies according to the inheritance from the parent institute.  
Success in today's competitive environment requires a company to pursue a coherent 
technology strategy to articulate its plans to develop, acquire, and deploy technological 
resources to achieve superior financial performance (Zahra, 1996a). There must be a fit 
between the resources and the strategy that the spin-off follow (as well as for any type of 
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firm) in order to achieve a competitive advantage. Strategies must be established by taking 
into account the resources that the firm possesses to have a positive impact on performance. 
Most spin-offs have resource constraints that might influence their technology strategy 
choices. Zahra (1996b) found that independent ventures and corporate ventures follow 
different paths in their technology strategy to achieve success. This study contributes to the 
literature by demonstrating that CSO and USO need to follow different strategies in order to 
achieve a competitive advantage. The same choice of technology strategy has a different 
impact on performance for CSO and USO due to the fact that they start with different 
technological resources because of their inheritance.  
Previous studies have focused mostly on the characteristics of a single group of spin-
offs (e.g., USO or CSO). Few studies have examined the two groups together, making it 
difficult to explore the differences between CSO and USO. Our results indicate that it is 
opportune for CSO to have a high level of newness of technology. This allows them to 
distinguish themselves from their parent firm. It is beneficial for them to have a rather narrow 
scope of technology. CSO tend to be aware of the market needs and therefore it is more 
interesting for them to focus on a few technologies and to bring these to the market. USO on 
the other hand, tend to profit more from a lower level of newness of technology and a broader 
scope of technology. This may be explained by the fact that USO usually start with a more 
radical, leading edge technology. It often takes longer to transform a radical technology into a 
market ready product. Therefore, a large amount of start capital is necessary to bridge this 
period of time. USO also need a broader scope of technology. Due to their limited market 
experience, their technological developments are less market oriented. A broader scope of 
technology heighten the chances that one of the technologies will be suited to be transformed 
more quickly into a product that addresses customer needs.  
The findings of this study contribute to the resource-based view of the firm literature. 
Following this view, the starting point in creating a competitive advantage is to identify the 
firm’s resources. Next, a company should determine its strategy by determining which of its 
resources surpasses those of the competition as well as what the company does better than its 
rivals. In other words, it is argued that a firm’s strategies in conjunction with the firm’s 
resource base determine firm performance (Barney & Zajac, 1994). In this disseration, we 
have explored the relationship between the technological resources, the technology strategy 
and performance. We have created additional insights into the co-alignment between 
technological resources and technology strategy in order to achieve firm performance. Our 
work contributes to the development of the internal contingency perspective by suggesting 
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that resource bundles when appropriately channeled through strategic choices, determine firm 
performance (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984).  
The findings of this study also contribute to the organizational sociology literature and 
the institutional theory literature. Corporate and university spin-offs are unique in that they 
originate from a larger parent institute. Organizational sociologists have long considered the 
effects of the transfer of resources and routines from old to new organizations (Phillips, 
2002). They have attempted to establish a framework for understanding new organizations as 
the progeny of parent organizations. Models and metaphors from biological evolution are 
increasingly being used in the analysis of organizations (Aldrich 1999), business strategy 
(Barnett and Burgelman 1996), and industrial competition (Nelson 1995). Studies have 
posited that some amount of a parent organization’s “blueprint” would carry over to the new 
organization through the experiences of the founders of the spin-off companies (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1986; Romanelli, 1991). Spin-offs inherit general technical and market-related 
knowledge from their parents that shape their nature at birth (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). Yet, 
some areas remain underdeveloped. While past efforts have emphasized the source of 
progeny, there have been few attempts to assess empirically the consequences of transferring 
resources and routines from parent organizations to their progeny. In our study, we consider 
the transfer of technology and production knowledge from the parent to the spin-off and its 
relationship with technology strategy and performance. 
 
 
7.3 Managerial Implications 
This study is particularly interesting for founders of CSO and USO. Our results give 
insights into the relationship between the technological resources, the technology strategy and 
performance. If the founders of a USO wish to commercialize a radical, new-to-the-world 
technology, they should take into account that it will probably take several years before they 
will be able to generate any revenues. Therefore, they will need sufficient start capital in 
order to bridge this period of time. Founders of CSO on the other hand, need to take into 
account that they need to differentiate their technology and products from their parent in 
order to survive; e.g., a CSO in our sample stayed in the same technological area and 
competed against its parent. After a few years, the CSO went bankrupt since the parent firm 
outperformed them. Our results indicate that on average, CSO tend to perform well. This 
implies that when employees of established firms spot an opportunity, they should not be 
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afraid to pursue that opportunity since chances are high that they will develop this 
opportunity into a successful business.  
 The insights of this study can be useful for technology transfer officers at universities 
or managers of incubator centers. Our study sheds light on the relationship between 
technological resources, technology strategy and performance. This might help technology 
transfer officers to decide which technological resources they will provide the CSO or USO, 
since they now better understand the impact the availability of certain technological resources 
may have on the spin-off’s strategy and performance. Moreover, the insights of our study will 
allow them to defend to their board of directors why certain USO or CSO will take several 
years to become profitable or why they gave away certain technological resources. 
Established firms often face difficulties in commercializing radical technological 
innovations. In order to commercialize these radical technologies, often unfamiliar roads 
have to be taken by the parent firm. This frequently leads to discussions between the manager 
of the radical project and the management team of the established firm. Therefore, 
established firms have tried to find solutions by setting up incubators, opening research 
centers who are removed from the traditional activities. Another option, which is less 
explored by established firms, is to create a corporate spin-off to commercialize this radical 
technology. CSO can be an ideal solution to commercialize a radical technology. On the one 
hand, the CSO has the freedom to walk on certain paths and to try out several options. On the 
other hand, the CSO inherit the routines and cultures of their parent firm, which might make 
it easier to reintegrate the CSO after a few years, once the technology has been proven.  
 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study  
Several limitations exist in terms of the generalizability and interpretation of the results 
of this dissertation. First, the sample was taken from one region e.g. Flanders. Our focus on 
this small geographic area allows us to reduce the influence of non-measured variance and 
culturally induced variation. The trade-off, however, is that one might question the external 
validity of this region and our findings. However, we have little reason to believe that the 
Flemish region would not be comparable to most emerging and developing high technology 
regions.  
A second limitation of this study is that we collected data solely from CSO and USO. It 
might have been interesting to also collect data at the parent organizations. This would allow 
 150
to test the direct impact of the parent on the transfer of technology and production 
knowledge. Moreover, it could be interesting to see the impact the parent has on the 
technology strategy in case the parent continues to have a formal relationship with the spin-
off e.g. through a seat in the board of directors. Future research might benefit form collecting 
data from both sides; however, such an approach is very difficult and time-consuming to 
execute.  
Although this study has speculated on the causal relationships among the constructs, 
the cross-sectional design of this study prevents direct tests of causality. The direction of the 
relationships cannot be empirically verified in this study. Therefore, it is possible that 
relationships may take place in the opposite direction. In future research, the data of this 
study can be used as a starting point to compile a longitudinal dataset to address the issues of 
causality, and to explore the dynamics of the relationship between technological resources 
and technology strategy.  
We found that CSO demonstrate higher performance than USO. However, our data 
does not allow us to look at the effectiveness of the technology strategy on a long term. We 
feel at least 10 to 15 years should be bridged before we can make a judgment on the 
effectiveness of choosing a technology strategy of a broad scope and a high level of newness 
of technology. The average age of the USO in our dataset (e.g., 5 years)  is too young to test  
the full effect of such a technology strategy. It might be that USO that do succeed in 
commercializing this strategy become very profitable and solid companies. Future research 
might create more clarity in this issue.  
Understanding the factors that determine the success and long-term performance of 
CSO and USO is an important topic of discussion in the literature. Potential factors relate to 
the history, external environment, management, resources, networks and capabilities of these 
spin-offs (Zahra et al., 2006). The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation has 
attempted to incorporate all factors that influence the performance of CSO. Now that a deeper 
insight is created in the relationship between technological resources, technology strategy and 
performance, future research might consider testing the complete theoretical framework by 
including environmental variables and considering the parent-spin-off relationship. 
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8 FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
 
The findings of this dissertation suggest several additional avenues for future study. 
First of all, it would be interesting to further examine the relationship between the CSO/USO 
and its parent. Second, a longitudinal study that tracks the changes in technology strategy 
over time, will add to our understanding of the dynamics of the technology strategy of spin-
off companies. Third, this study has concentrated on the formal technology strategy. Future 
research might instead benefit from emphasizing the informal technology strategy. Fourth, 
more work is needed on the role of spin-offs in an open innovation setting. Finally, more 
attention should be devoted to capture the regional differences in samples. 
 
 
8.1 Relationship Parent –CSO/USO 
Oakey (1995) has argued that two major sources of new high-technology firms are 
higher-education institutions and well-established industrial firms. In this dissertation, we 
have focused on corporate and university spin-offs. Corporate and university spin-offs are 
unique in the sense that they originate from a larger parent institute e.g. an established firm, a 
university or a research institute. The effect of originating from a parent may influence the 
spin-off beyond formation, as the transfer of rules, routines, and procedures from parent to 
progeny organizations can both constrain and empower the spin-off (Brittain & Freeman, 
1986; Romanelli, 1991). These transfers may include unique insights and decision rules used 
to transform resources into action (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), cognitive dimensions of 
competency (Fiol, 1991), and specific knowledge and information (Boeker, 1997). Since 
“what an organization knows at its birth will determine what it searches for, what it 
experiences, and how it interprets what it encounters” (Huber, 1991), one implication is that a 
spin-off’s capability accumulation may be linked to its inherited knowledge and that the 
agent of transfer may have an impact on the efficacy of transfer.  
In this study, we have collected data from the CSO and USO companies, but not from 
the parent institutions. Collecting data at the parent institutions would allow to examine the 
relationship between the parent and the CSO/USO company more closely. In future research, 
it would be interesting to examine the influence of originating from a parent on the 
performance of the spin-off. Potential research questions are: What is the role of the parent in 
creating the spin-off? In case of active support from the parent, is there a more efficient 
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transfer of technology, know-how and IP rights to the spin-off? Or is active support from the 
parent rather constraining in creating the spin-off? An equity ownership by the parent may 
give a strong signal of involvement and potential access to resources, but under which 
conditions is equity ownership by the parent beneficial for the spin-off?  
Moreover, collecting data at the parent institution may allow to take the characteristics 
of the parent firm into account. E.g. are large companies/universities better than small ones in 
generating successful spin-offs? Is the experience of the parent in spinning off firms an 
important determinant for their success? What is the impact of the motivation of a parent to 
create a CSO/USO on the technology strategy and performance of a CSO/USO? Collecting 
data from both the parent institutions and the spin-offs may be useful in answering these 
questions.  
 
 
8.2 Dynamics of Technology Strategy 
Spin-offs tend to operate in dynamic environments where customer tastes, product-
service technologies and competitive weapons often change unpredictably. As a consequence, 
they can not build their strategy based on a detailed competitive analysis. They will rather 
have to rely on strategic alliances and pre-commitments from stakeholders as a way to reduce 
and/or eliminate uncertainty and to erect entry barriers. This assumes a dynamic decision 
making environment which implies that the technology strategy will change over time. 
Moreover, technology strategies must be set in conjunction with the resources the spin-offs 
possess, in order to achieve a competitive advantage. These resources also change during the 
lifetime of the spin-off.  
In this study, we have looked into the technological resources and technology strategy 
at founding and we have examined their relationship with the short term performance of spin-
off companies. We have chosen to look at short term performance, since technology strategy 
is likely to make a difference on short term performance. Long term, successful (or even 
poor) performance may cause companies to alter their strategies which would, later, influence 
performance. CSO and USO use their technological resources and their technology strategy 
to make profits. These profits may allow them to do more R&D or expand their product 
offering which can improve their performance later. This is an ongoing cycle. In future 
research, the data of this study can be used as a starting point to compile a longitudinal 
dataset that will allow to examine the technology strategy of spin-offs on a longitudinal basis. 
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Potential research questions are: How do spin-offs change their technology strategy in 
accordance to the industry there are operating in? What triggers a change in technology 
strategy?  
In a longitudinal study, one could examine how companies approach and organize 
alliances in order to further develop new technologies or to approach new markets. Alliances 
have become an increasingly popular mechanism to supplement and complement a firm’s 
internal R&D efforts (Hagedoorn, 2002). While alliances have been mainly used as a 
mechanism to enter new/foreign markets in the past (Doz & Hamel, 1997), they are now 
increasingly applied as organizational structures to explore new technologies/products and/or 
improve existing technologies/products (Koza & Lewin, 1998). A longitudinal dataset would 
also allow to examine how CSO and USO build up their reputation and compete to create the 
next technology standard.  
 
 
8.3 Formal/Informal Technology Strategy 
In this study, technology strategy was captured by two dimensions: scope and newness 
of technology. The scope of a technology refers to the choice between focusing on a platform 
technology or a specific technology. The newness of technology refers to the innovativeness 
(intellectual component) and uniqueness (tacit component) of the technology. These two 
dimensions are part of the formal technology strategy. An interesting area for future research 
would be to also consider the informal technology strategy. This would allow to include 
knowledge conversion and learning effects.  
The literature suggests that spin-offs often encounter great difficulties in transforming 
their technologies into products and goods that can be quickly commercialized (Roberts, 
1991; Shane, 2004). Invention and discovery require different skills from those needed for 
successful technology commercialization. The spin-offs’ ability to transform their discoveries 
(e.g. innovative technology) into products depends on their prior experiences. The corporate 
or university parent may transfer valuable experience, routines and procedures to their 
progeny spin-offs (Moray & Clarysse, 2005). CSO and USO need the competence to convert 
their technology into market ready products and services or more specifically, spin-offs need 
to develop a knowledge conversion capability. Knowledge conversion means envisioning, 
conceiving and articulating ways in which this knowledge can be used and then integrating 
and embedding this knowledge into new products, goods and services that create value. It is 
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not enough to possess technological knowledge, this knowledge must also be translated into 
products that customers need and value (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). It would be interesting to 
examine how CSO and USO apply their knowledge conversion capability as part of their 
technology strategy.  
Another interesting venue for future research would be to expand the uniqueness of 
technology to include more information on the intellectual property rights. Since CSO and 
USO originate from a parent institute, a transfer of knowledge and technology is most likely 
to take place. Some spin-offs start with a formal transfer of technology from a university or 
corporation in the form of a license of a patent. Others may not have formal transfer 
agreements at their start-up phase. Gaining more insights into the difficulties CSO and USO 
experience in transferring technological knowledge to their companies can add to a better 
understanding of the development of their technology strategy, since the IP strategy of a 
company is part of its technology strategy.  
 
 
8.4 Role of Corporate and University Spin-Offs in Open Innovation 
Models 
The traditional model of innovation developed by large companies used to be 
characterized as the ‘closed innovation’ process. Innovation projects started as new ideas that 
emerged in the central R&D lab, and the best ones received additional development resources 
until a new product could be launched. It was a fully integrated innovation pipeline from 
basic scientific research to the development and commercialization of new products and 
businesses. In the last decade, an increasing number of large firms have abandoned the closed 
innovation system in favor of an open innovation model. More and more, large established 
firms tend to use more flexible innovation strategies in which they rely heavily on externally 
sourced technology (Chesbrough, 2003b). By combining resources and capabilities, 
companies using an open innovation model expand their individual resource base and can 
thereby develop new technologies and products/services beyond their reach. Open innovation 
redefines the boundary between the firm and its surrounding environment, making the firm 
more porous and embedded in loosely coupled networks of different actors, collectively and 
individually working together commercializing new knowledge. 
Open Innovation has been considered so far from the perspective of large, technology 
user established firms (Chesbrough, 2003b). However, Open Innovation is also about 
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technology transactions between at least two actors (firms) and these transactions can only 
continue to take place when both parties can benefit from it. In future research, it would be 
interesting to explore in what way large established firms include corporate and university 
spin-offs in building their knowledge networks. Potential research questions are: While 
setting up open innovation models, do large established firms consider including corporate 
and university spin-offs? What is the role of these corporate and university spin-offs in open 
innovation models? What is the impact of open innovation models on the growth of corporate 
and university spin-offs? How can corporate and university spin-offs benefit from technology 
cooperation with large established firms? How can they avoid opportunistic behavior from 
the latter? 
 
 
8.5 Regional Characteristics of the Sample 
The sample of the study was taken from one region in Belgium, namely Flanders. By 
focusing on this small geographic area, non-measured variance is being reduced. However, 
this focus also includes some unique characteristics to the CSO and USO of this sample. In 
our sample of CSO, none of the CSO were the result of an active corporate venturing policy 
of the parent company. All CSO were set up in anticipation to a spotted opportunity. The 
reason for this is that there are almost no large established firms in Flanders that possess an 
active corporate venturing policy. The past few years, some established firms have started by 
creating a corporate venturing process, but in Flanders, no CSO have been spun off yet. 
Established firms tend to keep their CSO in this process for several years, before spinning 
them off. Therefore, it was not possible to examine the impact such an active corporate 
venturing process has on the technology strategy and performance of CSO. This situation 
may be very different in case a sample of CSO from the United States would be considered. 
In the US, several multinational firms have had an active corporate venturing process e.g. 
Xerox.   
Also the USO sample has some unique characteristics. In Belgium, people tend to go to 
university after graduating from high school. It is no custom to first go to industry, start 
working for several years, and then come back to university to study. In contrary, only in rare 
exceptions do people come back from industry to start an education at the university. The 
same scenario is the case for doctoral students. Doctoral students tend to be hired a few 
months after graduating from university. This implies that most doctoral students do not 
 156
possess any business experience while performing their PhD. Consequently, in case these 
PhD students create a USO, they possess little business experience to transform their 
technologies into a market ready product. Again, this may be very different in case a sample 
of USO from the US would be considered. In the US, it is not that strange to quit your job at 
the age of 40 and to start a PhD. This implies that these people may possess an elaborate 
number of years of business experience. 
In the past, researchers have had the tendency to homogenize their samples. Future 
research could benefit from considering the distinctive characteristics of certain regions. This 
would create more insight into the impact of certain factors unique to the region of the 
companies on the results obtained in several studies.  
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APPENDIX 
 
In our conclusion, we have posited that the initial stage of technology of USO is more 
radical than that of CSO. Consequently, due to a different inheritance, a similar technology 
strategy may have a different impact on performance. We performed an additional analysis to 
test our interpretation of the results. We considered the whole sample of CSO and USO, and 
added a dummy variable (1=CSO; 0=USO). The results from the PLS analysis confirm our 
interpretation.  
 
 
Performance 
Scope->Performance 0.1604 
Newness->Performance -0.1629 
Dummy*Scope->Performance -0.3325* 
Dummy*Newness->Performance 0.4415* 
Age->Performance 0.2332*** 
Experience->Performance 0.1024 
Start capital->Performance 0.4840*** 
Size->Performance 0.0931 
Tech domain->Performance -0.0081 
R2 0.3279 
Table 28: Results of the PLS analysis (* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01) 
 
  
